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Abstract
One of the major ways through which humans overcome complex challenges is
teamwork. When humans share knowledge and information, and cooperate and coor-
dinate towards shared goals, they overcome their individual limitations and achieve
better solutions to difficult problems. The rise of artificial intelligence provides a
unique opportunity to study teamwork between humans and machines, and poten-
tially discover insights about cognition and collaboration that can set the foundation
for a world where humans work with, as opposed to against, artificial intelligence to
solve problems that neither human or artificial intelligence can solve on its own.
To better understand human-machine teamwork, it’s important to understand
human-human teamwork (humans working together) and multi-agent systems (how
artificial intelligence interacts as an agent that’s part of a group) to identify the
characteristics that make humans and machines good teammates. This perspective
lets us approach human-machine teamwork from the perspective of the human as well
as the perspective of the machine. Thus, to reach a more accurate understanding of
how humans and machines can work together, we examine human-machine teamwork
through a series of studies.
In this dissertation, we conducted 4 studies and developed 2 theoretical models:
First, we focused on human-machine cooperation. We paired human partic-
ipants with reinforcement learning agents to play two game theory scenarios where
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individual interests and collective interests are in conflict to easily detect cooperation.
We show that different reinforcement models exhibit different levels of cooperation,
and that humans are more likely to cooperate if they believe they are playing with
another human as opposed to a machine.
Second, we focused on human-machine coordination. We once again paired
humans with machines to create a human-machine team to make them play a game
theory scenario that emphasizes convergence towards a mutually beneficial outcome.
We also analyzed survey responses from the participants to highlight how many of
the principles of human-human teamwork can still occur in human-machine teams
even though communication is not possible.
Third, we reviewed the collective intelligence literature and the prediction
markets literature to develop a model for a prediction market that enables humans
and machines to work together to improve predictions. The model supports artificial
intelligence operating as a peer in the prediction market as well as a complementary
aggregator.
Fourth, we reviewed the team cognition and collective intelligence literature to
develop a model for teamwork that integrates team cognition, collective intelligence,
and artificial intelligence. The model provides a new foundation to think about
teamwork beyond the forecasting domain.
Next, we used a simulation of emergency response management to test the
different teamwork aspects of a variety of human-machine teams compared to human-
human and machine-machine teams. Lastly, we ran another study that used a pre-
diction market to examine the impact that having AI operate as a participant rather
than an aggregator has on the predictive capacity of the prediction market.
Our research will help identify which principles of human teamwork are appli-
cable to human-machine teamwork, the role artificial intelligence can play in enhanc-
iii
ing collective intelligence, and the effectiveness of human-machine teamwork com-
pared to single artificial intelligence. In the process, we expect to produce a substan-
tial amount of empirical results that can lay the groundwork for future research of
human-machine teamwork.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
The goal of this dissertation is to advance our understanding of human-machine
teamwork by studying coordination and cooperation between humans and artificial
intelligence (AI). We examine human-machine teamwork from the perspective of both
the human and the machine by exploring the connections between team cognition and
collective intelligence as they apply to humans and AIs interacting in various ways (AI
as a coordinator, AI as a team-mate, etc) and various scales (small teams, large com-
plex systems, dyadic partnerships). We first review the literature on human-human
teamwork, reinforcement learning, and collective intelligence in order to identify the
key concepts needed to ground human-machine teamwork. Secondly, we implement
two different experiments using different models of human-machine teamwork inspired
by these principles. Lastly, we use our results to make inferences about the ways in
which human-machine teamwork manifests in multiple scales (small teams vs large
crowds) and dimensions (AI playing different roles as part of the team).
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1.2 Problem Motivation
One of the major forces that will influence the course of humanity in the next
century is the development of artificial intelligence (AI). Specifically, the primary
objective of contemporary artificial intelligence research is the development of arti-
ficial general intelligence (AGI): a strong AI that would theoretically be capable of
matching and eventually outperforming human intelligence across a variety of dif-
ferent tasks where intelligence plays a decisive role [Goertzel and Pennachin, 2007].
AGI differs from narrow AI in that it holds a true understanding of itself and its envi-
ronment that makes it capable of easily transferring learning between different tasks
[Pennachin and Goertzel, 2007]. A major unfortunate consequence of this pursuit is
the attempt at rendering human effort obsolete by automating away the roles hu-
mans play in complex processes. However, more closely examining human-machine
partnerships at both the micro and macro level suggests that prioritizing joint ef-
forts between humans and AIs will result in much higher degrees of effectiveness and
progress.
At the micro level, prior research suggests that effective human-machine part-
nerships outperform not just human teams, but also sophisticated AI systems. One
of the major areas where this insight is self-evident is the healthcare domain. For
example, in cancer detection, teams of doctors partnering with machine learning algo-
rithms outperformed both expert teams as well as state-of-the-art neural networks in
diagnosing cancer [Wang et al., 2016]. Specifically, although the AI’s error rate was
2.9% when compared to the average pathologist’s 3.5%, the pair working together
had a collective error rate of 0.5%. In this context, five times as many effective diag-
noses were performed by the human-machine team than by the AI alone, potentially
impacting the lives of the many people afflicted with cancer each year. These results
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are not outliers, and are part of a broader pattern. For instance, recent studies of
children’s infections, which are notoriously challenging to diagnose, showed that an
AI processing the patient’s electronic health records had an 86.2% accuracy rate when
compared to the average experienced doctor’s 75% rate. However, tuning the algo-
rithm to minimize false negatives at the expense of minimizing false positives, and
having the doctors integrate their own perception and judgment in the diagnosis led
to a 99.4% detection rate of deadly infections that claim the lives of children every
year. In both instances, the AI’s performance alone would have justified the incor-
rect inference that the doctor was no longer necessary, which would have resulted in
massive losses in accurate diagnoses by failing to take into account the possibility of
humans and AIs working together.
At the macro-level, the interactions between large groups of humans and AIs
give rise to complex systems that can be challenging to manage. For example, in
stock markets and financial marketplaces, “Flash Crashes” can have disastrous conse-
quences. A ”Flash Crash” occurs when financial security prices collapse rapidly within
a short-time window [Bozdog et al., 2011]. On May 6, 2010, all major stock market
indexes collapsed within a 36 minute window, with the Dow Jones Industrial Average
having its biggest intraday decline in history [Kirilenko et al., 2017]. Prior to the un-
precedented rebound, over $1 trillion in market capitalization was lost [Grocer, 2010].
Similarly, on October 7, 2016, the value of the British pound fell over 6%, which put
it at its lowest level against the dollar since May 1985 [Ismail and Mnyanda, 2016].
These extreme events were the result of High Frequency Trading (HFT) algorithms
reacting to each other’s buy and sell orders, which in turn triggered a negative feed-
back loop that exaggerated a downward market move. These kinds of chaotic chain
reactions can lead to catastrophic consequences for any complex system that does
not take into account the feedback loops between human and machine behavior. Fur-
3
thermore, whether humans and AIs can cooperate at a larger scale is still an open
question. Recent research published in Nature shows how bots attempting to solve a
graph coloring problem, a matching task that requires high levels of coordination, fail
to achieve a globally optimal solution [Shirado and Christakis, 2017]. Essentially, the
bots can successfully coordinate on a micro-level but fail to do so on a macro-level,
thereby preventing the collective goal of a stable match to occur. However, the study
also points to a way to transcend such limitations: adding humans to the team and
nudging attempts at coordination through a separate type of bot that pushes the
humans and AIs to communicate even at large scales [Shirado and Christakis, 2017].
All of these examples hold a key characteristic in common: the initial results in
AI performance would have justified the erroneous conclusion that human expertise
should be disregarded because of superior AI performance, when in fact ensembling
the two results in major improvements compared to AI performance alone. These
successes in having humans and AIs work together, at both the micro and macro
level, can be attributed to the unique advantages that emerge from harvesting human
and AI potential in a compatible and integrated way, and should pave the way for
more research of this kind. In essence, studying human-machine teamwork enables
Human Computer Interaction (HCI) to shape the future of AI development in a
human-centered direction.
1.3 Research Motivations
AI has the ability to contribute in many different facets of teamwork by playing
a variety of roles such as coordinator, decision-aid, agent, and teammate. Therefore,
human-machine teamwork encompasses a wide variety of sub-disciplines that sit at the
intersection between cognitive science and computer science. Thus human-machine
4
teamwork in all of its forms (micro vs macro, autonomous vs automated) can only
be understood through an interdisciplinary perspective. To that end, we identify
the two core research fields that are needed to understand the role AI can play in
teamwork, as well as the theoretical and empirical gaps that exist when it comes to
human-machine teamwork specifically.
1.3.1 Human-Human Teamwork
Human teamwork is the obvious starting point to ground research in human-
machine teamwork. Decades worth of prior research have begun to understand the
principles that govern human teamwork, with concepts such as shared situational
awareness, transactive memory, and team cognition [Cooke et al., 2012]. However,
human-machine teamwork has been comparatively under-researched because of strong
technical limitations that have historically been encountered when building agents [?].
Up until recently, most research was restricted to either the robotic domain or contexts
where the human had a supervisory role on an automated system [Gao et al., 2016,
Sheridan and Telerobotics, 1992]. Despite those limitations however, breakthroughs
in cognitive modeling and artificial intelligence recently opened up the opportunity
to study humans interacting with machines at a peer-level [Sun et al., 2006].
Yet, only a limited amount of empirical research has been conducted on hu-
mans interacting with autonomous (as opposed to automated) agents in a team set-
ting, especially looking at the presence of characteristics of successful human team-
work [Demir et al., 2017]. Specifically, whether the assumptions of the human-human
teamwork paradigm will end up being validated in human-machine teams is now
an open question, as contemporary research has begun to question whether human
teamwork should be the model that drives the design and experimentation of human-
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machine teams in the first place [McNeese et al., 2019]. Thus, a major gap exists in
the literature with regards to empirically testing whether the principles of human-
human teamwork will prove as decisive in human-machine team performance as they
are in human team performance.
1.3.2 Collective Intelligence
Collective intelligence (also known as “the wisdom of the crowd”) refers to
the emergence of a globally optimal solution from the proper aggregation of individ-
ual information that exceeds what any individual would be capable of on their own
[Watkins, 2007]. Collective intelligence can emerge in large crowds of humans cor-
rectly guessing the number of jelly beans in a jar, in complex multi-agent systems of
AIs solving complex resource allocation problems, and in humans and AIs working to-
gether to solve graph coloring problems [Surowiecki, 2005, Shirado and Christakis, 2017].
Thus, collective intelligence can be understood as the large scale equivalent of many
of the emergent cognitive properties of good teamwork.
The major research avenue for collective intelligence is prediction markets:
mechanisms that enable participants to bet on future events in the way stock traders
place bets in the stock market in anticipation of corporate earnings [Surowiecki, 2005].
The way collective intelligence manifests itself in prediction markets is through re-
markable forecasting accuracy, far above that of individual or expert level judgement.
Studies of the use of prediction markets in sports [Goel et al., 2010] and politics
[Hanson, 2003] have shown orders of magnitude improvements in forecasting accu-
racy between other methodologies and prediction markets.
However, prediction markets are far from perfect. Even though they exhibit
high degrees of signal processing by compensating for overconfidence as well as under-
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confidence, they still face severe limitations [Hanson, 2003]. Specifically, major biases
such as sampling error, market maker bias, and convergence error have been iden-
tified as unique barriers to collective intelligence emerging [Dudik et al., 2017]. The
majority of prior research has focused on addressing these issues through the design of
better calibration methods, which unfortunately have turned out to be unsuccessful
[Chen et al., 2005].
Furthermore, comparatively little research exists on the role AI can play in
improving the collective intelligence of a prediction market. The few studies that exist
on the subject focus on developing randomized bots whose trading patterns induce
human participants to improve their forecasts [Malone, 2018]. This gap presents a
major research opportunity to integrate the recent advancements in machine learning
into prediction markets. Specifically, there are two major ways in which AI can be
studied: hybrid prediction markets (where AIs and humans participate at a peer-level)
and machine-learning-based aggregators (AI receiving a prediction market’s trading
data as its input in order to produce more accurate predictions).
Thus, a major gap exists in the literature with regards to how humans and AI
can interact as a team at a large scale in order to produce collective intelligence.
1.3.3 Research Objective & Questions
The main objectives of this dissertation are to (a) identify the similarities
and differences between human-machine teamwork, human-human teamwork, and
machine-machine teamwork; (b) explore the unique ways in which team cognition
emerges in human-machine teams; (c) identify the ways in which AI can enhance col-
lective intelligence in human-machine teamwork; and (d) develop empirically-backed
design guidelines for the integration of AI in prediction markets;
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These following main research areas and research questions will address the
gaps in the research and this dissertation’s main objectives:
Understanding team cognition in human-machine teams
RQ1: Which principles of human teamwork are applicable to human-machine teams?
RQ2: In what ways do human-machine teams outperform machine-machine teams?
RQ3: What are the performance tradeoffs between human-human, human-machine,
and machine-machine teams?
Understanding collective intelligence in human-machine teamwork
RQ4: Do human-machine multi-agent systems exhibit higher degrees of collective in-
telligence than human-only systems?
RQ5: Can collective intelligence be used as the input to artificial intelligence?
RQ6: Which machine learning approaches are best suited for prediction markets?
Research Gaps Research Questions
There is a lack of understanding with regards to the extent
RQ1 and RQ2
to which team cognition is possible in human-machine teams
There is a lack of clarity as to what principles
RQ1
of human-teamwork apply to human-machine teams
Few guidelines exist as to how to optimally
RQ2 and RQ3
configure human-machine teams
The literature has tended to restrict AI research to
RQ2 and RQ5
the purpose of automating human effort
Very little research exists studying the use of
RQ4, RQ5 and RQ6artificial intelligence to enhance collective intelligence
of both human crowds as well as human-machine teams
Table 1.1: Research Gaps and Research Questions
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To better understand how these research questions were developed based on
the gaps within the literature; the following tables have been constructed 1.1 which
links the research questions to the specific research gap.
1.3.4 Overview & Summary of Studies
To achieve the research objectives outlined previously, we conducted 4 studies
and developed 2 new models from the literature:
Study 1: Game Theory for Teams. Recent advancements in reinforcement
learning have expanded the type of models available to conduct agent-based machine
learning research. To that end, many of these models have not been studied from
an HCI perspective. This study employs a new methodology that leverages game
theory from an HCI perspective to investigate the extent to which both AI and
human players alter their strategic behavior when interacting in cooperative and non-
cooperative scenarios. After conducting a large scale study of human and AI gameplay
across multiple game theory models, the results indicate that different reinforcement
learning models cooperate differently with humans, and that human players display
biases towards AI that influence the extent to which they end up cooperating in social
dilemmas [Barberis Canonico et al., 2019d].
Study 2: Human-Machine Teams as Multi-Agent Systems. Under-
standing human-machine teams requires bridging the gap between human teamwork
and multi-agent systems. To that end, we conducted a study where human par-
ticipants were paired up with reinforcement learning agents to play a game theory
scenario that emphasizes cooperation. Results indicate that human biases in favor
or against AI have significant effects on aggression and peacefulness, and that shared
understanding plays a major role in cooperation [Barberis Canonico et al., 2019b].
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Both of these studies served as the foundation for our approach to human-
machine teamwork by leveraging game theory models to observe how machines change
their cooperative behavior when playing with humans and vice versa. Our results in-
formed our understanding that many team cognition aspects can emerge from human-
machine teams even when communication is not possible.
Model A: Human-Centered Prediction Markets. There is an ever-
growing literature on the power of prediction markets to harness “the wisdom of
the crowd” from large groups of people; however, traditional prediction markets are
not designed in a human-centered way, often restricting their own potential. This
creates the opportunity to implement a cognitive science perspective on how to en-
hance the collective intelligence of the participants. Thus, we proposed a new model
for prediction markets that integrates human factors, cognitive science, game the-
ory, and machine learning to maximize collective intelligence. We do this by iden-
tifying the connections between prediction markets and collective intelligence, using
human factors techniques to analyze our design, and outlining the practical ways
with which our design enables artificial intelligence to complement human intelligence
[Barberis Canonico et al., 2019c].
Model B: Collectively Intelligent Teamwork. We proposed a new model
for teamwork that integrates team cognition, collective intelligence, and artificial in-
telligence. We did this by first characterizing what sets team cognition and collective
intelligence apart, and then reviewing the literature on “superforecasting” and the
ability for effectively coordinated teams to outperform predictions by large groups.
Lastly, we delved into the ways in which teamwork can be enhanced by artificial intel-
ligence through our model, highlighting the many areas of research worth exploring
through interdisciplinary efforts [Barberis Canonico et al., 2019a].
Both of the models are currently published conceptual models and this disser-
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tation empirically tested them through the 2 studies outlined below:
Study 3: Team Cognition in Human-Machine Teams. We tested the
team cognition aspects (shared understanding, shared situational awareness, etc) of
a variety of human-machine teams through a simulation of emergency response man-
agement. We also compared human-machine teams’ performance against that of
human-only and machine-only teams, while also gaining a qualitative understanding
of the factors examined in Study 1 and 2.
Study 4: Human-Machine Collective Intelligence in Prediction Mar-
kets. We implemented model A to empirically test the model and gain insight into
the role artificial intelligence can play in the enhancement of collective intelligence.
We studied prediction markets as a human-machine teamwork problem by looking at
the impact that having AI operate as a participant rather than an aggregator has on
the predictive capacity of the prediction market.
Overall, we sought to study the cognitive implications of human-machine team-
work at the micro level through team cognition and at the macro level through col-
lective intelligence. The insight gained through these studies will apply to human
teamwork and multi-agent systems by covering both perspectives through the con-
ceptual basis of human teamwork and the computational foundation of contemporary
reinforcement learning.
1.3.5 Conclusion
Research on human-machine teamwork is critical to alter the trajectory of AI
research towards enhancing human potential by leveraging the best features of each
cognition: human cognition as well as machine cognition. Given that human-machine
interactions can occur at multiple levels of decision-making, as well as in a variety of
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goal-oriented settings, it’s important to establish strong methodological foundations
that can yield insights into how to develop AI in a way that optimizes the human-
machine partnership. In the process, it’s very likely that valuable contributions will
be made to multiple areas of science, ranging from HCI to cognitive science.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
2.1 Overview
Pursuant of the interdisciplinary nature of this proposal, a wide variety of
theoretical constructs need to be established to ground our perspective on human-
machine teamwork. This chapter establishes the theoretical foundations of human-
machine teaming (the current state of the research), reinforcement learning (the ma-
chine learning paradigm underlying AI in all of our studies), team cognition (the
principal concept in Study 3), and collective intelligence (the basis for Study 4).
Each theory explains a particular emergent phenomenon from different ensembles of
agents (human and AI) as they engage in a shared form of information processing that
cannot be understood at the individual level. For each theory, we begin by summa-
rizing the literature as it applies to groups of humans, and then identify models and
concepts from the theory that can extend and generalize to human-machine teams.
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2.2 Human-Machine Teamwork
2.2.1 HAT: Human-Autonomy Teaming vs Human-Automation
Teaming
Traditional perspectives on human-machine teamwork have evolved out of cog-
nitive science and human factors research in the interaction design and evaluation of
humans interacting with different degrees of automated technology [Vagia et al., 2016,
Demir et al., 2017]. A new perspective was introduced when technology reached a
point where it could function independently of human action, thus leading to an
automation-vs-autonomy divide. The divide is understood to be predicated upon
the degree to which human control determines the technology’s actions: automa-
tion refers to systems that exactly follow their programmed instructions without
independent action, whereas autonomy refers to systems who make their own task-
related decisions independently of human control [Vagia et al., 2016]. A more con-
temporary definition of autonomy is given by Endsley (2015), as a system with
intelligence-based capabilities to respond to situations outside of the range of the
possibilities considered at the design phase. Much of the prior work in this area
has been related to human-robot teaming and human control of automation in a
supervisory role [Gao et al., 2016, Sheridan and Telerobotics, 1992]. However, new
technologies have expanded the realm of possible machine teammates humans can
interact with (Ex. hazard warning systems, virtual agents, decision-support systems,
etc) [McNeese et al., 2019].
From a human teamwork perspective, human-autonomy teaming is most anal-
ogous to human-human teamwork because both AI and human teammates interact
through a peer-relationship as opposed to a master-subordinate relationship (Adler,
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1997). Therefore, human-machine teaming originates from the human-autonomy lit-
erature because both conceptual models share the basic characteristic of humans and
machines engaging in interdependent behaviors towards a common goal [McNeese et al., 2019].
2.2.2 Major Results in Human-Machine Teamwork
Prior research has approached the question of human-machine teamwork through
several different methodologies. For example, Fan et al (2010) developed an agent
based on the naturalistic decision-making model of cognition, and their findings
suggest that the agent can help human decision-makers by improving situational
awareness albeit at the expense of higher cognitive load. Identifying these trade-
offs is an important step to develop a precise understanding of the ways in which
human-machine teams differ from human-human teams. Other research by Chiou
and Lee (2016) have demonstrated that the cooperative behavior of machine agents
in joint resource management and scheduling tasks has a meaningful impact on overall
team performance. More recently, comparative studies of human-machine teams and
human-human teams in a simulation highlighted team-level communication and co-
ordination deficiencies in human-autonomy teams [McNeese et al., 2019]. The same
methodology has produced findings highlighting the importance of situational aware-
ness and team synchrony in human-autonomy teaming as well [McNeese et al., 2018,
Ball et al., 2010].
At a higher level, Klein et al (2004) developed a series of principles to set up
robust foundations for human-machine teams:
1. To be a team player, an intelligent agent must fulfill the requirements of a Basic
Compact to engage in common-grounding activities
2. To be an effective team player, intelligent agents must be able to adequately
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model the other participants’ intentions and actions vis-à-vis the joint activity’s
state and evolution
3. Human-agent team members must be mutually predictable.
4. Agents must be directable
5. Agents must be able to make pertinent aspects of their status and intentions
obvious to their teammates
6. Agents must be able to observe and interpret pertinent signals of status and
intentions
7. Agents must be able to engage in goal negotiation.
8. Support technologies for planning and autonomy must enable a collaborative
approach
9. Agents must be able to participate in managing attention
10. All team members must help control the costs of coordinated activity
They summarized much of the literature on human-machine teamwork not just
by identifying these principles, but also delving deeply into why they are so important
to the effectiveness of human-machine teams. They point out that team coordination
between humans and machines can only occur if there is a commitment to goal align-
ment that can facilitate coordination towards shared goals [Klien et al., 2004]. Pre-
dictability also plays a major role because many team-related actions rely on a highly
interdependent set of activities that are only possible if the team has developed shared
knowledge through extended experience in working together [Klien et al., 2004]. Di-
rectability on the other hand refers to the ability to assess and change actions to adapt
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to a dynamic environment, and it plays a key role in the team’s ability to effectively re-
spond to activities that require high levels of coordination [Christoffersen and Woods, 2002].
This principle has led researchers to focus on developing ways for humans to control
aspects of agent autonomy in a way that can be dynamically specified and easily
understood [Christoffersen and Woods, 2002].
Klein et al’s (2004) model for human-machine teamwork has profoundly shaped
many of the design choices of agents for human-machine teams. Specifically, prior
research in mixed human-robotics team used these principles to design a general-
purpose agent to manage collaboration and support human-agent, human-human,
and agent-agent interactions [Allen and Ferguson, 2002]. Yet, despite these results,
progress in the area of human-machine teamwork has been limited by several factors.
2.2.3 Limitations and Research Gaps
The primary barrier to human-autonomy research has been technical. The
development of highly autonomous agents that can effectively interact with humans
and adapt to dynamic environments has proven non-trivial across a variety of domains
[Klien et al., 2004]. It’s been particularly challenging to study team-related concepts
that involve high degrees of communication because natural language processing,
especially at the sophisticated level required to match human-human communication,
is still an open problem [Bates and Weischedel, 2006]. However, recent breakthroughs
in reinforcement learning (highlighted in the next section) provide a new opportunity
to build sophisticated, general-purpose AIs.
On the other hand, many of the research gaps highlighted in the Introduction
still exist because our understanding of human-human teamwork grows more sophis-
ticated with the passage of time, generating a wealth of concepts, models, and princi-
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ples that may or may not apply to human-machine teams and have yet to be studied
[McNeese et al., 2019]. Fundamentally, it is still not clear what many of the similar-
ities and differences between human-human teams and human-autonomy teams are,
and only a small amount of evidence exists actually validating the assumption that
human teamwork should be the basis for our understanding and design of human-
machine teams [McNeese et al., 2019]. For example, even though team situational
awareness and interactive team cognition have been identified as critical components
of successful human-human teams, very little empirical evidence suggests this is the
case for human-machine teams [Demir et al., 2017]. Prior research in command-and-
control environments suggests that it’s very likely that human-machine teamwork
requires the human to compensate for the machine’s shortcomings and unpredictabil-
ity through specific mental models [Endsley, 2015].
2.2.4 Relationship to the Dissertation
This dissertation addresses many of the historical limitations of HAT research
by incorporating reinforcement learning (explained in the next section) as the machine
learning paradigm to build teammates for human-machine teams. This decision will
establish a methodology that can generalize to a variety of settings, unlike prior
research.
Furthermore, the invitation by the current human-machine literature to ex-
plore alternatives to the human-human model of teamwork as the reference point is
accepted. This dissertation looks at human-machine teamwork at different scales:
dyads in Study 1 and Study 2, triads in Study 3, and complex systems in Study 4.
Yet, all of these approaches are motivated by the same goal of the current state of
the research: this dissertation seeks to identify universal principles of human-machine
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teamwork that are broadly applicable to a variety of settings.
2.3 Reinforcement Learning
2.3.1 Background
Reinforcement learning (RL) refers to a class of machine learning algorithms
based on behavioral models where behaviors are rewarded and punished until a
reward-maximizing policy mapping situations to actions is discovered [Tuyls and Weiss, 2012].
Furthermore, RL agents have to balance exploration and exploitation: exploration
can lead to the discovery of new actions and better values over time, while ex-
ploitation leads to the selection of the best action available at the time to maximize
rewards [Tuyls and Weiss, 2012]. Such tradeoffs are optimized through a series of
hyper-parameters and algorithms unique to each RL model.
In recent years RL has gained attention for its performance in Go, Chess, soc-
cer, and Atari games [Hu et al., 1998, Foerster et al., 2018]. In many of these scenar-
ios, such as GO and Dota2, RL proved its usefulness in environments where self-play
is possible or where knowledge about other agents is not as important. In both cases,
the complexity of the resulting behavior far exceeded that of the environment, and
self-play produced a perfectly tuned curriculum for each task [Bansal et al., 2017].
Specifically, DeepMind’s research has shown that Deep Q-Networks (combining con-
volutional neural networks for feature representation with Q-learning training) can
achieve superhuman performance in Atari games despite only having access to board
states and reward signals [Tampuu et al., 2017].
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2.3.2 Game Theory and Reinforcement Learning as the Foun-
dation for human-machine Multi-Agent Systems
Game theory is the study of the decision-making behavior of reward-maximizing
agents in strategic situations [Von Neumann et al., 2007]. It integrates economics and
math to provide a framework that encodes incentive structures in a way that can be
understood by both the human (through games) and the AI (through matrices).
The fundamental theorem of game theory developed by John Nash guarantees that
in every game there will be a set of strategies that each player will converge to as
they mutually respond to each other: this is known as the Nash Equilibrium (NE)
[Nash et al., 1950].
However, it is often the case that the NE results in an outcome that is either
suboptimal or collectively harmful to the players, and yet is inescapable because it
emerges from each agent not having a strictly better alternative given their expecta-
tion of the behavior of the other players [Bab and Brafman, 2008]. Such dilemmas
can only be resolved through coordinated and joint strategies, by all the players, that
will result in optimal rewards for the group as a whole [de Cote et al., 2006]. Coor-
dination, cooperation, reciprocity, and fairness are always contingent on the players’
preferences, which are in turn systematically influenced by the game’s incentives, and
can be designed to tie rewards to collaborative outcomes [Erev and Roth, 1998].
2.3.3 Challenges and Limitations
In situations where multiple NEs exist, learning one NE strategy does not nec-
essarily guarantee that the other players will select the same NE strategy, leading to
vastly higher levels of complexity [Hu et al., 1998]. Prior research has shown that in
a multi-player setting, RL agents converge towards a NE strategy only through my-
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opic actions, training with specific trials, or Q-learning-optimizing greedy algorithms.
Often, the agents end up stuck in a local optimum because of the associated costs of
exploration [Hu et al., 1998]. Thus, despite their prowess, RL agents are susceptible
to game-theory induced dilemmas.
Two major results point to the game-theoretical deficiencies of RL agents.
First, in zero-sum games, RL agents overestimate their future discounted rewards to
be near 0.5 when the expectation between two equally skilled players would make it
zero [Tampuu et al., 2017]. Secondly, in infinitely repeated Prisoner’s dilemmas with
discounting, randomly initialised RL agents collapse into independent and uncooper-
ative strategies with high probability, failing to learn to cooperate reliably over time
by not considering the learning process of the other players [Foerster et al., 2018].
However, up until recently it was not possible to explore the strategic behavior
of such a huge variety of RL models in a game theory context. Specifically, much
empirical research about the behavior of RL agents with human players is missing.
RL uniquely lends itself to the study of human-machine cooperation because there
are multiple game theory scenarios that enable both types of players to work together
as a multi-agent system.
2.3.4 Relationship to the Dissertation
RL is the most useful machine learning paradigm to study human-machine
teamwork with because RL agents solve problems by learning through trial and error
without pre-assigned models. This characteristic of independence, alongside their
demonstrated useful across a variety of problems, makes them perfectly suitable for
studies where the human-AI interaction is two-sided as opposed to one-sided. Multi-
agent systems are the closest analogues to teams in pure AI settings, thus the insights
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we gain from that area are important components to understand machine behavior in
human-machine teams. Game theory plays a major role in the cooperative outcomes
of multi-agent systems, and provides the perfect interface to encode complex strategic
situations and incentive structures in a way that enables humans and RL agents to
interact on an even playing field. This insight motivates the methodology employed
in Study 1 and Study 2 to precisely visualize how humans and machines change
their default strategic behavior when interacting with one another. Game theory
especially is an important framework to understand how to design RL agents whose
reward structures incentivize cooperation with humans.
2.4 Team Cognition
2.4.1 Overview
The concept of a team naturally lies at the core of team cognition. As opposed
to mere groups, teams are composed of members who have specified roles and respon-
sibilities related to solving and working on complex tasks. As such, even though all
teams are groups, not all groups are teams, making teams a form of highly special-
ized groups [McNeese et al., 2014a]. Salas and colleagues (1992) characterize teams
as sets of people who interact dynamically, interdependently, and adaptively toward
a common and valued goal/object/mission [Salas et al., 1992].
Most of our knowledge pertaining to teamwork is founded on the basis of
human- human interactions, including our understanding of situation awareness,
teamwork and taskwork knowledge, transactive memory, and team cognition in all-
human teams [Cooke et al., 2012].
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2.4.2 Human Teamwork
At the heart of team effectiveness is communication, for it’s the foundation of
coordination towards the common objective. Variations on how each team communi-
cates across interactions in tasks and subtasks are a major predictor of performance
[McNeese et al., 2014a]. As the team acquires, shares and processes information, a
larger cognitive process occurs, which has led prior researchers to characterize teams
as information processing units that allow for the attention, encoding, storage, re-
trieval, and processing of information [Hinsz et al., 1997].
One of the most important aspects of teamwork is team cognition. Team
cognition is the glue that can hold a team together by improving communication, co-
ordination, and awareness of the associated teamwork. In its most simple form, team
cognition allows for the development of a shared understanding of both teamwork
and taskwork [Mohammed et al., 2010]. Team cognition is both a process (commu-
nication and coordination) and an output (shared mental model) [Fiore et al., 2010].
There are two main perspectives that conceptualize team cognition: 1) shared knowl-
edge approach, 2) ecological interaction approach [McNeese and Cooke, 2016]. The
shared knowledge approach is defined by an input-process-output paradigm where
the input is individual team members’ knowledge, the process is the sharing of the
knowledge, and the output is shared cognition typically represented in the form of a
shared mental model [Mohammed et al., 2010]. The ecological interaction approach
states that team cognition is team interaction, thus there is significant focus on com-
munication and coordination at the team level [Cooke et al., 2012]. This approach
also explicitly notes that context must be taken into account when considering team
cognition.
It’s vital to note that team cognition is not simply the sum of the individ-
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Figure 2.1: Areas of Team Cognition Research
ual cognitions of the team members, but rather the team-level cognition emerging
from the interactions of the team members. Many activities team members carry
out are done so independently without team-level interactions, thus team cognition
is an emergent phenomenon that develops depending on the situation and context
[Cooke et al., 2007].
A major finding in team cognition research is that team cognition directly
affects team performance. Researchers have noted on multiple occasions that a lack
of or breakdown in team cognition may lead to decreased team performance (Wilson
et al., 2007). Similarly, it is found that the development of team cognition improves
team performance [Cooke et al., 2007, Cooke et al., 2012].
A summary of the different research areas involved in team cognition research
are highlighted in Figure 2.1, which has been repurposed with permission from the
author [McNeese et al., 2014b]:
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2.4.3 Shared Mental Models
A major theory of team cognition is the shared knowledge perspective. This
theory is predicated upon shared mental models. Mental models as the mechanisms
that enable humans to describe and explain a system’s purpose, form, function, and
predictable future states [Rouse and Morris, 1986]. Mental models emerge from in-
dividual cognition, and much in the same way shared mental models emerge from
individuals interacting at the team level. Team mental models are thus an emer-
gent property of team cognition as the team members developed a shared under-
standing and mental representations of knowledge about the team’s environment
[Cannon-Bowers et al., 1990, McNeese and Cooke, 2016].
Prior research highlights how compatible, shared mental models lie at the
foundation of the ability for experienced teams to coordinate, anticipate, predict, and
adapt to both the tasks as well as to each other’s needs [Fiore et al., 2010]. Mental
models are not merely shared through communication, but also through extended
observation. These factors enable each team member to describe, explain, and predict
future events at the team level [Graham et al., 2004, Mathieu et al., 2000]. Moreover,
team mental models are often evaluated in terms of similarity, which in this context
refers to the extent to which a team members’ knowledge structure is akin to that of an
experts’ structure [Hamilton et al., 2010]. Related research has highlighted how social
network distance and physical distance are major predictors of team mental model
similarity, as well as how high levels of communication and strengths of observation
magnify the team’s shared understanding of individual responsibility and work habits
high levels [Graham et al., 2004].
An alternative perspective on team mental models breaks them down into
taskwork and teamwork models. Research under this perspective has shown that
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both type of mental models are positively related to team performance, and that
team processes fully mediate the relationship between team effectiveness and mental
model converge [Mathieu et al., 2000]. However, many researchers have rejected the
view that there is a single mental model that is shared among teammates, and instead
argue that multiple mental models are shared throughout the team decision-making
process [Salas et al., 1992, Klimoski and Mohammed, 1994]. Under this view, there
are four primary mental models:
1. The equipment model: the different types of technology and equipment that
the team uses to accomplish tasks.
2. The task model: the procedures, environments, and tasks the team perceives.
3. The team interaction model: the collection of each team member’s assumptions,
perceptions, and understanding of their teammates’ norms, responsibilities, and
interactions.
4. The team model: the teammates’ represents teammates’ understanding of each
other’s attributes, knowledge, and skills.
Beyond classifying team mental models by their content, the literature outlines
two other majors classification criteria for mental models: accuracy and similarity
[McNeese et al., 2014b]. The former refers to how precisely the mental model matches
the real world, as well as the extent to which the team’s knowledge structure mimics
that of an expert [Edwards et al., 2006, Hamilton et al., 2010, Webber et al., 2000].
The latter refers shared knowledge understood as the degree to which the mental
models of the team members’ are consistent with each other or converge without
becoming identical [Cannon-Bowers et al., 1990, Mohammed et al., 2010]. This ac-
curacy is useful in determining the strength of a team’s mental model.
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Outside of mental model classification, prior research has focused on investi-
gating mental model convergence among teammates. Mental model convergence oc-
curs through the continuous interplay between communication and interaction among
teammates. As team members collect information and observe their teammates’ be-
havior, their individual mental model evolves into a team mental model, thereby
shifting the cognitive focus to the team level [McComb, 2007]. This converge pro-
cesses occurs through three distinct phases: orientation, differtation, and integration
. After these three phases, the team converges towards a shared understanding of
the model, which is not static but rather is dynamic as the team cycles through the
processes in order to adapt to their environment [McComb et al., 2010].
2.4.4 Multi-level theory and Macrocognition
Shared mental models speak to the team’s cognitive process in the realm of
perception. At the decision-making level, the best-known theory is multi-level theory,
which identifies four levels of decision-making that are eventually aggregated once a
decision happens at the team level [Hollenbeck et al., 1998, Hancock and Szalma, 2008]:
1. Decision Level: at the ground level, the individual team members acquire in-
formation and make local decisions to solve specific problems, yet lack the in-
formation to solve global problems.
2. Individual Level: at this level the individual makes recommendations to the
leader, which can be degrees away or towards the correct decision for the team.
3. Dyadic Level: at this level, the degree to which a team leader correctly weighs
each team member’s recommendation to arrive at a decision for the whole team.
4. Team level: at this level, the team’s hierarchy is tested as the leader seeks to
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optimally use and rely on all team member’s lower level of analysis.
The results from 380 individuals arrayed into 95 four- person teams work-
ing on a simulated naval command and control task indicated that the constructs
specified by this theory accounted for over half of the variance in team performance
[Hollenbeck et al., 1998].
The multi-level decision-making process often implies a hierarchy, but this
kind of cognitive behavior can also be explained through the lenses of macrocogni-
tion, which refers to “the internalized and externalized high-level mental processes
employed by teams to create new knowledge during complex, one-of-a-kind, collabo-
rative problem solving” [Letsky et al., 2007]. These team processes create new infor-
mation that the team then utilizes to solve the problem, and they don’t necessarily
occur purely through observable communication. Prior research identifies five key
stages along with fourteen cognitive processes [Letsky et al., 2007]:
1. Individual Knowledge Building
(a) Iterative Information Collection
(b) Individual Task Knowledge Development
(c) Individual Mental Model Development
2. Team Knowledge Building
(a) Pattern recognition and Trend Analysis of Team Mental Model Develop-
ment
(b) Recognition of Expertise
(c) Sharing Unique Knowledge
(d) Uncertainty Reduction
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(e) Knowledge Interoperability
3. Developing Shared Problem Conceptualization
(a) Visualization and representation of meaning or Building common ground
(b) Knowledge sharing and transfer
(c) Team Shared Understanding
4. Team Consensus Development
(a) Critical thinking
(b) Mental simulation
(c) Intuitive Decision Making
(d) Iterative Information Collection
(e) Solution Option Generation
(f) Storyboarding
(g) Team Pattern Recognition
(h) Negotiation of Solution Alternatives
5. Outcome Appraisal
(a) Feedback structure
(b) Replanning
(c) Team Pattern Recognition
These cognitive processes however are not just theoretical constructs useful in
understanding how teams operate: they are also observable in the differential per-
formance of optimal teams when compared to sub-optimal ones [Letsky et al., 2007].
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However, teams are by no means perfect, and often face observable constraints on
their cognitive capacity.
2.4.5 Functional Theory
The functional theory of group decision-making focuses on the outcomes of
the interactions and processes that make teams effective, and it formalizes a set of
assumptions: groups a goal oriented, performance and behavior can be evaluated,
group interactions are variable and can be evaluated, and lastly group performance
is influenced by both internal and external factors [McNeese et al., 2014b]. Further-
more, it attributes improved group decision-making to the effectiveness of the group
as a whole.
Most research from the functional perspective focuses on the relationship be-
tween group decision-making and the team’s ability to satisfy five primary functions
[Orlitzky and Hirokawa, 2001] :
1. Problem Analysis : The group must develop a thorough and accurate under-
standing of the nature of, the criticality of, the likely cause of, and consequences
of the problem
2. Establishment of Evaluation Criteria: The group must develop standards to
define, understand, and evaluate a successful response to the problem among
alternatives
3. Generation of Alternative Solutions : The group must develop realistic alter-
native solutions to the problem while operating under the assumption that a
correct solution exists.
4. Evaluation of Positive Consequences of Solutions : Given that there will be
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multiple options to select from, it is critical that the group understand and
analyze the positive merits of each developed alternative solution.
5. Evaluation of Negative Consequences of Solutions : The group must weigh the
negative consequences in the same way it weighs positive consequences in order
to work a common understanding.
Under functional theory, performance and group effectiveness are expected to
depend on the frequency and quality of the previous five interactions engaged with
by the group. A meta-analysis of the empirical results from the functional theory
literature underscores that the single most important process to group effectiveness is
the team members’ ability to assess the negative consequences of alternative solutions
[Orlitzky and Hirokawa, 2001] . Thus, groups who fully understand the problem their
asked with and effectively evaluate the merits of alternative solutions with a keen eye
for negative consequences are predicted to be effective under the functional theory of
group decision-making
2.4.6 Limitations of Teams
Even though teams adapt and respond to complex situations effectively, they
often still fall prey to the biases that affect individuals. For example, groups can be
primed to over-emphasize solutions from one problem to subsequent ones. Priming
in groups can inhibit creativity to solve complicated problems and cause groups to
resemble individuals in terms of mental set or habitual routine [Hinsz et al., 1997].
Furthermore, large teams are often inefficient at storing information. It is es-
timated that groups use only about 70% of their storage capacity because of the losses
incurred from the collaboration required to remember at the group level [Hinsz et al., 1997].
Beyond that, in scenarios marked by deep uncertainty, where probabilistic
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thinking is key to navigating the situation, teams not only fail to escape the base rate
fallacy, as the team members reflect a tendency to neglect base-rate information when
making a judgement, but they also exaggerate this very tendency [Hinsz et al., 1997].
The research reviewed above indicates that groups appear to exaggerate the
tendencies of information processing that occur among individuals. If some bias, error,
or tendency predisposes individuals to process information in a particular way, then
groups exaggerate this tendency. However, if the bias, error, or tendency is unlikely
among individuals processing the information (e.g., less than half of the sample), then
groups are even less likely to process information in this fashion [Hinsz et al., 1997].
2.4.7 Relationship to the Dissertation
Teams not only display magnified cognitive capacity, but they also display
unique cognitive abilities that emerge from the interaction between the team members.
Those abilities however are not unlimited and are often constrained by the very
biases that plague individual decision making. However, much in the same way team
cognition emerges from individuals to produce intelligence and behaviors beyond the
individual, a different type of intelligence emerges from large groups and crowds that
cannot be reduced to behaviors of the individual – collective intelligence.
2.5 Collective Intelligence
2.5.1 Overview
Crowdsourcing efforts have produced remarkable insights, findings, and inven-
tions that are hardly expected by individuals working alone or together. A primary
example is Foldit, a crowdsourcing effort for biochemistry and protein folding that
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uncovered in just three weeks the structure of an enzyme related to AIDS that had
eluded scientists for 15 years [Malone, 2018]. This type of phenomenon taps into
resources and skills needed to perform an activity are distributed widely or reside in
places that are not known in advance [Malone et al., 2009].
Such valuable, productive and intelligent behavior emerges from decentral-
ized groups of people that explore and aggregate local information into collectively
useful knowledge [Surowiecki, 2005]. Even though the decentralized nature of collec-
tive intelligence stands in sharp contrast to centralized and interdependent nature of
team cognition, the two phenomena can be understood as manifestations of the same
emergent properties.
2.5.2 Background
Collective intelligence is the result of the proper aggregation of local informa-
tion in generating a global solution to a problem that is more optimal than what
any individual could have provided [Watkins, 2007]. However, collective intelligence
should not be confused with “groupthink”: it is not merely the sum product of group
opinions but is instead a weighed and calibrated end-product of an information ex-
change between a group of thinkers. Just because a group convenes and votes on an
issue, it does not mean that the “wisdom of the crowd” is occurring.
Specifically, not all groups are good knowledge generators. At the extreme,
a crowd morphs into a mob: a dangerous and efficient arrangement to distribute
knowledge to members. Even at a micro-level, teams often fail to integrate all rele-
vant information about a problem before making a decision due to the kind of pressure
towards conformity inherent to group interactions. Social norms can pressure indi-
viduals with distinct perspectives to alter their behavior in order to assimilate, which
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undermines the kind of diversity that lies at the core of the accuracy gains in collective
intelligence [Watkins, 2007].
Prior research has identified four conditions that enable the emergence of col-
lective intelligence in a crowd [Surowiecki, 2005]:
1. Diversity of opinion: each person should have some private information, even if
it’s just an eccentric interpretation of the known facts
2. Independence: people’s opinions are not determined by the opinions of those
around them
3. Decentralization: people are able to specialize and draw on local knowledge
4. Aggregation: some mechanism exists for turning private judgments into a col-
lective decision
Prediction markets succeed because their nature lends itself to support all
four factors, as participants have a financial incentive to research and grain private
information that is then implicitly shared once they begin trading in the market.
Decentralization is especially apparent, as any individual gets to immediately trade
with every other participant in the market, enabling information to flow very rapidly
because it does not have to go through a hierarchy.
Independence is also extremely important to collective intelligence because the
underlying reality of any crowd effort is that no individual has perfect access to all
information, and that the estimate of all individuals is always flawed in some way.
Independence guarantees that errors in individual judgment won’t wreck the group’s
collective judgment as long as those errors aren’t systematically pointing in the same
direction. One of the quickest ways to make people’s judgments systematically biased
is to make them dependent on each other for information. Furthermore, independent
34
individuals are more likely to have new information rather than the same old data
everyone is already familiar with [Surowiecki, 2005].
Decentralization at its best ensures in a balance between independence and
coordination and between specialization and aggregation. At its worst it fails to
guarantee that value info that is present within the system (within an individual
or a small sub-group) is going to be propagated throughout the rest of the system
[Surowiecki, 2005]. Collective intelligence can thus only emerge if the individuals
specialize and acquire local knowledge and the crowd (a market, corporation, agency)
aggregates into a globally and collectively useful whole [Surowiecki, 2005].
In essence, the reason why the average of all a classroom’s estimates for how
many jelly beans are in a jar is only a few percentage points away from the actual
number is because the overconfident estimates and underconfident estimates offset
each other, thereby distilling signal from the noise and yielding an estimate that is
superior to that of any individual participant.
2.5.3 Prediction Markets as Collective Intelligence Mecha-
nisms
Prediction markets are mechanisms that enable participants to bet upon the
occurrence of particular events. At their core, they extend the dynamics of the stock
market, where traders buy and sell stocks in anticipation of corporate announcements,
to broader events such as political elections and box office performance. A basic
example would be an election, where the value of a candidate’s “stock” becomes $1 if
the candidate wins, and $0 if the candidate loses, thus enabling participants to buy
and sell the stock until all trading ends and yields a price that inherently reflects the
probability of the candidate winning (70c would imply a 70% chance).
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Prediction markets are remarkably effective at forecasting events and are of-
ten better than pundits and experts alike. For instance, in the case of sports,
real-money prediction markets were found to be more accurate than expert polls
[Goel et al., 2010] . In the realm of politics, a study of the Iowa Electronic Mar-
kets (IEM)’s performance over the course of the presidential elections between 1988
and 2000, shows that the IEM’s market price on the day each of the 596 different
polls were released was more accurate than the polls themselves 75% of the time
[Hanson, 2003, Surowiecki, 2005]. These results carry over into geopolitical forecasts
as well, where IARPA’s DAGGRE prediction market accuracy was about 38% greater
than the baseline system at over 400 geopolitical questions [Laskey et al., 2015]. Re-
cent research also suggests that prediction markets outperform even AI-based big data
approaches. For instance, IEM outperformed a highly advanced machine learning
model analyzing 40 million unique tweets in the 2012 election [Attarwala et al., 2017].
These results are not isolated, but rather are consistent with a broader pattern of
prediction markets being systematically more effective than expert and collective
judgements.
The key to the success of prediction markets lies in their ability to aggre-
gate diverse opinions to parse signal from noise. Specifically, prediction markets
can combine potentially diverse opinions into a single consistent probability distribu-
tion (Hanson 2003). Markets also provide strong economic incentives for individuals
to correct systematic biases, such as overconfidence or underconfidence. A rational
trader would place bets that are profitable in expectation, realigning prices with his-
torical base rates [Atanasov et al., 2016]. Furthermore, they are able to handle more
complexity than an individual or centralized body could grasp because “knowledge
that is implicit, dispersed, and inaccessible by traditional, conscious methods can be
organized through markets to create more rational calculation than can elite experts”
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[Watkins, 2007].
Watkins (2007) summarizes the three main theoretical explanations for the
collective intelligence exhibited by prediction markets:
1. Crowds are not always necessarily better at solving a problem than an indi-
vidual, yet they are structurally well positioned to overcome the limited infor-
mational capacity of individual humans. Thus, as long as each member of the
group does not shift their opinion in order to conform to the perceived consen-
sus (groupthink), a prediction market will be even better than its individual
members at processing information.
2. Prediction markets effectively balance the synthesis of large amounts of in-
formation with the avoidance of interactions that can lead to groupthink. The
competitive dynamics of prediction markets do this by encouraging competition
as opposed to consensus, thereby creating a strong incentive to avoid sharing
privately held information that can influence of pressure others into ceasing
independent decision-making.
3. Prediction markets ensure high degrees of the type of diversity critical to decision-
making by disincentivizing copycat behavior. The financial stakes required to
participate in a prediction market thus function as a self-selection mechanism
that disincentivizes participation by individuals who do not have marginal infor-
mation to contribute to the market. Specifically, the incentives of a prediction
market force individuals to assess the uniqueness of information they possess
as they attempt at profiting from the market price adjusting to reflect their
expectations.
Wolfer (2009) advances another theory as to why prediction markets are so
effective: the marginal trader hypothesis. The hypothesis states that “the efficiency
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of prediction markets is driven by a minority of unbiased and active participants
who wield corrective influence”. This view argues that collective intelligence emerges
in prediction markets because the mechanism incorporates differences in forecaster
knowledge and skill automatically. Specifically, in the short turn order size serves as
a useful proxy for a trader’s confidence in a prediction, and in the long run higher
earnings are rewarded to traders who made correct predictions, thereby increasing
the resources at their disposal to influence future prices. What drives trader behavior
is thus the rational and risk-averse expectation to profit from the difference between
the market price and their private beliefs [Wolfers, 2009].
In essence, prediction markets generate a strong financial incentive for par-
ticipants to express their opinions in precise and informative ways, which are then
aggregated and calibrated by the trading mechanism to reflect the most reliable es-
timate for a particular event. This transition from the local information of each
participant to the global information of the crowd speaks to the powerful emergent
property of prediction markets: collective intelligence.
2.5.4 Limitations of Prediction Markets
Just like financial markets, prediction markets are not immune to problems.
Forecasting future events is such a challenging task that is prone to errors of all
types, that can potentially be magnified by the macro-nature of a prediction mar-
kets. Prior research has identified three major types of errors in prediction markets
[Dudik et al., 2017]:
1. Sampling error, which arises from traders possessing noisy estimates that dilute
the truth-value of their information.
2. Market-maker bias, arising from a particular cost function being used to gen-
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erate an opportunity for profit to facilitate trading actually inducing particular
biases on overshooting or undershooting the estimate.
3. Convergence error, arising from huge market fluctuations caused by all the
trading before the price stabilizes arising because, at any point in time, market
prices may still be in flux
These problems are exacerbated by the fact that redesigning the aggregation
function, the primary technical solution often discussed in the literature, often not
enough. Chen et al. (2005) analyzed data from football games and found that linear,
logarithmic, absolute distance, and quadratic scoring did not differ significantly as
aggregation functions in their overall accuracy. Purely technical approaches have
thus not shown major improvements in addressing some of the variability factors in
prediction markets.
An alternative that has been proposed is to move away from prediction markets
all together and focus on better prediction polls to elicit and aggregate estimates from
individuals. The results however have not been supportive of such a claim, as prior
research has indicated that simple aggregate of prediction polls tends towards not
just underconfidence (despite the well-known tendency for people to be overconfident)
but also less meaningful as the average forecasts converge towards 50% probability
for two-option questions [Satopää et al., 2014].
Lastly, prediction markets rely on financial incentives to motivate partici-
pants. This makes sense, for no participant would trade if there was not an op-
portunity to profit from someone else’s lack of information (Ex. buying a candi-
date’s stock that sells for 50c to resell it at 70c). Thus, prior researchers have
highlighted the importance for the manager of the prediction market to subsidize
trading for new events in order to catalyze the trading process among participants
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[Chen and Vaughan, 2010, Chen et al., 2010, Hanson, 2003]. This kind of solution
creates a barrier to entry to the implementation of prediction markets in areas beyond
geopolitics or elections, where a thick market of many participants can be expected.
We thus seek to address these concerns by designing a new type of prediction
market that not only harnesses collective intelligence in a sustainable way, but also
enables artificial intelligence to address many of the limitations of traditional design.
2.5.5 Relationship to the Dissertation
Collective intelligence provides an alternative perspective with which the emer-
gent cognitive properties of human-machine teams can be understood. However, the
role AI can play in prediction markets is still very poorly understood, and this dis-
sertation seeks to remedy that through Proposed Study 2. Studying the applications
of machine learning to prediction markets will serve as useful methodology to de-
termine whether the biases identified in this section (biases the literature considers
inherent to the cognition of the participants) can be mitigated by treating prediction
markets as a large-scale human-machine team. Moreover, many of the principles of
collective intelligence stand in sharp contrast to those of team cognition, thus recon-
ciling both will inform a much better way to understand human-machine teamwork
by determining which principles from either model are applicable.
2.6 Conclusion
This dissertation aims at developing a comprehensive view of human-machine
teamwork that accounts for the different role AI can play in a human-machine team.
To that end, this chapter highlighted the relationship between team cognition and
collective intelligence: they are all emergent cognitive phenomena that enables teams
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to accomplish tasks that are beyond the grasp of the individual. The next chap-
ter presents a study we conducted focusing on the role game theory plays in the
cooperation between humans and RL agents.
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Chapter 3
Study 1: Game Theory for Teams
A major theme of the dissertation is understanding human-machine teamwork
as a two-sided relationship. In practice, this means approaching human-machine
teamwork from both the perspective of the human as well as the perspective of the AI.
The following study of human-AI cooperation in several game theory scenarios does
this by first looking at how different RL models alter their cooperative behavior when
interacting with humans; and secondly by looking at how the human participant’s
belief about whether they are playing against a human or an AI influences their
willingness to cooperate. The key findings for this study speak to RQ1 by showing
how cooperation can occur between humans and machines even when communication
is not possible, while also proving that incentive structures play a major influence in
human-machine teamwork.
Reported here are major excerpts of the journal article that was subsequently
submitted and is now under review.
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3.1 Introduction
The current trajectory of the field of computer science is aimed at devel-
oping artificial general intelligence (also known as AGI). This kind of strong AI
would theoretically be capable of matching and eventually outperforming human in-
telligence across a variety of different tasks where intelligence plays a decisive role
[Goertzel and Pennachin, 2007]. AGI differs from the kind of narrow AI that we see
today in that, unlike current AI, it can easily transfer learning between tasks because
of a true understanding of itself and its environment [Pennachin and Goertzel, 2007].
Regardless of whether AGI will ever be feasible, the focus of AI research should not
be towards developing technology meant to make humans obsolete. Instead, the AI
community should reconsider whether the inevitable consequence of the rise of AI will
be the full replacement of human effort. In fact, prior research suggests that effective
human-AI partnerships outperform not just human teams, but also sophisticated AI
systems.
A major historical example of the valuable yet counter-intuitive nature of the
findings that emerge from human-machine teamwork research is in chess, with IBM’s
Deep Blue, a chess-playing computer that eventually defeated Gary Kasparov, the
world champion at the time. Kasparov had already won the first match against
Deep Blue, and it was only after a substantial hardware upgrade that IBM’s Deep
Blue finally defeated Kasparov [Hsu, 2004] . Deep Blue however did not really prove
computers superior to the human brain at a complex task such as chess; rather,
its performance was driven by a brute force evaluation of every possible move, as
opposed to heuristic and strategic approach that Kasparov and any chess player
engages in [Cords, 2007]. This key difference gets precisely at one of the primary
distinctions between artificial and human intelligence: the human brain is not merely
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running computations, but rather is making sense of the larger context of the situation
[Hipp et al., 2011].
Kasparov went on to demonstrate through his ”advanced chess” tournament
(where AIs, humans, and human-machine teams compete against each other), that a
human-machine team could defeat both the top AI as well as the top human chess
players, and that the human-machine team was not constituted of a partnership
between a top chess player and a sophisticated AI. Rather, an amateur human and
a mediocre AI managed to outperform precisely because their limitations made their
intelligence level more compatible as the human focused on highlighting the top moves
they were considering and the AI computed opponent responses to figure out the
best move among those options [Thompson, 2010]. This type of finding suggests that
through collaborative interfaces that bridge the gap between AI and the human brain,
a shared understanding of the situation can emerge that enables human-machine
teams to perform at their best.
More recently however, the team at DeepMind managed to create AlphaGo: an
AI that defeated the world champion in Go [Silver and Hassabis, 2016]. AlphaGo is
distinct from Deep Blue because it’s dealing with a much more complex problem: the
number of possible moves in Go is exponentially greater than that of Chess, thereby
making it impossible for the AI to compute all possibilities [Schraudolph et al., 1994].
Through machine learning, AlphaGo, unlike Deep Blue, developed a strategic under-
standing of its task, thereby discovering brand new ways to play the game that were
unknown to humanity beforehand. Furthermore, once upgraded, AlphaGo achieved
mastery of the game by playing against itself as opposed to training its analytical
skills with games from famous players [Silver et al., 2017]. However, it is easy to
draw the wrong lesson from this event. Despite its heightened capabilities, AlphaGo
is still a narrow AI whose usefulness is strictly limited to singular, well-defined tasks
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and thus cannot adapt to context changes or complex effects.
Naturally, it becomes paramount to delve more deeply into the mechanics
of a successful human-machine partnership. To start with, it’s useful to extend
the constructs of human-human teaming to ground our understanding of human-
machine teams. Teams at their core are composed of interdependent agents who
at their highest level operate according to a shared understanding of the task and
situation they are confronted with [McNeese et al., 2017]. Through this shared sit-
uational awareness, teams can adapt to a dynamic environment while retaining co-
ordinated behavior that’s critical to accomplish both short-term and long-term goals
[McNeese et al., 2017]. Communication is what enables individuals to relate to and
understand one another to a sufficient enough extent that they begin processing infor-
mation cohesively, which leads to the emergence of team cognition [Demir et al., 2016,
Demir et al., 2017].
The challenge with human-machine teams however is that both types of agents
operate with fundamentally different understandings of the world that cannot be eas-
ily communicated. Prior research has shown that effective team behavior occurs when
each team member seeks to model the thought process of their teammates, which is
inherently more challenging in a human-machine team [McNeese et al., 2017]. Specif-
ically, humans tend to inherently distance themselves from teammates they perceive
to be autonomous, and AIs tend to avoid wanting to cooperate with human agents
who don’t share their thought process [Demir et al., 2018]. These challenges require
a bidirectional solution that emphasizes both the need for better thought-sharing
protocols as well as better computational architectures that enable the AI to model
the human teammate’s thought-process [Chattopadhyay et al., 2017]. To achieve the
same result from the human-side, it also becomes necessary to simplify the com-
plexity of the AI-agent in a way that is accessible to the teammates and encourages
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a shared understanding and shared cognition occurring in a human-machine team
[Crowder and Carbone, 2014].
It thus follows that further research is needed to clarify the dynamics behind
human-machine teams as well as human-machine multi-agent systems as they become
more prevalent.
3.2 Methods
We enlisted over 600 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk to play a dif-
ferent game theory scenario under different conditions. The participants were grouped
in batches of 50, and were assigned to one of the two possible games. The partici-
pants were either told they were playing against an AI or against a human, and were
assigned to one of two possible games. We also collected demographics and survey
of team effectiveness and perceptions but we are not including those results because
they are beyond the scope of this study. The demographics breakdown is displayed
in Table 3.1.
Male Female
Gender 23.77% 76.23%
African American Asian Caucasian Indian Other
Race & Ethnicity 3.52% 37.89% 40.08% 16.75% 1.76%
18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65
Age 25.55% 53.73% 10.13% 6.16% 4.40%
Table 3.1: Demographics
We built an interface that supports all of the experimental conditions, thereby
restricting each participant to only interact with a specific variation of the experimen-
tal setup. Each move made by the players is recorded by the application and stored
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on a server. Each player plays 3 rounds of 10 turns each, with the score resetting
every round.
To implement the RL agents, we used TensorForce which is an open source RL
library focused on providing clear APIs, readability and modularization to deploy RL
solutions both in research and practice [Schaarschmidt et al., 2017, Schaarschmidt et al., 2018].
There are a host of predefined algorithms present in this library. The following is a
list of algorithms available:
• A3C using distributed TensorFlow [Mnih et al., 2016].
• Trust Region Policy Optimization [Schulman et al., 2015].
• Normalized Advantage functions (NAFs) [Gu et al., 2016].
• DQN [Mnih et al., 2013].
• Double-DQN [Van Hasselt et al., 2016].
• Vanilla Policy Gradients (VPG/ REINFORCE) [Williams, 1992].
• Deep Q-learning from Demonstration (DQFD) [Hester et al., 2018].
• Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) [Schulman et al., 2017]
We will be focusing on PPO, DQN and VPG for our experiment and results.
This methodology led to a 2x2x3 experimental design for a total of 12 experimental
conditions. All of the experimental conditions are identified in Table 3.2
3.3 Data Collection and Analysis
The data was collected by our game interface automatically. Each time a
human player submitted a move, the client sent a request to the REST API in our
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Prisoner’s Dilemma
PPO DQN VPG
Human Opponent pd-human-ppo pd-human-dqn pd-human-vpg
AI Opponent pd-ai-ppo pd-ai-dqn pd-ai-vpg
Battle of the Sexes
PPO DQN VPG
Human Opponent bos-human-ppo bos-human-dqn bos-human-vpg
AI Opponent bos-ai-ppo bos-ai-dqn bos-ai-vpg
Table 3.2: 2x2x3 Experimental Design
server. The requested triggered a call to the specific RL agent which prompted the
agent to submit their own action. Subsequently, the server processed the human and
AI move and responded with the appropriate payoffs. Throughout this process, each
turn was logged into our database for further analysis.
Specifically, the data collected was the userID, the human player’s move (0 for
cooperation, 1 for defection), the RL agent’s move (0 for cooperation, 1 for defection),
the type of RL agent (”ppo”, ”vpg”, ”dqn”), the belief condition (whether the human
believed they were playing against a human or AI), and the turn number.
Once the experiment was completed, several R scripts were deployed to clean
up and restructure the data so that it could be analyzed properly. Specifically, each
pair of moves was translated into an outcome (cooperation, non-cooperation), and
each move by the human as well as the RL agent was also classified as cooperative
or non-cooperative. The latter data was used to produce histograms plotting the
frequency of specific behaviors by both the human and the AI.
Next, given the non-normal nature of the data, we deployed a generalized
linear model with mixed effects. Linear mixed models differ from mere linear models
in that they are not described by a distribution of vector-valued random response,
but rather by the distribution of two vector-valued variables: the response variable
and the vector of random effects [Bates et al., 2014]. The term ”mixed effects” refers
48
to the models’ incorporation of both fixed and random effects in its linear predictor of
the conditional mean of the response variable [Bates et al., 2014]. The model works
because the transformation of our collected data turns the 4 possible outcomes of
each game into a binomial (cooperation vs non-cooperation).
3.4 Game Theory Scenarios
Two cooperative game theory scenarios were selected to provide a broad ana-
lytical base to identify the extent to which different factors affect the willingness to
cooperate of both the human players as well as the reinforcement learning agents.
3.4.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a classical scenario in game theory where
two players are posited to have been arrested by authorities for committing a crime.
Once apprehended, each player is separated from the other so that they are unable
to communicate. Because the police do not have sufficient evidence to convict both
players, they offer to each player the opportunity to confess in order to gain a lighter
sentence at the expense of the other player.
The core result in PDs is that the Nash Equilibrium induces both players
to confess, leading to the collectively worst outcome for both players. However,
in experimental settings this dynamic often changes when the PD is played in an
iterative fashion. This is because a sequential PD creates the opportunity for players
to punish one another for defecting from an agreement to remain silent, thus creating
a reasonable expectation of cooperation.
Figure 3.1 is taken from the PD interface of our web application. The payoffs
for mutual cooperation are -1 for each player, the payoffs for mutual defection are -2
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for each player, and the payoff for successfully defecting on a cooperative player are 0
and -3 respectively. In a PD, defecting is the dominant strategy because both players
are better off defecting given what they expect the other player to do. Essentially,
the mutual best response in the game is for both players to defect on one another.
Figure 3.1: Human (bottom) and AI(top) views of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Interface
3.4.2 Battle of the Sexes
The Battles of the Sexes (BoS) is another classical game theory scenario which
posits that two players are trying to meet up at one of two locations. Each player
has a preference for which one of the two locations they would rather meet up in,
yet both players would rather be in the same place together than by themselves in
their respectively preferred locations. The challenge of a BoS is that the players
cannot communicate, and thus have to rely on the incentive structure of the game to
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successfully cooperate.
Unlike with a PD, a BoS does not have a strictly dominant strategy any of
the players is better of adopting irrespective of what the other player does. There are
three Nash Equilibria: the two pure equilibria associated with each of the two options
as long as both players select the same one, and the mixed strategy equilibrium of the
players randomizing between the two locations given a calibrated probability function
that can be derived from the differential payoffs of the game.
Figure 3.2 is taken from the BoS interface of our web application. The players
are given two options: going to Opera or going to the Sports Game. The human player
is assigned the preference for the Opera, whereas the AI is assigned the preference
for the Game. The human player and the AI earn 3 and 2 points respectively if they
both decide on the Opera, and 2 and 3 points respectively if they settle for the Game.
Each player also incurs a payoff of 1 point if they fail to end up in the same location
are at least in their respectively preferred location, as opposed to 0 points in the worst
case scenario where both players not only fail to be in the same location but are also
away from their preferred option.
An interesting aspect of a BoS is that it involves a deeply strategic evaluation of
whether altruism pays off, because both players selecting the option the other player
prefers as opposed to their own results in the worst possible outcome. Thus, the
expectation for altruism has to be unilateral. Furthermore, altruistic behavior in this
case requires one player to be submissive to preferences of the other player because
once the player settles on the same location, the dynamic of the Nash Equilibrium
reinforces the incentive not to deviate.
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Figure 3.2: Human (bottom) and AI(top) views of the Battle of the Sexes Interface
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma
Figure 3.3 below shows the frequency distributions of the average mutual co-
operation and mutual defection levels between the human and AI participants. The
right skew on the first graph indicates that the human and the AI failed to effectively
cooperate most of the time to avoid losing points. The second graph shows that
on average, humans and AIs did not necessarily spend most of the turns mutually
betraying one another.
The distributions make it very clear that the data is not normally distributed,
which is to be expected given how the game has a Nash Equilibrium where the
players are expected to converge. Therefore, we converted the data to a binomial
distribution of cooperation vs. non-cooperation where cooperation represented the
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Figure 3.3: Mutual Cooperation and Mutual Defection Frequency Distributions
mutually beneficial outcome of the game. That enabled us to run a generalized linear
model with mixed effects:
cooperation = opponent+ turn+ (1 | participantID))
Table 3.3 shows that the random intercept of the participant did not have
residuals, thus suggesting that there is no variability that is not accounted by the
random effects of the model. On the fixed effects, the slopes of the different agent
type had around similar negative coefficients (-1.41 and -1.53) on overall cooperation
that were both significant (p-value = 0.00589 and p-value = 0.00407). The coefficient
for turn (which refers to which turn out of the 30 played is being analyzed) is quite
small, having a much smaller effect (-0.221) that albeit significant indicates that the
levels of cooperation between the human and different AI models are better predicted
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by which AI model the human playing against as opposed to how long the two players
have been playing together.
Opponent + Turn
Estimate Std. Error p-value
Fixed Parts
(Intercept) 0.16721 0.34310 0.62600
opponent:ppo -1.41327 0.51318 0.00589
oppponent:vpg -1.53198 0.53327 0.00407
turn -0.22197 0.01551 <2e-16
Random Effects
Variance Std. Dev Count
humanID 5.281 2.298 125
Observations 4830
Table 3.3: Generalized Linear Model with Mixed Effects for Prisoners Dilemma
We also ran a similar model to determine whether there were any meaningful
differences on human behavior if the human was told they were playing against an
AI or not. Specifically, we compared a model considering only the belief condition
(whether the human player thought they were playing against another human or an
AI) and the amount of turns elapsed to a model which also took into account the
specific RL model the human was playing against:
cooperation = condition+ turn+ (1 | participantID))
cooperation = condition+ opponent+ turn+ (1 | participantID))
Table 3.4 shows that the human player’s belief that they are playing against
another human has a negative effect (-0.73, p-value = 0.04) on overall cooperation.
Just like in the prior setup, the number of turns elapsed has a minimal yet significant
effect (-0.18, p-value <2e−16).
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Condition + Turn Condition + Opponent + Turn
Estimate Std. Error p-value Estimate Std. Error p-value
Fixed Parts
(Intercept) -0.80757 0.19709 4.18e-05 0.01201 0.28983 0.96696
opponent:ppo -1.32838 0.43397 0.00221
oppponent:vpg -1.40403 -0.45067 0.00184
turn -0.18071 0.01293 <2e-16 -0.18084 0.012477 <2e-16
condition:human -0.73069 0.35581 0.04 -0.20575 0.43633 0.63725
Random Effects
Variance Std. Dev Count Variance Std. Dev Count
humanID 4.037 2.009 175 3.703 1.924 175
Observations 6540 6540
Table 3.4: Generalized Linear Model with Mixed Effects Comparison
Furthermore, the condition variable in the model is only significant in the first
model, for the second’s predictive capacity is dominated by the opponent variable.
3.5.2 Battle of the Sexes
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 shows the frequency distributions of the average successful
cooperation as well as the average failure to coordinate between the human and AI
participants. They both separate the different types of coordination: human-preferred
coordination means both the human and the AI decided to go to the Opera, which
resulted in higher points for the human, while AI-preferred coordination refers to the
scenario when the human and the AI both selected to go the Game, which resulted
in higher points for the AI.
Both charts display strong left skews which implies that extreme cases did
not happen frequently, suggesting that most of the time the strategic interaction
converged to benefit the human.
Much like with the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the distributions make it very clear
that the data is not normally distributed. Therefore, we converted the data to a
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Figure 3.4: Frequency Distributions of Successful Cooperation
Figure 3.5: Frequency Distributions of Coordination Failure
binomial distribution of cooperation vs. non-cooperation where cooperation repre-
sented any of the mutually beneficial outcomes of the game (Opera, Opera and Game,
Game). This enabled us to run a generalized linear model with mixed effects:
cooperation = opponent+ turn+ (1 | participantID))
Table 3.5 shows that the random intercept of the participant did not have
residuals, thus suggesting that there is no variability that is not accounted by the
random effects of the model. On the fixed effects, the slopes of the different agent
type had around similar negative coefficients (-1.36 and -1.10) on overall cooperation
that were both significant (p-value = 5.15e−7 and p-value = 7.48e−6). The coefficient
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for turn is once again quite small, having a drastically smaller effect (-0.03422) that,
albeit significant, indicates that the levels of cooperation between the human and
different AI models are better predicted by which AI model the human playing against
as opposed to how long the two players have been playing together.
Opponent + Turn
Estimate Std. Error p-value
Fixed Parts
(Intercept) 0.97945 0.18582 1.36e-07
opponent:ppo -1.36189 0.27126 5.15e-07
oppponent:vpg -1.10211 0.24603 7.48e-06
turn 0.03422 0.01110 0.00205
Random Effects
Variance Std. Dev Count
humanID 1.318 1.148 137
Observations 4890
Table 3.5: Generalized Linear Model with Mixed Effects for Battle of the Sexes
We also ran the same model to determine whether there were any meaningful
differences on human behavior if the human was told they were playing against an AI
or not. Just like with the Prisoner’s Dilemma, we compared a model considering only
the belief condition (whether the human player thought they were playing against
another human or an AI) and the amount of turns elapsed to a model which also
took into account the specific RL model the human was playing against as well:
cooperation = condition+ turn+ (1|participantID))
cooperation = condition+ opponent+ turn+ (1|participantID))
Table 3.6 shows that the human player’s belief that they are playing against
another human has a slight negative effect (-0.54, p-value=0.0275) on overall coop-
eration. Just like in the prior setup, the number of turns elapsed has a minimal yet
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positive effect (0.02, p-value = 0.0190).
Condition + Turn Condition + Opponent + Turn
Estimate Std. Error p-value Estimate Std. Error p-value
Fixed Parts
(Intercept) 0.23744 0.11333 0.0362 0.98986 0.16478 1.89e-09
opponent:ppo -1.32168 0.23967 3.50e-08
oppponent:vpg -1.06341 0.21745 1.01e-06
turn 0.02333 0.00995 0.0190 0.02848 0.26698 0.9151
condition:human -0.54203 0.24591 0.0275 0.02848 0.26698 0.9151
Random Effects
Variance Std. Dev Count Variance Std. Dev Count
humanID 1.301 1.141 166 0.9973 0.9987 166
Observations 5880 5880
Table 3.6: Generalized Linear Model with Mixed Effects Comparison
The second model has much lower levels of variance accounted for by random
effects (0.9973). The result is similar to that of the Prisoner’s Dilemma in that the
more complete model does not hold the belief condition (whether the human believes
the other player to be an AI or not) as statistically significant because most of its
predictive power emerges from the type of RL model involved in the interaction.
3.5.3 Summary
The generalized linear models with mixed effects proved very effective as pre-
dictors of cooperation between the humans and the AIs over a variety of conditions.
The amount of variance accounted for by random intercepts was higher in the PD
game than in the BoS game, but they were both much more significantly predicted
by the fixed effects. Specifically, although the turn number was a significant predic-
tor of cooperation (which implies that the amount of turns the human and the AI
have played with each other affects their overall tendency to cooperate), the major
predictors were the types of RL model. The PD experiment produced data about
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cooperation (willingness to sacrifice personal gain for collective gain) and the BoS
produced data about coordination (willingness to consider the other player’s prefer-
ences to achieve an optimal outcome). Lastly, although the belief condition (whether
the human believes they are playing against AI or against another human) has a neg-
ative influence on the human player’s willingness to cooperate, it’s only significant
when it’s used as a predictor along with turn number. The adding more fixed effects
to our model did not improve prediction in a statistically significant ways, whereas
exploring different combinations of fixed effects did.
3.6 Discussion
Our results show meaningful differences in the cooperative dynamics between
humans and AIs across a variety of different settings. Instead of limiting ourselves to
just one game theory model, such as the often-used Prisoner’s dilemma, we explored
human-machine cooperation in even more complex social dilemmas. The results from
each game can be analyzed separately, but they should also be understood as indica-
tive of a broader pattern of human behavior.
Specifically, the data from the Prisoner’s dilemma setup have implications for
both AI as well as human cooperative dynamics. For the former, each RL model
cooperated differently with their human counterpart. This result is not surprising
given the distinct ways in which DQNs and PPOs process strategic interactions. On
the other hand, our GLMER also suggests that humans have a higher propensity
towards cooperation when playing against other humans as opposed to AIs, which
belies a particular bias in the context of a Prisoner’s dilemma. Furthermore, the
results from the Prisoner’s Dilemma dynamic stand out as strong indications that
both humans and AIs hold hostile tendencies in such a context. At the outset, the
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Nash Equilibrium of the game induces both players towards aggression. However,
the iterative nature of our setup would lend itself towards the development of norms
of reciprocation, where both players would learn over time that aggression would be
punished and thus potentially converge towards peaceful outcomes. The GLMER
provides similar support for cooperative outcomes being mediated by the type of
RL agent involved (hypothesis 1) as well as to whether the human believes they are
playing an AI or not (hypothesis 2).
The results from the Battle of the Sexes should also be analyzed separately.
To start with, the game itself does not have just one Nash Equilibrium, giving the
players two possible outcomes where they mutually benefit from cooperation. The
data indicates that the most frequent outcome was cooperative and to the benefit of
the human (I.E. the players converged towards the Nash Equilibrium that benefits
the human most). The GLMER shows that although the type of RL agent strongly
influence the outcome of the interaction (hypothesis 3), the nature of the equilibria
leads the players to cooperate more than in the two prior instances.
Overall, larger patterns about the dynamics of human-machine cooperation
can be observed across all three games. First, not a single game resulted in the
players converging towards the Nash Equilibrium 100% of the time. This is important
because it speaks to limitations of theoretical research on human-machine teamwork.
Only through empirical setups, such as ours, can the belief that human-machine
interactions default to equilibrium be undermined. Second, the data from three of the
major models used in RL point to the strong influence the underlying algorithms have
on the decision-making of such agents. Not only does the type of RL model influence
the degree to which the agent will cooperate with the human, but it also shapes
the responses the humans will have during such encounters. Repeated interactions
between humans and AIs further underscore the divergent behavior of each RL model
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when playing against humans. Third, the experiments yielded strong evidence in
favor of the notion that humans are influenced by biases towards AI. Even though
the primary dynamic of each game is the Nash Equilibrium (since it’s the mutual
best response emerging from what each player expects the other to do), the human
players attribute significance to whether they are playing against an AI or not when
they develop expectations of cooperative behavior.
It’s thus important to note that AI safety researchers should not assume that
the willingness for an AI to cooperate with humans in one scenario necessarily gen-
eralizes to all situations and vice versa. Our setup goes a long way in establishing
a strong basis to investigate human-machine teamwork by testing such cooperative
dynamics across a variety of games where coordination is in the collective interest of
the multi-agent system. Using game theory in this setting is really useful because
sharp deviations from Nash Equilibria are indicative of the complex nature of the
interactions. However, limiting empirical research on human-machine cooperation to
just one game would have only provided narrow evidence about the behavioral pat-
terns of both AI and human players. Thus, testing different RL models, different
beliefs about whether the other player is an AI or a human, as well as different game
theory models with different Nash Equilibria provides a much stronger basis to make
inferences about the ability for human-machine teams to coordinate.
3.7 Conclusion
RL is quickly becoming the dominant machine learning paradigm because of its
generalizability. Thus, questions about the role incentive structures play in human-
machine cooperation are now more relevant than ever. To that end, this study’s
methodology shows how game theory models are an effective interface to empirically
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study the degree to which humans and machine cooperate under different circum-
stances as well as the factors that influence such cooperation. The next chapter will
extend this methodology to look how principles of human-human teamwork influence
human-machine cooperation.
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Chapter 4
Study 2: Human-Machine Teams
as Multi-Agent Systems
This study expands upon the methodology used in Study 1 in that it uses a
game theory scenario (albeit a different one with a focus on coordination as opposed to
cooperation). It addresses RQ1 by looking at how different aspects of team perception
(as elicited by a team effectiveness survey) affect the human participant’s ability to
effectively coordinate with different types of RL agents. The results informed the
methodology we are deploying more comprehensively in Proposed Study 1.
Reported here are major excerpts of the journal article that was subsequently
submitted and is now under review.
4.1 Introduction
Game theory is the study of the decision-making behavior of reward-maximizing
agents in strategic situations [Von Neumann et al., 2007]. It integrates economics and
math to provide a framework to encode incentive structures into matrices. This prop-
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erty is extremely useful because AIs, unlike humans, understand their environments
through matrices. Furthermore, the fundamental theorem of game theory developed
by John Nash guarantees that in every game there will be a Nash Equilibrium (NE),
a set of strategies where each player will converge to as they mutually respond to
each other [Nash et al., 1950].
Very often, however, the NE leads to an outcome that is sub-optimal or col-
lectively harmful to the players, and yet is inescapable precisely because it emerges
from each agent not having a strictly better alternative given what they expect the
other players to do [Bab and Brafman, 2008]. In such dilemmas, only a coordinated
and joint strategy by all the players will result in optimal rewards for the group
[de Cote et al., 2006]. Cooperation, fairness, reciprocity, and coordination and reci-
procity rely upon the players’ preferences, which are in turn systematically influenced
by the game’s incentives, and can be designed to tie rewards to collaborative outcomes
[Erev and Roth, 1998].
The class of machine learning models that best responds to incentives and re-
wards is reinforcement learning (RL) [Tuyls and Weiss, 2012]. These algorithms em-
ploy behavioral models that reward and punish behavior to induce the discovery of a
decision framework that maximizes positive rewards over time [Tuyls and Weiss, 2012].
The challenge RL agents face is that exploring new actions that can yield better
values over time comes at the expense of committing to selecting the best action
available at the time to maximize rewards [Tuyls and Weiss, 2012]. Regardless of
such tradeoffs however, RL has been a driving force in major advances in AI in
recent years, in a variety of settings, such as Go, Chess, soccer, and Atari games
[Hu et al., 1998, Foerster et al., 2018].
However, a major challenge to RL emerges when the agents are placed in an
environment where multiple NEs exist, since learning one NE strategy does not nec-
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essarily result in an optimal outcome because there is no guarantee the other players
will also select the same NE out of the possible ones [Hu et al., 1998]. Very often,
the agents in multiplayer settings remain trapped in game-theory-induced dilemmas.
Furthermore, RL agents over-estimate rewards in zero-sum games and fail to learn to
reliably cooperative over time by not considering the other player’s learning process
[Tampuu et al., 2017, Foerster et al., 2018]. Thus, game theory provides an effective
interface to study the cooperative dynamics and the influence of incentives in multi-
agent systems of humans and AIs.
The next aspect to consider is whether teams that include AI teams can col-
laborate as effectively as human teams do. Specifically, whether AIs are capable of
larger scale cooperation is still an open question. Prior research has shown that bots
attempting to solve a graph coloring problem (a high-coordination-required match-
ing task) successfully coordinate on a micro-level but fail to do so on a macro-level,
thereby preventing the collective goal of a stable match to occur [Shirado and Christakis, 2017].
However, the study also demonstrated that adding humans to the team accelerating
the median solution time by 55.6% [Shirado and Christakis, 2017]. Furthermore, in-
tegrating human factors in the design of human-machine teams has led to remarkable
results in the healthcare domain. Specifically, teams of oncologists partnered up with
machine learning algorithms outperformed both state-of-the-art neural networks as
well as expert teams in diagnosing cancer [Wang et al., 2016]. These results speak to
the major advantages that emerge from harvesting and integrating human intelligence
and AI, and should pave the way for more research of this kind.
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4.2 Hawk-Dove Games and Zero-Sum Mentalities
The Hawk-Dove game (HD) is a game where each player is faced with a decision
of whether to attack or to remain peaceful. Each player operates under the same
incentive structure, where collective peace results in both players receiving 0 points
and collective war resulting in both players losing 2 points. The key aspect of the
game is that each player is better off being peaceful, unless they manage to successfully
attack when the other player goes for peace.
Figure 4.1 shows the information available to the human players when they
are assigned to play the HD. A successful attack results in a point being transferred
from the peaceful player to the aggressive player. It’s important to note that such
an outcome leads to a smaller lose for the peaceful player than in a war (mutual
aggression), which in turn creates a powerful incentive to remain peaceful unless
either of the player is driven by a zero-sum mentality.
Figure 4.1: Hawk-Dove Interface
4.3 Experimental Setup
Experimental design details include enlisting over 100 participants from Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk to each play the HD with RL agents. We also collected demo-
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graphics and a survey of team effectiveness and perceptions at the end of every game,
as well as the outcome data from each game from the web interface.
Male Female
Gender 23.77% 76.23%
African American Asian Caucasian Other
Race & Ethnicity 3.52% 54.64% 40.08% 1.76%
18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65
Age 25.55% 53.73% 10.13% 6.16% 4.40%
Doctorate Professional Degree Associates Degree High School
(PhD, EdD) (MD, DDS, DVM) (AA) (GED)
Education 0.44 4.40 5.28 7.04
Some College Bachelor’s Degree Masters
(BA, BS) (MA, MS, MEd)
Education 7.04 62.99 12.77
Table 4.1: Demographics
Figure 4.1 displays the interface we built for the experiment. It records and
stores each move made by each player as they play 3 rounds of 10 turns. Our game
interface automatically collected userID, the RL agent’s move (0 for cooperation, 1
for defection), the human player’s move (0 for cooperation, 1 for defection), the type
of RL agent (”ppo”, ”vpg”, ”dqn”), and the turn number.
We used the TensorForce open-source library to implement the RL agents in
a modular way [Schaarschmidt et al., 2017, Schaarschmidt et al., 2018]. We focused
on Vanilla Policy Gradient (VPG), Deep-Q Networks (DQN), and Proximal Policy
Optimizers (PPO) for our experiment and results [Williams, 1992]. DeepQ agents rely
on Q-learning and yet overcome its limitations through the use of deep neural networks
to estimate value for unseen states [Schulman et al., 2017]. Once the experiment
was completed, each pair of moves was translated into an outcome (cooperation,
non-cooperation), and each move by the human, as well as the RL agent, was also
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classified as cooperative or non-cooperative. The survey results were then matched
to the participant’s ID.
The survey enabled participants to answer Likert-scale questions in regard to
their feelings towards AI and their perception of different team aspects of the task.
The analysis focused on a subset of survey data in light of the length restrictions.
The data being analyzed focused on the following questions:
1. ”I felt my teammate and I had a shared understanding of our teamwork”
2. ”I am optimistic towards AI”
3. ”I would prefer working with a human rather than an AI”
4.4 Results of the Game Outcomes and Survey
Data
Cooperation was associated with participants’ level of agreement towards three
different phrases using Likert scales. The first phrase, “I felt my teammate and I had
a shared understanding of our teamwork,” was used to see if there was a relationship
between a participant’s perceived level of shared understanding, and their actual level
of cooperation with their teammate. The second phrase, “I am optimistic towards
artificial intelligence,” was used to see if a participant’s feelings towards artificial
intelligence would be correlated with their level of cooperation with their teammate.
The third and final phrase, “I would prefer working with a human rather than an
AI,” was used to see if a user’s feelings towards an AI teammate could hinder their
overall cooperation. All of these scales were used with levels of cooperation to create
ordered logistic models.
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4.4.1 Shared Understanding
Participants rated their perceived level of shared understanding with their
teammate by responding to the phrase “I felt my teammate and I had a shared
understanding of our teamwork” on a scale from very little (-2) to very much (2).
Using neutral (0) as a baseline, ordered logistic regression models were created to
determine the relationship between a user’s perceived level of shared understanding
and the actual team cooperation they experienced.
Figure 4.2: Mean cooperation based on different levels of shared understanding
Shared Understanding CI: 2.5% 97.5% Odds Coefficient
(0 baseline)
-2 0.9105888 1.3602221 1.1123634
-1 0.6542316 0.9199658 0.7758380
1 0.7136371 0.9368801 0.8179720
2 0.3652745 0.4896615 0.4230801
Table 4.2: The relationship between perceived shared understanding and cooperation
This model was able to determine a significant relationship between shared
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understanding and a team’s level of cooperation
(χ2 = 216.866, p << 0.001)
. Users who gave shared understanding a -1, 1 or 2 were associated with a signif-
icant (Confidence Interval (CI) does not cross 1) difference in levels of cooperation
than those with a neutral response towards shared understanding. From this model,
the level of a team’s cooperation sees a strong association with the level of shared
understanding given by a participant. The only levels of shared understanding are
associated with a decrease in the odds of increasing team cooperation (Table 4.2).
This level of shared understanding may be affected by other factors, like optimism
and human preference, but it is still shown to be an important factor in increasing
cooperation. However, the best level of shared understanding, supported by the data,
is a neutral understanding; this could be due to feelings of overconfidence or under-
confidence in the level of shared understanding between human and AI teammates.
4.4.2 Optimism Towards Artificial Intelligence
Similar to shared understanding, participants were asked their level of op-
timism towards artificial intelligence by responding to the phrase “I am optimistic
towards AI” on a scale from very low (-2) to very high (2).
Shared Understanding CI: 2.5% 97.5% Odds Coefficient
(0 baseline)
-2 1.5371439 3.6239674 2.2336973
-1 0.9544499 1.3767417 1.1460139
1 0.8247815 1.0695927 0.9394992
2 0.5440443 0.7277647 0.6293811
Table 4.3: The relationship between optimism towards AI and cooperation
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Figure 4.3: Mean cooperation based on different levels of optimism towards artificial
intelligence
The model saw a significant relationship between the participant’s optimism
towards artificial intelligence and their overall team cooperation
(χ2 = 2760.496, p << 0.001)
. Users who had levels of optimism -1 and 2 saw a significant (CI does not cross
1) difference in overall team cooperation versus those with a neutral level (Table
4.3). Significant differences in team cooperation can only be observed at the extreme
ends of this scale. This leads to the conclusion that Optimism may only affect team
cooperation at very strong levels. The most cooperative teammates were seen to have
the lowest levels of optimism towards AI, this could be due to the human working
harder to cooperate due the lack of trust in the AI, while humans with high optimism
may put too much trust into the AI lowering the overall cooperation.
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4.4.3 Preference Towards Human Teammates
Like the previous two phrases, participants rated their opinion towards the
phrase “I would prefer working with a human rather than an AI” on a scale from
very little (-2) to very much (2). These responses were used to see if a preference
towards a human teammate could possibly be a contributor towards overall team
cooperation.
Figure 4.4: Mean cooperation based on different levels of preference towards human
Shared Understanding CI: 2.5% 97.5% Odds Coefficient
(0 baseline)
-2 0.9050088 2.0107818 1.3418218
-1 0.9670076 0.4552385 1.1856354
1 0.9865519 2.5747484 2.2615868
2 0.5583562 0.7159055 0.6323584
Table 4.4: the relationship between preference towards working with a human and
cooperation
The model saw a significant relationship between a participant’s preference
72
towards a human teammate and their levels of cooperation
(χ2 = 3259.792, p << 0.001)
. Users who had a preference level of 1 or 2 saw a significant (CI does not cross 1) dif-
ference in overall cooperation versus those with a neutral level (Table 4.4). Although
participants with a slight preference towards human teammates saw an increase in
the odds of having higher cooperation, participants with a strong preference towards
human teammates actually saw a decrease in cooperation. This observation leads
us to believe that strong preferences towards human teammates could be associated
with decreased cooperation, while a slight preference towards human teammates could
yield human teammates willing to work harder to cooperate to make up for faults
they see in AI teammates.
4.5 Discussion
The results suggest that human participant’s preferences towards AI have a
substantial effect on whether or not the human player decides to be cooperative.
Cooperation occurs more frequently when participants don’t hold strong views over
whether they’d rather play with a human or an AI, which suggests that biases against
AI are not necessarily wide-spread but do affect the human willingness to cooperate
in the hawk-dove scenario.
The other major result is that there is an extremely significant relationship
between perceived shared understanding and cooperation. Such results validate one
of the major components of human-human teamwork, as it’s shown to also apply
to human-machine teams. These results speak to a different dimension of human-
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machine cooperation than personal biases towards AI. Shared understanding is an
emergent property of teamwork, thus our results can pave the way to study other
factors involved in successful human-human teamwork [McNeese et al., 2017]. We
should not assume that all the principles of human teamwork would be validated in
the human-machine setting given the limited communication involved, yet our results
with shared understanding suggest that some aspects would overlap between the two
types of teams.
The underlying dynamic of the hawk-dove game should also be underscored:
both players are better off remaining peaceful but can only do so if they are willing
to forego the short-term incentive to betray each other [Neugebauer et al., 2008].
Prolonged periods of cooperation that we have observed in our data are in some ways
irrational, for the expectation of peaceful behavior by the other player would induce a
self-interested agent to attack. The fact that this is not the case speaks to the ability
for humans and AIs to coordinate through their behavior even when communication
is not possible, such as in our setup.
The cooperative behavior that leads to coordination and mutually beneficial
outcomes is thus mediated by many of the factors that lie at the core of team effec-
tiveness, such as shared understanding. For future work, a more expansive survey
could be delivered to infer a broader spectrum of characteristics and human qualities
that are conducive to human-machine teamwork. The methodology deployed in the
study can be a very useful test-bed to empirically verify principles of teamwork in
human-machine interactions because it leverages game theory’s role in both human
as well as AI decision-making.
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4.6 Conclusion
Understanding human-AI teams requires bridging the gap between human
teamwork and multi-agent systems. To that end, this study paired human par-
ticipants with reinforcement learning agents to play a game theory scenario that
emphasizes cooperation. Results indicate that human biases in favor or against AI
have significant effects on aggression and peacefulness, and that shared understanding
plays a major role in cooperation. The next chapter shifts the focus towards theory
by introducing the first theoretical method we developed that will be tested in this
dissertation.
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Chapter 5
Model A: Human-Centered
Prediction Markets
This chapter outlines the theoretical foundation of the model we are imple-
menting in Study 4. By approaching prediction markets from a human factors per-
spective, it provides a useful model to address RQ4, RQ5, and RQ6 by identifying the
ways in which AI can play a role in prediction markets and its relevance to collective
intelligence. Moreover, it provides a framework to interpret the results we are antici-
pating from Proposed Study 2 and grounding them in a human-machine perspective
through the literature on collective intelligence.
Much of the work contained in this chapter refers to and is taken from what
became the final paper that was eventually published.
5.1 Introduction
Prediction markets are mechanisms that enable participants to bet upon the
occurrence of particular events [Hanson, 2003]. The objective of a prediction market is
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to create an incentive structure to coordinate a sophisticated forecasting process that
can enable organizations, communities, and countries to better deal with uncertainty
about the future. To that end, they have been studied in many social psychology con-
texts to identify their connections to collective intelligence [Tetlock and Gardner, 2016].
However, despite their relevance to cognitive science, prediction markets have
been mostly analyzed in the context of economics and computer science, where the
objectives are optimizations of the underlying process as opposed to collective intel-
ligence.
We approach prediction markets from a human factors perspective to identify
the key cognitive features that enables collective intelligence to emerge. Subsequently,
we propose a new human-factors-based prediction market whose design enhances col-
lectively intelligence. Furthermore, we go one step further and integrate an artificial
intelligence component to set the foundation for much higher degrees of collective in-
telligence. Thus, our model enables designers to leverage all the recent advancements
in machine learning.
5.2 Model Design
Our prediction market in Figure 5.1 relies on 4 components: 1) human par-
ticipants without access to historical trading data, 2) noisy trading bots that trade
randomly to generate a profit opportunity for other traders, 3) market making bots
that learn from market patterns and trade in order to stabilize or open up new markets
for event, and 4) neural network that receives the data generated by the prediction
market to make its estimate.
As Figure 5.1 shows, the noisy bots create the profit opportunity that moti-
vates the human participants to engage in the trading alongside the market making
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Figure 5.1: The collective intelligence emerging from humans and AIs in the prediction
market becomes the input of a neural network
bots that rapidly smooth price changes and stabilize the market for each event. The
data generated by the process is then fed as the input to the neural network that
calibrates its aggregate estimate of all the participants over time.
5.2.1 Human Interface
The primary objective on the human side of prediction markets is to incen-
tivize only traders with new information to engage. Without such a goal, the market’s
incentives can lead to speculate behavior observable in stock markets, where some
traders specialize in trading on price movements as opposed to changes in fundamen-
tals. Such behavior would dilute the signal of prices in the prediction market for they
would be distorted by copycat and speculative traders that are not contributing to
the implicit deliberation process. To that end, our design does not include interfaces
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displaying historical trading data as to induce traders to consider only information
relevant to the reality of the event as opposed to its financial counterpart in the
prediction market.
Furthermore, we deploy Hanson’s market scoring rule market maker (MSR)
to generate activity on new events [Hanson, 2003, Chen et al., 2010]. This structure
induces even just a single trader to reveal their information, which would otherwise not
occur under a standard double action in traditional prediction markets. Furthermore,
MSR enables the manager of the prediction market to not only reduce the amount
of money needed to simulate initial activity in the prediction market, but to also
efficiently allocate that capital in fixed amounts set in advance regardless of how
active the trading ends up being before the final estimate [Chen and Vaughan, 2010].
From a human factors perspective, our design seeks to use these incentive
structures to guarantee non-competitive self-selecting mechanism that encourages the
type of diversity in information and decision-making needed for prediction markets
to avoid the kind of exuberance that hallmarks “bubbles” in financial markets. In
our prediction market, each participant is asked to evaluate the uniqueness of their
information before entering into any trade. This is further reinforced by the reason-
ing from the current market price as to whether it reflects the participant’s unique
information or whether it justifies the buying or selling of shares to direct the price
closer to their estimate. Diversity has value in a prediction market, thus participants
with diverse information will self-select to become a trader [Watkins, 2007].
Beyond that however, our design incorporates differences in forecaster knowl-
edge and skill. Specifically, the order size and the amount of money at stake on a
given trade serves as a useful proxy for the participant’s confidence, for their risk-
aversion will make the amount of invested be proportional to the gap between their
expectations and the current market price. On a long enough time line, successful
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traders will be highly rewarded and thus wield greater influence on future prices. This
feature is consistent with the “marginal trader hypothesis” in economics where the
efficiency of a stock market is driven by a minority of unbiased and active participants
who wield corrective influence [Wolfers, 2009].
5.2.2 Machine Interface
The machine side of the design includes two types of agents: noisy traders and
market makers. We designed them because they provide distinct functions within the
prediction market, by making it more effective and precise.
The noisy traders are designed to buy and sell shares of each event randomly
and selling them within a narrow interval from their current price. Their behavior cre-
ates the opportunity for the human participants to profit on a regular basis, preventing
a no-trade scenario that would make the price updates given new information sud-
den and extreme as opposed to gradual and incremental [Chen and Vaughan, 2010].
This type of agent resolves many of the concerns related to motivation of the human
participants.
The market makers are altogether different. They are not designed to behave
randomly, but rather learn how to trade from the historical trading data of the predic-
tion itself by using simple machine learning algorithms. Their purpose is to stabilize
trading by engaging in the type of behavior high frequency trading firms in financial
markets engage in to drive out speculation on price movements. Their function is to
also efficiently make bets on forecasts two-sided to reduce imbalances, and the nature
of machine learning positions them to rapidly improve their usefulness as they receive
new data from the human participants over time. Their trading behavior is extremely
important to counterbalance the long-shot biases that plague human-only prediction
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markets.
Furthermore, prior research with Football forecasts indicates that even though
such bots have no understanding of the underlying event being analyzed, they are on
average more accurate than the human participants and thus force the participants
to refine their analysis which improves their forecasts [Malone, 2018]. This type of
research suggests that prediction markets would benefit from the type of machine
interface we include in our design to mitigate human biases and create a more robust
guarantee that prediction markets focus on forecasting as opposed to speculation.
5.2.3 Neural Network Layer
A major contribution of this model is the layer that sits above the human
participants and the trading bots. We include a neural network whose input is the
data generated by participants to produce an aggregate estimate of the probability of
the event occurring. Artificial neural networks, much like the human brain, use neu-
rons that are made up of collections of nodes that function as processing units with
weighted connections to each other [Kaur and Wasan, 2006]. A neural network has a
very basic architecture: it has an input layer of neurons that accepts input, a customiz-
able number of hidden layers performing calculations and transformations over the
data, and an output layer of neurons that outputs predictions in the selected format
[Kaur and Wasan, 2006]. Whenever a neural network makes a prediction, the error
rate is measured so that the network can adjust the weights of its neurons in order to
calibrate its model and achieve better accuracy over time [Simon and Eswaran, 1997].
As mentioned earlier, there is no real consensus on how to translate fluctuating
prices in the prediction market into a sensible probability estimate for the event being
forecasted. We believe the issue lies in the prior literature emphasis on algorithmic
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solutions. Instead, we seek to integrate the recent advances in AI to create dynamic
as opposed to static solution to the problem, and one that evolves with the prediction
market over time.
Prior research has been able to show at a theoretical level how the market
scoring rules of prediction markets connect to the equations underlying the value of
function of many machine learning models (Chen Vaughan, 2010). Beyond the theory
however, artificial prediction markets can fuse the predictions of trained classifiers into
contract prices on all possible outcomes [Barbu and Lay, 2012]. The results indicate
that such systems outperform cutting edge algorithms that ensemble a variety of
models in the healthcare domain, which is attributed to the market mechanism’s
ability to aggregate specialized classifiers that participate only on specific instances
[Barbu and Lay, 2012, Jahedpari et al., 2017].
This type of result however extends beyond artificial prediction markets where
machine learning models are the participants. Tetlock’s research on forecasting for
IARPA also showed that an extremizing algorithm that took the probabilistic esti-
mates of “superforecasters” as its input actually outperformed 99% of the individual
super-forecasters, by aggregating their opinions and weighing them based on track
record and diverse POV [Tetlock and Gardner, 2016].
We go multiple steps further with our design. Not only do we accommodate a
hybrid prediction market where humans and AIs alike participate, but we also reject
static algorithms in favor of a neural network which is much more effective and capable
of aggregating and weighing the different estimates and viewpoints emerging from the
interactions of the prediction markets. The neural network will not merely be learning
from price fluctuations, but from the trading behavior of the human participants as
well, potentially identifying talented forecasters without having to rely or give undue
influence to any of them. Furthermore, our design generalizes to different settings
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because the neural network obviates the need to perfect knowledge from the group
as it detects patterns among participants who themselves may not be experts.
In essence, the machine learning layer enables our prediction market to tran-
scend the limitations inherent to traditional prediction markets by having a neural
network train and learn from the data generated by the human traders.
5.3 Discussion
Prediction markets have been proven useful in forecasting geopolitical events,
sports outcomes, and elections. Yet, they have failed to become ubiquitous despite
their success. We believe this is due to the many flaws of traditional prediction
markets that privilege algorithms over human effort. By putting collective intelligence
at the center of the discussion, our design shows us how a human factors perspective
can not only enhance human intelligence, but also make room for artificial intelligence.
On multiple fronts, AI can be the key to overcoming many of the challenges
posed by prediction markets. It can downplay the influence of human biases in the
market by checking and balancing activity to suppress bubbles before they form.
It can induce the participants to think probabilistically and more precisely about
their understanding of the event. It can also make the market more adaptive to
new information by forcing every participant to update their beliefs based on new
information. Through these interventions, the machines in our prediction market
smooth out the often erratic behavior of human traders and thus provide a more
reliable forecasting mechanism that can extend beyond the few areas where prediction
markets have been tried.
Beyond that, however, our model forces us to reconsider how we think about
prediction markets in the first place. By de-emphasizing the computation and game
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theoretical perspective in favor of the cognitive science one, we no longer think about
prediction markets as an auction mechanism but rather as a platform for decentralized
collaboration between humans trying to tackle the challenges of uncertainty.
Furthermore, our design opens up a new branch of research where the pre-
diction market is seen as a coordination mechanism to enable a different type of
cognition: artificial intelligence emerging from collective intelligence. The wisdom of
the crowd becomes the input the neural network learns from, whose emergent prop-
erty is an altogether different type of artificial intelligence that is worth exploring in
future research.
5.4 Conclusion
Through an interdisciplinary perspective, we brought a human factors ap-
proach to the design of a more effective prediction market that is not merely opti-
mized for the wisdom of the crowd but also enables a higher level cognitive process
that integrates collective intelligence with artificial intelligence. The next chapter
introduces another model we developed for human-machine teamwork that will be
tested through this dissertation.
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Chapter 6
Model B: Collectively Intelligent
Teamwork
This chapter outlines the theoretical foundations of one of the major underly-
ing theses of the dissertation: team cognition and collective intelligence are analogous
phenomena happening at different scales. It classifies the similarities and differences
in the cognitive models represented in Study 3 (team cognition) and Study 4 (collec-
tive intelligence) in order to identify the connections between them to set the stage
for them to be combined into a more unified understanding of emergent cognition.
Furthermore, this chapter also discusses the Superforecasting phenomenon and its
several major implications for human-machine intelligence.
Much of the work contained in this chapter refers to and is taken from what
became the final paper that was eventually published.
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6.1 Introduction
Cognitive science is a study of information processing and neurological be-
havior that all take place in the human mind. Through those lenses, it becomes
possible not only to examine individual behavior, but also to investigate social be-
havior. Team science lies at the intersection between researching individual and group
psychology, and actively deals with how collections of individual people coordinate
most effectively.
This kind of phenomenon however is replicated at a larger scale with intellec-
tually productive crowd efforts. A primary example is Foldit, a crowdsourcing effort
for biochemistry and protein folding that uncovered in just three weeks the structure
of an enzyme related to AIDS that had eluded scientists for 15 years [Malone, 2018].
This type of phenomenon taps into resources and skills needed to perform an ac-
tivity that are distributed widely or reside in places that are not known in advance
[Malone et al., 2009].
So far, the team cognition literature has mostly focused on the ability for teams
to develop shared situational awareness or a shared understanding of a complex task
in many practical contexts [Cooke et al., 2007]. On the other hand, the collective
intelligence literature has mostly focused on the ability of large decentralized groups
to aggregate and process large amounts of information to produce insights far superior
to those of individuals and teams, especially in scenarios marked by deep uncertainty
[Atanasov et al., 2016].
In this model, we analyze the results of “superforecasting” (teams of forecast-
ers outperforming prediction markets) as the starting point for a new way to think
about teamwork that merges the insights from team cognition and collective intelli-
gence to challenge many assumptions held by each school of thought. Thus, one of
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the contributions of this model is a comparative analysis of the team cognition and
collective intelligence literature to identify the connections between the concept of a
shared mental model and that of the wisdom of the crowd respectively.
Furthermore, we analyze the results from the superforecasting research to de-
velop a model that enables the coordination individuals whose information processing
enables both team cognition as well as collective intelligence to emerge. Lastly, we
demonstrate how to incorporate artificial intelligence into our model in order to enable
team’s information processing to become the input of a neural network to enhance
the team’s collective intelligence to outperform smart crowds.
6.2 Model Description
On the surface, team cognition and collective intelligence appear to be irrecon-
cilable. Teams cognition is heavily dependent on information sharing and verbal com-
munication, whereas collective intelligence relies on the opposite: local information
gathering and independent analysis [Graham et al., 2004]. Team cognition benefits
from centralized leadership, whereas collective intelligence is predicated upon decen-
tralization [Fiore et al., 2010]. Teams exaggerate the cognitive biases of individuals,
whereas wise crowds compensate for them [Atanasov et al., 2016].
However, by delving deeply into the phenomenon of “superforecasting”, a new
type of team cognition can be identified as the properties of the wisdom of the crowd
can emerge from small teams operating in the right structure. In turn, this insight
sets the foundation for methods to combine artificial intelligence with collective in-
telligence. We thus develop a new model (Figure 6.1) for teamwork that unifies team
cognition, collective intelligence, and artificial intelligence.
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Figure 6.1: Each teammate shares evidence for a team discussion, and expresses a
probability estimate that is then aggregated by the neural network
6.3 Collectively Intelligent Teams
A collectively intelligent team is a team whose shared mental model enables
higher degrees of collective intelligence than in crowds. The first major component
is a set of cognitive strategies that are deployed at the individual level. Specifically,
each individual is trained on specific cognitive strategies to improve their decision-
making. Just like superforecasters, collectively intelligent teammates are trained in
probabilistic thinking, evidence-based discussions, depersonalized intellectual conflict,
diversity of viewpoints, commitment to truth, and data-driven decision-making. All
of these practices can dramatically enhance the teammate’s team cognition.
The second major component is a set of guidelines to the team for information
processing. Elite superforecasters in the literature are shown to engage in many
distinct behaviors that were predictors of accuracy, they cognitively triaged (deciding
how to allocate effort across questions). They asked five times more specific questions
than average and were answered six times more frequently. They made comments
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roughly one third longer, and made between nine and thirteen times more general
comments than average. Beyond merely being more likely to gather news and opinion
pieces related to the forecast, superforecasters were between six and ten times more
likely to share news links with their teammates [Mellers et al., 2015].
The last component is a layer of artificial intelligence to aggregate the team’s
insights. An often overlooked result of the superforecasting research is how applying
an extremizing algorithm that aggregates the forecasters’ forecasts and weighs them
based on track record and diverse point of view outperformed 99% of the individual
super-forecasters [Tetlock and Gardner, 2016]. Already prediction-polled superfore-
casters outperform prediction markets, the best collectively intelligent mechanism to
date, so the fact that shifting from a statistical aggregation rule to an algorithm leads
to even better predictive power is remarkable. Prior research in both prediction mar-
kets and prediction polling has identified the choice of an aggregation function as a
factor that materially changes the value of the probability estimates of the system
[Atanasov et al., 2013, Atanasov et al., 2016].
The advances brought about by a simple algorithm open up the opportunity
to incorporate AI in the forecasting process. Prior research has shown how collec-
tively intelligent teams can be created through cognitively optimized software appli-
cations. Specifically, a recent radiology study at Stanford has shown that a team
radiologist coordinated with a probabilistic interface gained a 22% margin on the
state-of-the-art deep-learning solution and a 33% margin on individual radiologists
as a whole [Rosenberg et al., 2018b, Rosenberg et al., 2018a]. This result is not iso-
lated to healthcare but also works in financial forecasting. A recent Oxford study on
using the same probabilistic interface to coordinate traders to predict four economic
indicators showed a 26% increase in prediction accuracy as compared to individual
forecasts [Rosenberg et al., 2018b, Rosenberg et al., 2018a].
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However these results occur with the use of simple algorithms that aggregate
the individual forecasts to produce an optimal estimate. Neural networks can process
much deeper correlations between individual forecasts over time, therefore machine
learning can yield significant gains for collectively intelligent teams that are orders of
magnitude better than base performance.
In essence, our model for collectively intelligent teamwork relies upon each
teammate being trained by probabilistic cognitive strategies, the team sharing infor-
mation through protocols that preserve independence, and most importantly the use
of neural networks to optimize the collective intelligence of the team.
6.4 Discussion
The superforecasting research could not be understated: those results robustly
demonstrate how small teams can outperform the most collectively intelligent mech-
anism known to date – prediction markets – in a significant way. This evidence
suggests that a new type of intelligence can be unlocked through teamwork that goes
beyond what the team cognition literature has been demonstrating. Team cognition
expands from perception into prediction as a team of superforecasters displays both
team cognition and collective intelligence, two emergent phenomena thought to be
separate up until that point.
Researching superforecasters expands how we think about collective intelli-
gence as well as team cognition. For the former, it means that you no longer neces-
sarily need a crowd to have collective intelligence as long as teams are trained through
particular cognitive strategies when engaging in forecasting. For team cognition, it
means that the possibility landscape for teamwork is vaster than previously thought,
and is relevant beyond the military setting and responding to physical situations and
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can move into a higher-order form of information processing like forecasting.
Furthermore, our model bridges the literature gap between team cognition
and collective intelligence. Specifically, we note that shared mental models are to
team cognition, what the wisdom of the crowd is to collective intelligence: they
are emergent phenomena of effectively coordinated groups of people. Through the
collectively intelligent team model, these two perspectives can be integrated. Not
only can teams rapidly develop a sophisticated understanding of their situation and
environment, but can also work together to produce remarkable insights under deep
uncertainty by thinking about the future in a probabilistic manner.
The collectively intelligent team model is also useful as the foundation for
new technology. A collectively intelligent team emerges when a team’s shared mental
model enables each teammate to enhance their forecasting process so that they can
each produce better estimates that can be fed as input to a neural network that learns
over time how to calibrate the weight it assigns to each team member’s opinion in
particular contexts. The use of AI in this case creates a highly adaptive coordination
mechanism that enables the team to retain independent thought while still collabo-
rating. Rosenberg et al’s (2018) work on coordinating teams through probabilistic
decision making is merely an initial attempt at developing human-centered interfaces
that can transform team cognition into collective intelligence.
Interestingly enough, the literature on team cognition provides many results
that are consistent with collectively intelligent teamwork. For example, Google’s
Project Aristotle illustrates how the stronger predictors of team success in knowledge-
work shows are equality of conversational turn-taking and higher levels of social sen-
sitivity [Duhigg, 2016]. This is consistent with the observations that superforecasters
deeply value hearing everyone else’s opinion before expressing their own [Tetlock and Gardner, 2016].
Furthermore, prior research has shown that asking team members to defend
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their position induces a cognitive strategy relying on generative confirmatory evi-
dence, whereas not expecting them to leads to greater freedom to explore arguments
counter to initial positions [Hinsz et al., 1997]. Teams of superforecasters do this by
keeping track of arguments from different viewpoints in favor or against a particular
forecast [Tetlock and Gardner, 2016].
6.5 Conclusion
Through a deep analysis of team cognition and collective intelligence, we de-
veloped a new model that integrates the two phenomena. This model sets the basis
for a new type of teamwork that exhibits both properties, as evidenced by the results
on teams of superforecasters. Lastly however, we go one step further to show how
artificial intelligence can be used to cognitively enhance collectively intelligent teams
to reach a new level of intelligence that has only begun to be fully explored.
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Chapter 7
Study 3: Team Cognition in
Human-Machine Teams
7.1 Introduction
There are many ways of studying teamwork, but only a few that can identify
the properties of team cognition. This study focuses on the first research goal: un-
derstanding team cognition in human-machine teams. Team cognition is an emergent
phenomenon of shared understanding that arises out of the coordination of the team
members as they try to adapt to a complex environment and deliver on a challenging
task. In order to study teamwork and team cognition, it’s thus not only useful but
necessary to create a dynamic environment that motivates the teammates to work
together in order to accomplish a goal. To that end, simulations and simulated en-
vironments can effectively provide such a set up in a way that is replicable across
iterations, so that team performance can be meaningfully compared.
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7.2 Overview
The study analyzes three major types of teams (human teams, machine teams,
and human-machine teams) from both a quantitative perspective (looking at the com-
parative performance of each team type) and descriptive perspective (using team-
work surveys to identify principles of human teamwork that are predictive of human-
machine team performance). This dual approach addresses RQ2 and RQ3 with the
quantitative analysis, and RQ1 with the qualitative analysis.
This between-subjects study uses an emergency response simulation to create
an experimental environment where participants have to work together to coordinate
effective team responses to a variety of situations. Traditionally, the emphasis has
been placed upon the role communication plays into the development of a shared
mental model [Graham et al., 2004, Mathieu et al., 2000]. However, the type of nu-
anced and deep communication that is associated with effective human teams is not
currently applicable in the case of human-machine teamwork. Thus, the emphasis
in our study is not on communication, but rather on shared situational awareness
(defined in our measurements section), as the humans and AIs have to work together
by effectively anticipating each other’s behavior and succeed as a team.
7.3 Methods
7.3.1 Simulation
The simulation we are using for this study is NeoCITIES. In NeoCITIES, par-
ticipants respond to a sequence of incidents in a fictional college town that requires
emergency response [McNeese et al., 2014a]. Teams of three individuals playing sepa-
rate roles (police, fire, and hazardous material response) are tasked with assessing each
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episode and appropriately allocating scarce resources. This basic setup has historically
lead to multiple findings in information science, psychology, and geographical sciences
[McNeese et al., 2014a]. Furthermore, through the repeated use of established mea-
sures and metrics, NeoCITIES enables researchers to investigate specific aspects of
team cognition and other critical factors in teamwork [Mohammed et al., 2010].
7.3.2 Updated NeoCITIES
In order to conduct our study, it became necessary to develop a new version of
NeoCITIES that could incorporate AI agents and support a wider variety of scenarios.
To better understand the nature of the changes that we made in the new version, it’s
important to begin by discussing the limitations of the prior version of NeoCITIES.
7.3.2.1 Backend and Architecture
With respect to its architecture, the prior version of NeoCITIES used a client-
server model to display information generated by a simulation engine that was devel-
oped with Java and Adobe technologies as a multi-threaded application that handles
the event and resource data, maintains the state of the world, and calculates event
scores [Hellar and McNeese, 2010].
The downside of this type of design is that it did not support multiple sim-
ulations simultaneously, and thus limited researchers to running one simulation at
a time on their local environment. To solve this problem, we implemented a cloud-
based design where clients push updates to a cloud server (specifically Firebase) that
automatically updates a global state that the clients are listening to through a REST
API. Essentially, any time changes are made to the server, the state of the simulation
is updated and the clients reflect those updates in real time.
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Furthermore, the Firebase server supports a vast amount of simultaneous ses-
sions because each session is managed by a child in the database’s JSON tree, which
prevents the clients from accidentally updating the wrong session. Therefore, the new
architecture leverages the benefits of the cloud to enable researchers to conduct simu-
lations without having the participants be co-located, while also removing limitations
on session being run simultaneously, thereby accelerating the data gathering process
for researchers in the future.
The last major way in which the new architecture advances NeoCITIES is
by creating an API layer that enables AI agents to easily interact with the human
participants, thereby enabling the platform to support human-machine teams for the
first time. Specifically, the AI agents can request the state of the simulation through
the REST API on Firebase and push actions to the database. This enables the agents
to participate in the simulations in an asynchronous manner similar to human players.
Overall, the new architecture is designed to be very modular and thus support
researchers to develop a variety of scenarios with different roles, resources, and number
of players. Prior versions of NeoCITIES required updating the backend every time
a new scenario had to be implemented, thereby rendering all the parameters static.
The new version sidesteps the entire issue by making the scenario customizable from
the backend. All the researcher needs to do is specify the parameters through a JSON
structure (for which we created a template) and upload it to Firebase.
7.3.2.2 Frontend and Interfaces
The next major aspect of NeoCITIES consisted of updating the frontend in-
terface. Figure 7.1 shows what the prior version of NeoCITIES looks like.
Hellar and McNeese (2010) describe the user interface at a high level, and their
description is summarized below:
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Figure 7.1: Frontend Interface of the Prior Version of NeoCITIES
The resource panel displays the unique set of resources available to each player
that can be applied to events. Each resource has a limited number of units that are
represented by an icon associated with the resource and a specific badge number. By
clicking the Dispatch Units button the interface expands and allows the user to drag
and drop resources to selected events on the event tracker.
There is also a unit monitor that displays the unit’s status (which includes
current location and field reports from the event) and enables the player at any time
to recall the resource to the home station so that it can be re-allocated. Resources are
automatically recalled when an event fails or is completed, but a player can always
choose to reassign a resource to a more extreme event.
The redesign of the interface sought to preserve many of the key features (the
mechanics of resource allocation, recall, chat, briefs) while also altering it in several
ways, mostly to effectively support AI agents.
To start with, Figure 7.2 shows the default view the human participants have
access to.
On the right are the resources the player has access to. Players can assign
resources through the SEND button, which when clicked turns into a dropdown menu
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Figure 7.2: Frontend Interface of the Updated NeoCITIES
where the user selects which event to assign the resource to. Once the resource is
assigned, the button turns into a RECALL button which if clicked recalls the resource
to the player’s location.
On the left side is the chat component, which identifies each player and their
messages through distinct colors. Unlike the prior version of NeoCITIES, the chat
automatically scrolls to the bottom so that only the latest 3 messages are immediately
visible. If a player needs to go back to the prior message, they just need to scroll
upward in the chat. This design choice was implemented because it makes the chat
more consistent with how modern applications implement chats, thereby avoiding
having the player switch behaviors they’ve grown accustomed to when using a chat
interface.
In the middle are the tasks and events that are currently active. Each event is
represented by a card that includes an event description alongside its current status,
broken down per requirement (false/red means that particular resource has not arrived
to the event yet). The event card also provides two additional types of information,
as shown in Figure 7.3.
In the top right it shows how much time is left before the event fails, and if the
RESOURCES tab is clicked upon, the card shows the amount of time it would take
for each of the player’s resources to reach the event. These calculations are done on
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Figure 7.3: Event Card
the client side and are updated every time the global state of the simulation changes.
A far larger change however is the implementation of a map locating events and
resources, which is shown in Figure 7.4. The events and resources are represented
through the same icons that are used on the default view, and are still identified
through the legends on the left and right side of the screen.
Figure 7.4: NeoCITIES Map
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The last version of NeoCITIES did not have a map, thus the players were forced
to coordinate purely looking at the estimates. However, one of the early versions of
NeoCITIES did include a map to focus more on shared geo-spatial reasoning among
the players. As described above, our version supports both, and specifically includes
the map because AI agents can only process states through a matrix representing
the coordinates of the elements in the simulation. Thus, were a map not included,
the agents would be perceiving the simulation in an entirely different way than the
human players, thereby preventing an accurate direct comparison between human-
only teams and human-machine teams. Only by having all players have access to
geo-spatial information can an effective comparison be drawn.
Overall, participants scroll through and switch from view to view as needed in
order to respond to scenarios and its accompanying sequence of events that are being
studied.
7.3.3 AI Agents and Training
For the first time since its original development, NeoCITIES supports AI
agents. These agents are based upon reinforcement learning, a type of machine
learning model that learns tasks through behavioral rewards and has recently gained
attention for its superhuman performance in Go, Chess, soccer, and Atari games
[Hu et al., 1998, Foerster et al., 2018]. Using RL not only enables NeoCITIES to in-
corporate the most cutting edge AI models, but it also enables the agents to generalize
to a wide variety of scenarios since RL agents learn independently from the feedback
of the game.
Each agent is an instance of one of the RL models currently existing from both
the literature as well as the private sector. To implement the RL agents, we used
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Tensorforce, which is an open source RL library focused on providing clear APIs, read-
ability and modularization to deploy RL solutions in both research and real world ap-
plications [Schaarschmidt et al., 2017, Schaarschmidt et al., 2018]. There are a host
of predefined algorithms present in this library:
• A3C using distributed TensorFlow [Mnih et al., 2016].
• Trust Region Policy Optimization [Schulman et al., 2015].
• Normalized Advantage functions (NAFs) [Gu et al., 2016].
• DQN [Mnih et al., 2013].
• Double-DQN [Van Hasselt et al., 2016].
• Vanilla Policy Gradients (VPG/ REINFORCE) [Williams, 1992].
• Deep Q-learning from Demonstration (DQFD) [Hester et al., 2018].
• Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) [Schulman et al., 2017]
In order to generate these RL agents, we developed our own training system.
RL only works if the agent is able to extensively iterate through the game, thus using
NeoCITIES clients and servers would not work because it would take too long. In-
stead, our training system replicates NeoCITIES mathematically so that each agent
can learn through self-play as part of a multi-agent system that encompasses all 3
roles. Specifically, the system represents NeoCITIES as a sequence of matrices of
the ever-evolving state of the game. This aspect is critical because the human and
the machine in the human-machine teams inherently operate differently (the machine
perceives reality through linear algebra representations, the human uses biological
perception). The environment is configured to match the scenario that appears on
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NeoCITIES’ server, thereby removing the need for researchers to create a new envi-
ronment every time they make changes to the scenario: instead, the researcher simply
uses the same JSON file they uploaded to Firebase.
The agent receives the state as a 50x50 matrix with various unique identifiers
locating resources and events based on their coordinates. After receiving the state,
the agent performs an action by selecting the destination coordinates of each resource
at its disposal. The action is processed by the environment, the locations of the
resources and the status of the events changes, and the state (which includes the
map) is updated. From the updated state, a reward is computed based on how much
closer the resource is to an appropriate event compared to its prior state, and the agent
then receives the reward. An epoch (an entire session of NeoCITIES) lasts for the
time specified in the scenario, but the update happens almost immediately as opposed
to taking the interval of time it takes in the real world (the default time interval for
updates for NeoCITIES is 5 seconds), which accelerates the agent’s training. The
agent’s model is saved at a regular interval (the default is every 5000 epochs), and
continues until a specified amount of epochs have elapsed (the default we used in this
study is 200000).
Lasty, we built an API that enables the trained agent to interact with the
Firebase database. This API connects to Firebase and generates a game state every
time there is an update and polls the agent for an action which is in turn restructured
and uploaded to the database. The agent thus responds to a stream of updates coming
directly from Firebase, thereby enabling a seamless integration between the human
players and the AI agents as NeoCITIES updates on both ends at the same time.
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7.3.4 Measurements
7.3.4.1 Scoring Model
In order to evaluate human task performance, NeoCITIES relies upon an event
growth formula inherited from the original design of the CITIES task [Wellens and Ergener, 1988].
The current formula is designed to incentivize participants to respond to events in a
correct and timely manner by allocating resources [Hellar and McNeese, 2010]:
M2 = a ∗M + b ∗M–C(R)
Each event begins with an initial magnitude (M), with the median range of
initial values being between 2 and 3. Constants (a, b, c) are the seed coefficients that
determine the rate of growth of the event’s magnitude (M2), which in turn affects
the number of resources (R) required to fully respond. As the number of resources
(R) is correctly allocated to the event, the event’s severity diminishes proportionally
until the event is resolved or it expires because the participants failed to respond in
a timely manner [Hellar and McNeese, 2010].
7.3.4.2 Team Metrics
At its core, NeoCITIES tracks performance by evaluating the speed and accu-
racy of the team’s response through raw (cumulative) and relative (weighted) scores.
Teams are rewarded for rapidly sending the correct type and amount of resources to
an emergency event, and are penalized when an event terminates either because of the
team’s inaction or through their incorrect or slow response [Hellar and McNeese, 2010].
Table 7.1 matches team metrics with particular measurements computed by the NeoC-
ITIES database.
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NeoCITIES Performance Metrics
Metric Measurement
Task Performance Raw Score, Relative Score, Response Errors
Situational Awareness Synchronicity, Sequencing
Team Communication Chat Log Frequency
Table 7.1: NeoCITIES Performance Metrics and their Measurements
Raw score refers to the cumulative magnitude of the events that were suc-
cessfully responded to by the team. The nature of the scoring model enables the
escalation of low-magnitude events into high-magnitude events, challenging teams to
effectively prioritize resources between events of varying magnitude. On the other
hand, the relative score refers to the raw score being understood as a percentage esti-
mate of possible performance. It’s computed by subtracting the ratio of raw score and
worst score (the raw score implied by the player taking no action) being subtracted
from 100 to retain a positive scale. By weighing events of all severities, the relative
score ends up emphasizing performance across all events as opposed to the raw score
which is biased towards high initial severity event. Team performance can thus be
represented by the average of the teammates’ relative scores (highest being best) and
the cumulative sum of their raw scores (lowest is best). Response errors refers to
the frequency of incorrect resources being allocated to a particular event, and thus
functions as a measure of accuracy.
Situational awareness is assessed through two variables: sequencing and syn-
chronicity. The former refers to the degree to which the order in which resources
reach an event match some pre-set parameter (highest being best), and the latter
refers to the degree to which the correct resources are applied to the event within a
narrow time-frame. Both these variables are automatically computed at the end of
the session as all interactions between resources and tasks are recorded at the server
level.
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Lastly, communication is measured in a straightforward way by looking at the
message frequency in the chat log. NeoCITIES records and timestamps all communi-
cation between players, which can then be analyzed in ways specific to the researcher’s
design.
7.3.5 Study Design
7.3.5.1 Overview
After comparing the performance of three RL agents, we selected the top
performing one as the AI agent for the human-machine teams. We then recruited
participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk to play NeoCITIES in teams of 3 under
different conditions.
7.3.5.2 Task
For the task, we implemented a variation of NeoCITIES default scenario. Each
of the three players are assigned to a different role: police, fire, and hazmat. The
police role controls an investigator, a squad car, and a SWAT team. The fire role
controls an investigator, an ambulance, and a firetruck. The hazmat role controls
an investigator, a bomb squad, and a chemical truck. Each player manages these
resources to respond to events which become active at different times throughout the
session and fail if they are not fully responded to within a certain time (measured in
seconds from start time). The list of events is shown in Table 7.2.
The task takes 5 minutes (900 seconds total), and it begins once all players
have signed on. At the end of the session, relative score is computed and displayed
to the players.
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Title Resources Difficulty Start Time (s) Time Limit (s)
Football
investigator 2 11 411Weekend
Briefing
Tanker
Collision
squad-car
3 41 441fire-truck
chemical-truck
Escort a
swat 1 126 526
Senator
Smoking
fire-truck 2 156 556
Kills
Field Chemical
chemical-truck 3 226 626
Removal
Luncheon Ambulance
2 256 656
Nausea investigator
Possible Student investigator
2 329 729
Rave squad-car
Old Main Frame investigator
2 359 759
Shoppe Fire fire-truck
Table 7.2: NeoCITIES Default Scenario
7.3.5.3 Experimental Setup
Each player logs in into NeoCITIES with a different url which identifies the
team they are a part of, the session they are about to start (they play a total of 5
sessions), and which role they are assigned (identified through A, B, and C).
Once they login and sign the consent form, they are taken to the training
page. The training page includes both a text explanation of how NeoCITIES works,
as short videos. At the very top of the page is a progress bar that lets the player
know whether all players have logged in. Figure 7.5 shows the training page.
Once all players are logged in, the interface takes the players to the main view
and the sessions begins. After the 5 minutes elapse, the relative score is computed
and displayed to each player, and a link at the bottom takes them to the next session.
Once all 5 sessions are completed, the participants are taken to Qualtrics to fill out
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Figure 7.5: Training Page
a survey.
The survey questions extend a basic teamwork principles to include questions
drawn from the team cognition literature that identify emergent interaction, shared
knowledge, and collaborative environment. These variables are integral to how team
cognition is studied in the literature, and emerge from a composite of several survey
questions whose cumulative responses have been shown to be correlated with team
cognition [Lee and Johnson, 2008].
7.3.5.4 Participants
We enlisted over 60 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk)
to play NeoCITIES under different conditions. Traditionally, research with NeoC-
ITIES has been limited to lab experiments because it was developed prior to the
advent of cloud computing [Hellar and McNeese, 2010]. Despite initial hesitancy,
the use of platforms such as MTurk for behavioral research has grown in popularity
among researchers in both psychology and economics [Horton et al., 2011]. The lit-
erature has identified the validity-related advantages and drawbacks of using Mturk
when compared to traditional lab studies, which serve as a useful starting point
to justify our experimental design choice while also discussing potential limitations
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[Horton et al., 2011, Paolacci et al., 2010].
To start with, Mturk offers a more diverse pool of subjects to draw samples
from. On the other hand, despite its ubiquity, the use of convenience samples in lab
studies has recently been heavily criticized as one of the major factors in the replica-
tion crisis in experimental economics and psychology [Horton et al., 2011]. Alongside
convenience sampling, the heavy reliance on traditional university subject pools by
lab studies has also been heavily criticized. MTurk enables researchers to sidestep
the problem because the platform’s user base has been found to be arguably closer
to the U.S. population as a whole than university subjects [Paolacci et al., 2010].
However, prior research has expressed concerns regarding the over-representation
of female and Asian subjects in recent experiments relying on MTurk [Eriksson and Simpson, 2010].
The criticism speaks to the distinctions between US Internet users, where an over-
abundance of female subjects in online study recruitment has been identified, and
the US population as a whole [Ipeirotis, 2009, Ross et al., 2010, Gosling et al., 2004].
These concerns, although valid, are reduced in the case of MTurk because the most
recent data shows that despite a significant number of workers from India (34%),
the plurality of workers is from the US (47%) [Paolacci et al., 2010]. Furthermore, a
comprehensive demographic analysis has shown that MTurk workers are at least as
representative of the U.S. population as traditional subject pools or more representa-
tive than college undergraduate samples and internet samples in general with respect
to gender, race, age and education [Paolacci et al., 2010].
Overall, even when directly compared to the kind of lab study NeoCITIES has
been traditionally used for, very little evidence exists to suggest that data collected
through platforms such as MTurk is necessarily of poorer quality when compared
to traditional subject pools [Krantz and Dalal, 2000, Gosling et al., 2004]. Indeed,
Horton et al (2011) have shown that MTurk workers engage in the same kind of
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decision-making that has historically characterized subjects in behavioral research.
Additionally, it is in fact that case that Mturk studies has been shown to be far less
susceptible to experimenter bias, subject crosstalk, and reactance than lab studies
because of the physical separation between the researcher and the research subjects
[Paolacci et al., 2010]. These findings imply that MTurk is a very reliable and ar-
guably superior way to conduct research, which alleviates the concern that subsequent
studies using our cloud-based version of NeoCITIES won’t connect to the literature
relying on the prior version.
Weighing these concerns, Horton et al (2011) put forth the following guidelines
to ensure that an MTurk study retains validity:
1. Experiments covering the behavior of selected groups (Ex. young mothers)
require the use of a contextualized sample for the MTurk subjects to adhere to
2. Experiments involving behaviors in specialized contexts (Ex. after a disaster)
also require the MTurk sample to match to the context
3. Estimates of changes (Ex. Do angry individuals take more risks?) are reliable,
while estimates of levels (Ex. How many people support candidate X?) much
less so
Lastly, the consensus in the MTurk literature heavily emphasise the strong
necessity to disclose the demographics of the study’s Mturk participants in order
to enable differences in the results of similar studies to be compared as to iden-
tify the kind of patterns exhibited by cross-cultural studies [Paolacci et al., 2010,
Horton et al., 2011]. To that end, we provide a breakdown of our Mturk’s samples
demographics in the Table 7.3.
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Male Female
Gender 67.23% 32.77%
African American Asian Caucasian Indian Other
Race & Ethnicity 5.89% 40.76% 30.52% 21.57 1.26%
18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65
Age 19.45% 64.31% 14.81% 5.03% 6.40%
Table 7.3: Demographics
7.3.5.5 Experimental Conditions
NeoCITIES supports 3 players at any given time, which implies 3 combinations
of human and AI players: a team of all humans, a team of 2 humans and one agent,
and a team of 2 agents and 1 human. We studied each combination as its separate
condition. To that end, the participants were grouped in batches of 30, 20, and 10
then assigned to one of the three experimental conditions respectively (human-only
team, human-machine team, human-machine-machine team).
In order to select an RL agent to participate as the teammate for the human-
machine teams, we trained 3 different RL agents (DQN, PPO, and VPG) and selected
PPO to be the teammate in all other conditions (including our benchmark ai-only
condition) since it performed the best.
NeoCITIES automatically tracks team performance across the 3 metrics de-
scribed earlier through the 6 measurements. These metrics were recorded for every
round of game play for all conditions, and were combined with the measures from
the teamwork principles survey to identify the descriptive ways in which teamwork
manifested itself differently across conditions.
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7.4 Results
We conducted two separate analyses of the results: one of performance metrics,
and one of the survey results.
7.4.1 Performance Analysis
Our experimental setup is simultaneously between subjects (each team is as-
signed only one of the team type conditions) and within-subject design (each team,
regardless of team type, plays the game 5 times). Pursuant of this dynamic, In order to
address how team performance and situation awareness differ across four conditions,
we conducted a 4 x 5 mixed Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to determine whether the
different team configurations (four conditions: ai-only, human-ai-ai, human-human-
ai, human-only) differed with respect to their performance improvement over time
(iteration).
7.4.1.1 Team Score
We began looking at the differences in the scores. As Figure 7.6 shows, there
is a wide gap in average performance between the ai-only and human-only teams,
while all of the human-machine teams perform in a similar manner and are closer to
the ai-only performance.
Breaking down the results in a more descriptive way (Table 7.4), the means
of the human-machine teams are extremely close and underperform ai-only teams by
17% (10 points), and the ai-only teams more than double in performance compared
to the human-only teams.
The ANOVA analysis displayed in Table 7.5 below shows a few high level
patterns:
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Figure 7.6: Means Plot of Team Scores
Mean Standard Deviation
human-only 25.00 3.05
human-human-ai 49.37 5.64
human-ai-ai 49.53 5.65
ai-only 59.95 5.59
Table 7.4: Means Table of Team Scores
1. Differences across iterations were not statistically significant (p = 7.99e-02)
2. There is not a statistically significant interaction between condition and itera-
tion (p = 3.52e-01)
3. The differences in performance across conditions were extremely significant (p
= 2.25e-28).
Overall, the condition main effect F (3, 36) = 437.83 was the only effect that
was significant.
Effect SSn SSd DFn DFd F p
Condition 32962.99995 903.4338 3 36 437.836158 2.257878e-28
Iteration 77.96752 864.6081 1 36 3.246362 7.996182e-02
Condition by
80.97534 864.6081 3 36 1.123867 3.522837e-01
Iteration
Table 7.5: Summary of Team Score ANOVA
112
However, because we did not have a directional hypothesis, we did not inter-
pret the main effects. Rather we performed additional follow-up analyses to better
understand the differences between the team types. To that end, we performed a
Bonferroni pairwise test, which showed significant differences between all team types.
ai-only human-ai-ai human-human-ai
human-ai-ai 5.9e-11 - -
human-human-ai 3.6e-11 1 -
human-only <2e-16 <2e-16 <2e-16
Table 7.6: Bonferroni Pairwise Test of Team Conditions for Team Score
As the Bonferroni comparison in Table 7.6 shows, almost all team configura-
tions differed from each other in a statistically significant way, except for the two
human-machine teams, whose differences were minimal to start with.
7.4.1.2 Situational Awareness
Next we ran similar tests for situational awareness. Just like with team score,
we first plotted the group means of each team condition across all five iterations. The
results are shown in Figure 7.7.
Figure 7.7: Means Plot of Situational Awareness
Just as the case of score, the human-only teams substantially underperformed,
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which makes sense given how situational awareness is highly related to team score
(higher situational awareness necessarily means that many resources reached events
to complete a task). However, in this case the difference between the human-machine
teams and the ai-only teams was much smaller, with the human-machine teams on
average outperforming the ai-only teams until the last iteration.
This pattern is more clear once the results are analyzed through descriptive
statistics (Table 7.7)
Mean Standard Deviation
human-only 2.10 0.42
human-human-ai 4.36 0.47
human-ai-ai 4.31 0.54
ai-only 4.40 0.37
Table 7.7: Means Table of Situational Awareness
The human-machine teams differ slightly more substantially with each other
(human-human-ai teams scored on average 0.32% lower for score vs 1.1% higher for
situational awareness), but still exhibit the same situational awareness, which in this
case is closer to that of ai-only teams (1% difference in situational awareness vs
1.7% difference in score). Consistent with the gap in team scores, human-only teams
displayed under half of the situational awareness of human-machine teams.
The ANOVA analysis (Table 7.8) not only shows that there was not a statis-
tically significant interaction between condition and iteration (p = 8.80e-0), but also
that the fluctuations in situational awareness across iterations were not significant
(p = 6.11e-01). Much like with score, the only effect that was significant was the
condition main effect F (3, 36) = 216.18, p = 4.51e-23.
To better understand the differences between team conditions, we once again
ran a Bonferroni pairwise comparison for situational awareness. Table 7.9 below
shows the p-values for each pairwise comparison.
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Effect SSn SSd DFn DFd F p
Condition 191.92161099 10.65315 3 36 216.1856620 4.507642e-23
Iteration 0.05534359 7.560027 1 36 0.2635400 6.107349e-01
Condition by
0.13991891 7.560027 3 36 0.2220927 0.00762372
Iteration
Table 7.8: Summary of Situational Awareness ANOVA
ai-only human-ai-ai human-human-ai
human-ai-ai 1 - -
human-human-ai 1 1 -
human-only <2e-16 <2e-16 <2e-16
Table 7.9: Bonferroni Pairwise Test of Team Conditions for Situational Awareness
Unlike with team score, situational awareness is only significantly different
when limiting the comparison between the human-only teams and all other team
types (p = <2e-16). This finding makes sense given the large gap in situational
awareness between human-only teams and the other teams and the far lesser gap
between human-machine teams and ai-only teams.
7.4.2 Team Cognition Survey Analysis
Next, we shifted our focus exclusively toward the teams that included human
participants (thereby excluding the ai-only teams) to analyze the relationship between
the performance metrics and team cognition to see if team cognition is a comparable
predictor of teamwork for human-machine teams. We accomplished this through a
linear regression model that relates team cognition variables to team score as well as
situational awareness.
The first team cognition variable we analyzed is team shared knowledge, which
is a composite of perception-related sub variables that range from perceived shared
knowledge about the task to perceived mutual understanding of individual preferences
and communication tendencies. All of these sub variables are elicited through their
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own specific question in the teamwork principles survey, and have their own desig-
nated sub-variable identification. The block of questions for this variable includes the
questions between Question #51 (“My teammate has a general knowledge of specific
team tasks”) to Question #66 (“My teammate strives to express his or her opinion”).
Next we analyzed team environment which, much like the prior variable, is a
composite of several sub-variables related to trust, perceived rewards tied to behavior,
safety, and perceived constraints. All these items were once measured through the
survey and aggregated to generate the variable. The block of questions for this
variable ranges from Question #67 (“There is an atmosphere of trust among my
teammates”) to Question #74 (“My team knows the environmental constraints when
we perform various team tasks”).
The last team cognition variable we analyzed was emergent interaction, which
is a composite of mutual role understanding, perceived shared information, perceived
interaction level, perceived exchange effectiveness, flexibility, collaborative decision-
making, informal communication, and listening. Once again, individual questions
designated for each variable in the survey in order to measure these constructs. The
block of questions for this variable ranges from Question #42 (“My team under-
stands its roles and responsibilities.”) to Question #50 (“My teammates consistently
demonstrate effective listening skills”).
Lastly, we combined all three variables into one regression model for both
team score (score ∼ team knowledge + team environment + team interaction) and
situational awareness (situational awareness ∼ team knowledge + team environment
+ team interaction). These three variables once combined serve as proxies for team
cognition under our methodology. The results are displayed in the Table 7.10.
Our “score” model had a residual standard error of 3.089 on 26 degrees of free-
dom. Looking the R-squared value, the team cognition variables collectively explain
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Variable Coefficient Std Error P-value
SCORE
Intercept 83.67 2.75 <2e-16
Team Knowledge -0.42 2.75 0.07
Team Environment -1.09 0.54 0.05
Team Interaction -1.08 0.43 0.02
SITUATION AWARENESS
Intercept 7.33 0.26 <2e-16
Team Knowledge -0.05 0.02 0.02
Team Environment -0.05 0.05 0.29
Team Interaction -0.11 0.04 0.01
Table 7.10: Team Cognition Linear Regression for Team Score
93.99% of the variance of team scores. The F-statistic is quite large (135.4 on 3 and
26 degrees of freedom) and significant (p = 5.48e-16). Pursuant of these results, it
becomes possible to regularize the coefficients and produce beta coefficients that can
be more effectively interpreted.
Considering the statistical significance of each team cognition variable, only
team interaction has a meaningful influence on team score. Specifically, team score
is expected to decrease by 0.46 for every standard deviation increase in team inter-
action. On the other hand, team score is expected to decrease by 0.26 for every
standard deviation increase in team environment however, these findings only neared
significance (p = 0.0539) and are not significant enough to be reliable. These results
need to be understood in context: the model’s intercept is 83.67, thus across condi-
tions it seeks to predict performance losses between human-only and human-machine
teams. Therefore, the results do suggest that even though team cognition is more
prevalent as more humans become part of the team, performance actually decreases
with team cognition because it emerges more intensively among the humans in the
underperforming human-only teams than between humans and machines.
On the other hand, our “situational awareness” model had a residual stan-
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dard error of 0.29 on 26 degrees of freedom. The Multiple R-squared shows that
team cognition explained most of the variance in situational awareness (93.91%). As
expected, the F-statistic is closely related to that of the “score” model (133.7 on 3
and 26 degrees of freedom, p = 6.42e-16) since, as previously explained. both perfor-
mance variables are highly related due to the nature of the game. Give the strength
of our model, we were able to regularize our coefficients into beta coefficients in this
instance as well.
Situational awareness is expected to decrease by 0.36 for every standard devi-
ation increase in team knowledge (p = 0.02). On the other hand, team environment
was not statistically significant. Lastly, situational awareness is expected to decrease
by 0.49 for every standard deviation increase in team interaction (p = 0.01). Once
again, the model’s intercept is 7.33, hence it’s oriented at understanding performance
drop offs between human-machine teams and human-only teams, and it does so very
effectively.
7.5 Discussion
The study enables us to draw inferences from several different perspectives.
The different experimental conditions are useful in determining both the way in-
teracting with AI changes human players’ ability to coordinate and adapt to the
environment as well as the extent to which team behavior in human-machine teams
differs from pure machine teams.
To start with, the survey data analysis enables us to detect the extent to
which principles of human-teamwork are as predictive of performance and situational
awareness in human-machine teams. This analysis speaks to RQ1, which asks about
the applicability of the principles of human-teamwork (specifically, through team
118
cognition) to human-machine teams. Our results run counter to expectations based
on extending what the literature as identified as key aspects human teamwork. Indeed,
human-machine teams outperformed human-only teams despite lower levels of team
cognition.
Specifically, our data indicates that higher levels of team interaction results
in lower team scores. One interpretation of this result is that the introduction of
an AI into the NeoCITIES team often induces the human players to communicate
differently to compensate for the agent’s inability to coordinate directly. However,
performance is still higher even in teams with only one human, which, in the context
of ai-only teams outperforming all other teams, suggests that higher team scores can
be achieved by humans following the machine’s lead. Still, with respect to team score
the other team cognition variables were not significant, which limits the inferences
that can be drawn about the relationship between team cognition and team score
alone among teams that included humans.
In the context of situational awareness however, the results were more signifi-
cant. With the exception of team environment, team knowledge and team interaction
had a negative influence on situational awareness. Specifically, team interaction twice
the impact as team knowledge on situational awareness. One way to consider the re-
sult is that the presence of a machine-team-mate who cannot communicate forces
the human players to redirect their efforts and more effectively coordinate themselves
through NeoCITIES’ map, thereby reacting more rapidly as they try to synchronize
with the autonomous agent.
Beyond the survey, the performance data speaks to RQ2, which asks in which
ways human-machine teams outperform machine-machine teams. Surprisingly, the
human-machine teams did not outperform machine-machine teams. As outlined in
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, albeit a limited number, there are strong examples of
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humans and AIs coming together to outperform AI alone. In our case, our results
more closely match those of DeepMind and OpenAI, where over time a RL agent
achieves super-human performance through strategies, tactics, and responses that
run counter to human intuition.
Given how this is the first time NeoCITIES has been used to study human-
machine teamwork, many of the prior results outlined in the literature are thus not
as applicable because they only speak to human teams as opposed to human-machine
teams. However, one way to frame this finding is by focusing on the unique dynam-
ics of RL. Whereas prior attempts at studying human-machine have suffered from
technical limitations (automated as opposed to autonomous agents, wizard-of-oz sim-
ulations of agents by humans), it’s possible that RL enables the development of agents
that eventually get so strong at the task that they can operate almost independently,
or are at least more effective as part of a multi-agent system with only AI as opposed
to one where humans are also involved.
Lastly, the performance results can be used to address RQ3, which inquired as
to whether there’d be performance between different teams of humans and machines.
As discussed previously, the ai-only teams substantially outperformed all other team
types across all metrics, whereas human-only teams underperformed all other team
types. The results also show that the human-machine teams performed closer to
ai-only teams (17% lower than ai-only vs. doubling human-only).
Interestingly enough, both types of human-machine teams performed very
similarly. While human-human-ai teams scored on average 0.32% lower for team
score, their situational awareness was on average 1.1% higher than human-ai-ai teams.
These patterns are important because they show that it is not necessarily the case
that human-ai-ai teams succeed because of the higher number of agents. Further-
more, the gap between human-machine teams and ai-only teams is far narrower for
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situational awareness (1% difference) than for scores (17%). This suggests that al-
though the coordination behavior between these teams is very different (for example,
human-machine-machine teams cannot rely on communication), both machines and
humans are able to adapt to the circumstance to retain high levels of performance
and situational awareness. Although they succeed for different reasons, they succeed
in much the same way at a complex task such as emergency response management.
7.6 Conclusion
In essence, our results suggest that the best way to understand the complex
dynamics of human-machine teams is not by attempting to replicate human teamwork
dynamics through the design of human-like agents. Rather, a much more fruitful
methodology involves leveraging advancements in AI to construct tasks and simulated
environments that enable agents and humans to work as peers. Our redesign of
NeoCITIES should serve as a useful example on how to accomplish such goals, as
well as the value it brings to the research community by making the study of human-
machine teamwork more precise and generalizable.
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Chapter 8
Study 4: Human-Machine
Collective Intelligence in
Prediction Markets
8.1 Introduction
Prediction markets are one of the major settings where collective intelligence
takes place. As participants trade shares, forecasting information is aggregated and
weighed based on the confidence expressed by the size of each participant’s investment.
The resulting price thus reflects the market’s weighted expectation of the event at a
given point in time. By setting up different kinds of prediction markets, it becomes
possible to incorporate varying degrees of artificial intelligence to better identify its
impact on the overall accuracy of the forecasts produced by each market.
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8.2 Overview
Prediction markets are one of the major settings where collective intelligence
takes place. As participants trade shares in a prediction market, forecasting informa-
tion is aggregated and weighed based on the confidence expressed by the size of each
participant’s investment. The resulting price thus reflects the market’s weighted ex-
pectation of the event at a given point in time. Thus, traditionally prediction markets
have been conceived in mechanistic terms. This study however reframes prediction
markets as complex systems of humans and machines interacting to better adapt to
uncertainty, akin to how teams work together to manage situations.
This study sets up different kinds of prediction markets in order to incorporate
varying degrees of AI to better identify its impact on the overall accuracy of the
forecasts produced by each market. Specifically, we developed two types of prediction
markets: one where bots participate alongside humans (hybrid) and one where only
humans participate (human-only). For both prediction markets, the trading data
generated by the activity of the participants is used to train several predictive models
that are in turn evaluated in their ability to calibrate the prediction market’s forecast
and make it more accurate.
This methodology thus implements a new prediction market design where AI
can play the role of participant (as a bot trading against the humans) as well as
that of an aggregator (as a model that uses the price data to refine the forecast).
The study then analyzes both prediction markets from a quantitative perspective by
looking at the role AI can play (as a participant vs as an aggregator) in enhancing
the collective intelligence of the system as measured by its predictive accuracy. The
results from the conditions where AI is merely a participant speak to RQ1, while the
results where AI functions as the aggregator which processes trading data as its input
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to then output a calibrated forecast speak to RQ2 and RQ3.
8.3 Methods
8.3.1 Simulation
Prior research on prediction markets has been limited to the analysis of the
performance of prediction markets predicting real-life events as they are about to oc-
cur. This approach is limited in several ways: there is no way to measure and track the
participants’ local knowledge, there is no ground truth that enables the researchers
to precisely identify predictive bias, and comparisons between participant conditions
are challenging given how the specific events being forecasted only occur once. To
sidestep these concerns, we developed a new type of prediction market that enables re-
searchers to effectively simulate events in abstract terms. Specifically, our prediction
market operates as an aggregator of local information represented in purely mathe-
matical terms. This methodology simplifies the structure of the prediction market by
focusing on the key features of decentralized information gathering and distributed
knowledge, and is an extension of Watkins’ (2007) methodology [Watkins, 2007]. An
example scenario is visualized in Table 8.1.
0 0 0 1 1 0 Belief
Alice 0 0 0 0
Bob 0 0 1 0
Charles 0 1 1 1
Dimitri 1 1 0 1
Table 8.1: Local Knowledge Relative to Ground Truth
Ground truth is represented by the binary vector at the top [0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0],
and each participant has restricted access to a subvector of length 3 [0, 0, 0] and in this
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case it’s assumed they express their beliefs through a simple majority rule. A simple
aggregation through this rule produces a 50% ( [1 + 1 + 0 + 0] / 4) probability
forecast, which is incorrect because the underlying probability represented by the
vector is 33% ( [0 + 0 + 0 + 1 + 1 + 0] / 6 ). Extending Watkins’ (2007) analogy,
the large vector represents 6 possible qualities that may (1) or may not (0) be present
in a candidate’s profile, and the participant’s vector represents their limited access
(only 3 values) to knowledge about the candidate’s profile. Even though they are
limited in their observation of the candidate’s qualities, the participants are tasked to
express their beliefs about the candidate’s chances at winning the election, and they
do by considering whether the majority of the qualities they are able to observe are
present (1) or whether they are absent (0), and thus voting accordingly.
However, unlike with traditional prediction markets where the value of the
asset being traded reaches $1 if the outcome occurs, or drops to $0 if the outcome
fails to materialize, our design ends trading by having the asset reach the actual price
as reflected by the ground truth probability (33c in the prior example because the
candidate only has 2 out of 6 qualities). This setup still enables the participants to
profit by buying and selling shares on the candidate’s chances at victory whose price
exceeds or is below what they believe to be the correct number.
8.3.2 Study Design
8.3.2.1 Overview
As mentioned in the previous section, two prediction markets were developed:
one where only humans participated, and a hybrid one where humans participated
alongside bots. This was done to be able to contrast and identify the ways in which
both human and AI behavior change when the two interact. Figure 8.1 provides a
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Figure 8.1: The collective intelligence emerging from humans and AIs in the prediction
market is fed as input into a neural network
graphical representation of the hybrid prediction market.
Each setup includes a prediction aggregator that takes in the price fluctuations
and trading data as its input to output a calibrated forecast that is then evaluated
against the ground truth probability. Three types of such aggregators were used (de-
scribed in the Experimental Conditions section), and they each represent a distinct
machine learning paradigm: algorithmic inference, classical methods, and deep learn-
ing. Because the aggregators don’t influence the prediction market, they can be run
independently and simultaneously without compromising the internal validity of each
experiment.
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8.3.2.2 Task Description
Each asset is represented by a vector of 60 binary features, and a subvector
of length 4 is randomly assigned to each participant. The asset’s vector represents
the ground truth, and the subvector represents the trader’s local knowledge. This
setup precludes perfect coordination because of the inherent duplicate information
(each trader overlaps in knowledge with two other traders), which tasks the partici-
pants as well as the aggregator with figuring out how to properly calibrate expected
probabilities.
Each participant is given 100 digital tokens at the beginning of the study.
These tokens function as the internal currency of the prediction market that enables
participants to buy and sell shares of the 10 available assets. Every time a participant
submits an order, they are asked to specify a price they are either willing to sell to
or buy at, and the order is placed in a queue. In the backend, the queue is divided
into batches of 10, and at every iteration buy and sell orders are matched to clear
all orders and make sure that as many trades as possible are executed. Every time a
buy and sell order was matched, a “trade” occurs, which is recorded as a datapoint
on our server along with a timestamp. Once all the possible trades in the batch are
executed by the server, the current price of the shares of the asset was updated to
reflect the average price at which the trades occurred in the last batch (Ex. 3 trades
were executed at 90c and 7 were executed at 80c results in the price to be updated
to 3/10 * 90 + 7/10 * 80 = 83c). Participants were rewarded at the very end based
on what percentage of the overall available tokens are in their possession.
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8.3.2.3 Experimental Conditions
Even though we ran only two prediction markets, our aim is to also understand
the usefulness of AI as an aggregator. To that end, we implemented several models
(5 to be exact) to compare each type of aggregator (algorithmic, classical machine
learning, and neural network) in terms of their ability to improve the probabilistic
estimates generated by each prediction market. The models we implemented for each
aggregator type are outlined in Table 8.2.
Aggregator Type Models
Algorithmic Linear Regression (LR)
Classical ML
Support Vector Machine (SVM)
Decision Tree Regression (Tree)
Neural Networks
Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP)
Long-Short-Term Memory Cell (LSTM)
Table 8.2: Aggregator Types
Thus, two prediction markets (human-only and hybrid) and the five aggrega-
tors (LR, SVM, Tree, MLP, LSTM) became the basis for 10 experimental conditions
in a 2x5 design. Through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform, we recruited 30 par-
ticipants for each prediction market for a total of 60 participants. For both prediction
markets, the participants traded a total of 10 assets one at a time.
8.3.3 Measurements
After running the prediction markets, the resulting trading data was collected
for analysis and subsequently used as the testing set for the three aggregation meth-
ods. At the first stage (prior to the use of aggregators), collective intelligence was
measured through different variables: overall accuracy (how close was the final price
to the ground truth probability), volatility (how large were the price movements),
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activity (frequency of trades). At the final state (where aggregators are evaluated),
the emphasis will be on the error rate by aggregator, and will be analyzed both at
an absolute level (how does the aggregator’s estimate compare to ground truth) and
at a relative level (to what extent is the aggregator’s estimate more or less accurate
than the final price). After recording the raw trading data for each of the prediction
markets, we structured it in three separate data structures to test which features en-
able different types of aggregators to be most effective. Then, the price of the event
at that time is compared to the ground truth to calculate a bias score, which is what
the aggregator is tasked with predicting.
First, we restructured the raw trading data into a 1x30 vector representing how
much capital each participant had after every transaction. The second data structure
we implemented revolved around price: a 1x2 vector holding the price values for each
side of the event (yes, no) at the time. The last data structure combines the capital
data structure and the price data structure to enable the aggregator to account for
the relationships among the players (reflected in their accumulated capital relative
to each other) as well as the current equilibrium among all orders (reflected in the
price).
8.4 Results
8.4.1 Overview
After collecting the transaction data, we generated the datasets through the
procedure outlined in the methods section. Every transaction became a data point
that included measures from the prediction market as independent variables (struc-
tured in one of the several ways outlined in the measurements section) and the dif-
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ference between the price and the ground truth (hereby referred to as “bias”) as the
dependent variable.
Subsequently, we proceeded to implement the models to compare their effec-
tiveness as aggregator as measured by their ability to predict bias from the data. Each
model was trained on a random selection of 70% of the available data, and tested on
the remaining 30%.
For each data structure, we begin the analysis with the algorithmic and clas-
sical models: linear regression, support vector machines, and the decision-tree regres-
sion. Following the classical models, we implemented two neural networks to identify
the predictive capacity of deep learning approaches to our problem. The first deep
learning system we implemented is a two-layer multi-layer perceptron (MLP). It re-
ceived the capital data structure in its input layer, and outputted a float value as its
prediction for the bias of the prediction market at a particular time. Since the MLP is
a very simplistic example of a deep learning system, we explored the future capabilities
of deep learning by implementing a more complex model: long-short-term-memory
neural network (LSTM).
8.4.2 Price
We began by running the models on the price data version of the dataset,
which limits the aggregators to just the price movements for all the shares.
For the human-only prediction market, the results are shown in Table 8.3.
Right away, all the aggregators substantially improve the prediction market’s
forecast (by at least 67%). The classical machine learning approaches fail to outper-
form the simple linear regression. Overall, the only aggregator that outperformed the
linear regression was the MLP. The MLP’s error rate in estimating the prediction
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Price
Model Median Mean Mean - 1std Mean + 1std
Linear Regression -2.128 -1.397 -1.977 -0.816
SVM -6.506 -6.193 -6.771 -5.615
Tree 1.0 -1.037 -1.601 1.525
MLP 0.047 0.008 -0.339 0.356
LSTM -33.725 -33.414 -33.992 -32.836
Table 8.3: Error Rates of Aggregators Trained on Price Data in the Human-only
Prediction Market
market’s bias was less than 1%, which gives it a substantial edge over a simple linear
regression. However, not all deep learning models outperformed, as the LSTM was
the worst performer with an error rate of over 30%.
The results were different for the hybrid prediction market, as shown in Table
8.4.
Price
Model Median Mean Mean - 1std Mean + 1std
Linear Regression 0.469 -0.296 -1.179 0.586
SVM 0.497 -0.118 -0.9993 0.763
Tree 0.100 0.094 -0.857 1.047
MLP -1.073 -1.301 -1.975 -0.626
LSTM 0.374 -0.395 -1.268 0.476
Table 8.4: Error Rates of Aggregators Trained on Price Data in the Hybrid Prediction
Market
At the outset, all models except for the MLP were substantially more accurate
in the hybrid prediction market than with the human-only one. However, in this
instance it was the LSTM that outperformed all others, potentially indicating that
each deep learning aggregator may be better suited for a different type of prediction
market.
Once again, the results suggest that the aggregators regardless of type are
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more effective under the hybrid prediction market condition, suggesting that the
introduction of bots trading alongside humans is removing noise from the system
which is in turn enabling the aggregation by the AI models to be more successful.
8.4.3 Capital
Next, we used the capital data structure as the input for both types of predic-
tion markets. Purely looking at the error rate distributions, no meaningful difference
appeared between classical and deep learning approaches. The issue changes once
breaking down the basic statistics of each model’s predictive success. To that end,
we proceed to compare each aggregator through different metrics.
For the human-only prediction market, the results are shown in Table 8.5.
Capital
Model Median Mean Mean - 1std Mean + 1std
Linear Regression -2.579 -2.267 -2.845 -1.689
SVM 6.5 -6.188 -6.766 -5.610
Tree -2.579 -2.267 -2.845 -1.689
MLP -33.725 -33.414 -33.992 -32.836
LSTM -33.725 -33.414 -33.992 -32.836
Table 8.5: Error Rates of Aggregators Trained on Capital Data in the Human-only
Prediction Market
Under this condition, all methods show substantial effectiveness in estimat-
ing the prediction market’s bias (lowest level of improvement is 67%), although all
of them consistently underestimate by how much the prediction market’s forecast
deviates from the ground truth. However, neither the classical or deep learning ag-
gregators outperform a simple linear regression, which suggests that machine learning
approaches do not add value over a simple regression when trying to calibrate the
prediction market’s forecast. Specifically, both deep learning aggregators underper-
132
form by a large margin (>30% in some cases), thereby reducing the significance of the
otherwise encouraging result of a 67% improvement from the raw market prediction
at that time.
For the hybrid prediction market, the results are shown in Table 8.6.
Capital
Model Median Mean Mean - 1std Mean + 1std
Linear Regression 0.300 -0.316 -1.197 0.564
SVM 0.500 -0.116 -0.997 0.764
Tree 0.300 -0.316 -1.197 0.564
MLP -12.725 -13.342 -14.223 -12.461
LSTM 0.212 -0.404 -1.285 0.476
Table 8.6: Error Rates of Aggregators Trained on Capital Data in the Hybrid Pre-
diction Market
Under this condition, all aggregators improve substantially when compared
to the human-only prediction market. In almost all cases, the aggregators’ errors in
estimating the gap between the market’s prediction and ground truth is less than
1%. The classical machine learning approaches are much closer to the baseline linear
regression, whereas the LSTM aggregator outperforms not just in its class (it’s the
best deep learning aggregator by far), but also overall. The confidence intervals for
the aggregators indicate that even in this context, the aggregators underestimate the
market’s bias far more frequently than they overestimate it.
Once again, the results show that all types of aggregators are more effective
under the hybrid prediction market condition, suggesting that the introduction of
bots trading alongside humans is removing noise from the system which is in turn
enabling the aggregation by the AI models to be more successful.
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8.5 Discussion
The design of our prediction markets was heavily influenced by Watkins (2007),
who identified an effective way to represent local knowledge and collective intelligence
through linear algebra [Watkins, 2007]. Thus, our design enabled us to know precisely
both the ground truth of the event being forecasted as well as the local knowledge of
the participants, which enables a multitude of inferences to be made about the nature
of prediction markets and the role AI can play in enhancing their collective intelli-
gence. With respect to RQ1, our results show very strongly that the hybrid prediction
market succeeds in making better forecasts than the human-only one, thereby exhibit-
ing higher degrees of collective intelligence. To explain this phenomenon, it’s useful to
consider the ways in which our design for a hybrid prediction market differs from a tra-
ditional prediction market. One of the key differences between a traditional prediction
market and our hybrid one is that the latter is designed to stimulate trading without
huge costs to the system at the expense of collective intelligence. The prior literature
has stressed the obstacles inherent to initial trading in a prediction market before in-
formation becomes incorporated in the price [Chen et al., 2010, Hanson, 2003]. Our
results show that trading can be catalyzed by the use of trading bots to create enough
volatility to incentivize trading without it coming at the expense of any of the human
participants.
Beyond stimulating trading however, our results show that introducing trad-
ing bots has positive consequences for collective intelligence. The assumption of the
literature, influenced by the marginal trader hypothesis, is that players in a predic-
tion market are risk-averse, and thus only expect to profit when the market price
deviates form their expectations based on their private beliefs [Wolfers, 2009]. Were
that truly the case, then it would not be possible to improve trading by introducing
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randomized trading bots, yet a few prior studies already show that human forecasting
in a prediction market can benefit from the introduction of randomized bots whose
trading patterns induce forecasting improvements [Malone, 2018]. Our results go one
step further by showing the improvements emerging from the introduction of another
type of trading bot that trains itself on the prediction market’s trading patterns and
trades accordingly.
With respect to RQ2 and RQ3, on the other hand, our results clearly show
that collective intelligence can be used as the input to AI so that the latter enhances
the former. Specifically, our findings reference one of the core conditions of collective
intelligence in prediction markets outlined by Surowiecki (2005): aggregation. The
prior literature has primarily focused on the use of different auction structures and
matching algorithms depending on the type of forecast that is being elicited from the
prediction market [Luckner et al., 2011]. The process of turning private judgments
into a collective decision is still poorly understood. Chen et al’s (2005) attempts at
using linear, logarithmic, absolute distance, and quadratic scoring in the context of
football forecasts showed very little effect in overall accuracy, whereas our use of
classical machine learning models and deep learning have shown impressive levels of
improvement in terms of accuracy (at least 70%) [Chen et al., 2005]. However, our
results don’t suggest that these methods would always achieve these levels of perfor-
mance in just any prediction market, but rather are tied to the fact that only through
our design can the right kind of data and corresponding ground truth be generated
through artificial events so that the models can learn and eventually generalize to
concrete events being forecasted.
Furthermore, our results speak to another preconditions for collective intelli-
gence to prediction markets according to the prior literature is diversity of opinion
[Surowiecki, 2005]. At a technical level, this principle is related to Wolfer’s (2009)
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“marginal trader hypothesis”, where the financial incentive structure of the prediction
market incentivizes only traders who believe themselves to possess unique informa-
tion not shared by the rest of the market. Our results however suggest that in our
hybrid prediction market, collective intelligence can emerge despite substantial over-
lap in participant’s knowledge (each participant in our experiment holds 50% overlap
of local information with at least two other players) and belief-less trading (our two
types of bots have no access to local knowledge and are merely speculating based on
trading patterns).
8.6 Conclusion
Overall, the results strongly suggest that the design of a prediction market
should not be merely thought of in terms of a mechanism run by matching functions
or auction structures, but rather as complex multi-agent systems where humans and
AIs can interact to induce emergent properties such as collective intelligence that
can in turn become the input to machine learning models to further enhance the
forecasting ability of the system.
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Chapter 9
Connecting The Studies
Given the interdisciplinary nature of the dissertation, it’s useful to compare
and contrast all of the studies to identify the surprising findings and common themes
within the results. By connecting the studies and the models together, it becomes
possible to better discern the true nature of human-machine teamwork and human-
machine intelligence.
9.1 Similarities and Differences Between Study 1
and Study 2
At the outset, Study 1 and Study 2 rely on a similar methodology to compare
and contrast how human-machine teams behave differently than either human-only
or machine-only teams. Specifically, the game theoretical nature of the experiment
makes their results more directly comparable.
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9.1.1 Cooperation
Both studies’ results suggest that different reinforcement learning models ex-
hibit different degrees of cooperation when interacting with humans in strategic game
theory scenarios. However, the major point of divergence between them is that in
Study 1 cooperative outcomes occur more frequently when the human believes they
are playing with another human (even though they are not), while in Study 2 coopera-
tion occurs more frequently when the human participants are indifferent as to whether
they are playing against a human or an AI. Essentially, Study 1 suggests that bias
towards humans strongly affects cooperation in human-machine teams, while Study 2
shows that the human willingness to cooperate with an AI has only a minor effect on
cooperation. Therefore, both studies suggest that the far more influential factor in
human-machine teams is the nature of the RL (as characterized by the specific model
it operates under) as opposed to the human willingness to cooperate with AI.
9.1.2 Coordination
Beyond that however, the results of Study 1 also include an aspect entirely
not considered by Study 2: coordination. While Study 1 and Study 2 both study
cooperation, understood as the ability for the human-machine to reach the mutu-
ally beneficial outcome despite their individual self-interest to the contrary, Study 1
also studies what happens when human-machine teams are tasked with coordination,
understood as the ability for the human-machine team to agree and match in a de-
cision over multiple mutually beneficial outcomes. Specifically, the data from Study
1 shows that in a more complex game theoretical scenario, the human-machine team
is not only more cooperative, but it also converges to the outcome that most benefits
the human far more frequently than to the outcome that benefits the AI the most.
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Furthermore, Study 1 shows that coordination, much like cooperation, is strongly
mediated by the type of RL agent that is part of the human-machine team. In that
respect, the studies both suggest that different RL agents behave differently in a
human-machine team, both when it comes to cooperation as well as coordination.
9.1.3 Applicability of Human-Teamwork Principles
On the other hand, the major aspect addressed by Study 2 but not Study 1 is
the extent to which principles of human teaming are effective predictors of coopera-
tion. Specifically, Study 1 showed that there is a substantially significant relationship
between perceived shared understanding and cooperation. Thus, Study 2 and its
results will serve as a point of comparison for the other studies (especially Study
3) with respect to the relationship between the principles of human teamwork and
human-machine teamwork.
9.1.4 Implications
Overall, both studies indicate that the type of RL agent has a strong influence
on both coordination as well as cooperation. This implies that researchers should not
simply assume that the results from one RL model generalize to all models, which is
especially relevant in the context of AI-safety: all models should be tested to ensure
safety in human-AI interactions. Furthermore, shared awareness is the far stronger
predictor of human-machine teamwork when compared to human player’s attitudes
towards AI and other key principles in human teamwork. This implies that in multi-
agent systems and human-machine dyads, the principles of human teamwork are not
as applicable or useful as they are with human teams.
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9.2 Similarities and Differences Between Model A
& Model B
The two models not only helped inform the design of Study 3 and Study 4,
but they also serve as useful theoretical contributions in their own right. Specifically,
they help contextualize the methodologies of Study 3 and Study 4 by situating them
within a larger research context so that the results can crystallize the connections
between the variety of cognitive models and teamwork models referenced throughout
this dissertation.
9.2.1 Crowd vs Team
Model A focuses on identifying the features of collective intelligence as well
as the behavioral biases in prediction markets highlighted in the literature in order
to design a prediction market that addresses such biases while still preserving the
properties that enable collective intelligence to emerge. Model B on the other hand
extended the implications of the Superforecasting findings in order to update our
understanding of both team cognition as well as collective intelligence. In the process,
it produced a new model to design teams with. Thus, even though they both speak to
collective intelligence, at a basic level Model A is focusing on optimizing a pre-existing
structure to enhance collective intelligence in crowds, while Model B brings forth a
new model to think about teams by synthesizing several perspectives in cognitive
science.
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9.2.2 Independence vs Feedback
Whereas Model A focuses on ensuring strong levels of independence among
all the components of its model in order to preserve collective intelligence, Model
B focuses far more on the design of a feedback loop system between teams and AI.
This distinction becomes self-evident when considering how the aggregator’s estimates
in the prediction market at the heart of Model A are not available to the traders,
whereas they are in the case of Model B. Model A considers the prediction market
as a collective intelligence mechanism primarily concerned with generating the input
for an AI, while Model B considers the human team and the AI as a feedback loop
aimed at enhancing the intelligence of the overall system by improving all of the
components.
9.2.3 Roles
Model A and Model B share similarities in the role they assign for AI. Both
models integrate AI as an aggregator of individual opinions insights by the partic-
ipants, in the hope of leveraging machine learning to better understanding how to
combine the team or the group’s insights and calibrate predictions. Model A however
goes one step further and enables AI to participate alongside the humans as a peer
by having different bots trade in the prediction market to improve humans’ trading
behavior.
9.2.4 Implications
Model A grounds Study 4 in many different research domains. It identifies
the core features of collective intelligence in order to develop a more abstract view of
collective intelligence that can incorporate AI. It also outlines the behavioral biases
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that have plagued prediction markets and have limited their ubiquity in all major
forecasting enterprises despite their potential, and it does so in a way that gener-
ates precise targets for improvement. Subsequently, model A also provides a deep
technical understanding of the mechanics of prediction markets, which is a necessary
precondition for Study 4’s ability to address the aforementioned behavioral biases and
thereby increase prediction market’s forecasting accuracy.
Model B on the other hand shows through analysis of the Superforecasting
results that team cognition and collective intelligence may be manifestations of the
same emergent cognitive phenomenon. This insight lies at the foundation of the en-
tire dissertation, which seeks to develop a nuanced understanding of human-machine
intelligence and its emergence at multiple scales.
9.3 Similarities and Differences Between Study 1
& 2 and Study 3
Study 1 and Study 2 looked at cooperation as a proxy for human-machine
teamwork, whereas Study 3 looked at NeoCITIES’s performance metrics (team score
and situational awareness) as the teamwork measure. Despite the major difference in
experimental setting (Study 1 and Study 2 rely purely on game theory, which implies
a static environment, whereas Study 3 uses NeoCITIES, a sophisticated simulation
that makes the environment dynamic), they both showed team-level coordination can
occur in human-machine teams despite the team’s inability to verbally communicate.
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9.3.1 Performance
The major difference however lies in the fact that in Study 3 the performance
difference between human-only and human-machine teams was far larger than it was
in Study 1 and Study 2. Furthermore, Study 3 offers a more accurate point of
comparison between human-only and human-machine teams because the human-only
condition in the experiment included actual humans playing with each other, as op-
posed to a reverse-Turing condition such as in Study 1 and Study 2, which at best
serves as an indirect proxy of the game theoretical decision-making of human-only
teams. On the other hand, Study 1 and Study 2 offer more effective comparisons
between machine-only and human-machine teams, thereby giving us better insights
into how AIs change their behavior when playing against a human as opposed to
another AI. In that respect, Study 3 provides better results that speak to the reverse
I.E. the extent to which humans engage in more effective forms of teamwork with
other humans as opposed to AIs.
Specifically, a major divergence occurs when contrasting the three studies on
whether the human-machine teams deviated substantially from baseline behavior.
Study 1 and 2 show sharp deviations from the equilibrium of the game among human-
machine teams, especially when the human participants believed themselves to be
playing with an AI. Study 3 on the other hand showed comparatively more change in
performance between human-only and human-machine teams than between human-
machine and machine-only teams. Essentially, the difference is smaller at the smaller
scale of a dyad than it is at the larger scale of a triad.
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9.3.2 Team Structure and Team Dynamics
The difference in team structure is also important. Study 1 and Study 2
provide important results for dyads in a setting that include adversarial dynamics.
Specifically, in all three game theory scenarios, the humans and AIs have to reconcile
their individual self-interest with that of the two-agent team. This dynamic creates
the incentive to betray one another, and thus speaks to trust. Study 3 on the other
hand produced results for a triad in a setting where the only objective was a shared
performance goal. The lack of incentives to betray one another makes the results
between Study 1, 2, and 3 stand out in sharp contrast. Thus, the fact that the
studies have different results when it comes to differences in performance speaks to
how human-machine teamwork manifests itself differently between dyads and triads.
9.3.3 Applicability of Human-Teamwork Principles
Furthermore, Study 2 and Study 3 both look at the extent to which principles
of human-teamwork were predictive for human-machine teamwork. The results of
Study 2 show that in a two-way interaction between humans and AIs human teamwork
principles, especially shared awareness, are strong predictors. Study 3 instead shows
that many of those same principles, team cognition specifically, are weak predictors
of human-machine teamwork with respect to team score.
9.3.4 Implications
This contrast suggests that when transitioning into more complex settings and
teamwork structures, the usefulness of traditional models from human teamwork in
predicting human-machine teamwork success breaks down. Human-machine teams
need to be understood on their own terms, integrating both the humans and the
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machine perspective. In the case of the latter, multi-agent systems are a useful
starting point because, as the results suggest, incentive structures strongly influence
cooperation and coordination in RL agents.
9.4 Similarities and Differences Between Study 3
and Study 4
Study 3 and Study 4 approached human-machine intelligence from two differ-
ent perspectives. Whereas Study 3 used NeoCITIES to study human-machine intelli-
gence at the micro-level, Study 4 used a prediction market study it at the macro-level.
Specifically, the results of Study 3 speak to human-machine intelligence from a more
traditional team perspective, whereas Study 4 approaches it from a complex system
perspective.
9.4.1 Team Structure and Team Dynamics
Furthermore, these results need to be understood in their proper context.
Study 3 is looking at human-machine teamwork manifested in a team’s ability to ef-
fectively adapt and respond to changes in a physical situation. Study 4 on the other
hand looks at human-machine teamwork in a complex system via a prediction mar-
ket, thus human-machine teamwork manifests itself in the overall system’s ability to
make accurate forecasts under deep uncertainty. To reframe the contrast in a different
way, Study 3 shows that human-machine teams respond to a dynamic physical envi-
ronment in a manner akin to that of human-only and machine-only teams, whereas
Study 4 shows that hybrid prediction markets are more accurate in assessing risk and
uncertainty in a probabilistic setting.
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One of the major implications of these two approaches is that unlike Study
3, Study 4 examined the role AI can play in human-machine intelligence through
different roles. Whereas the members of the teams in Study 3 all operated as peers,
AI in Study 4 played the role of both a participant as well as aggregator. Specifically,
Study 4 shows that not only is the collective intelligence of the prediction market
increased when AI participates and trades alongside humans, but that even when
being relegated merely to the role of aggregator major improvements still occur.
Therefore, the results of Study 4 speak to the importance of the different roles AI
can play as well as to the value of effective role design in successful human-machine
teamwork.
9.4.2 Types of Emergent Cognitions
Another major distinction between the two studies is the nature of the infer-
ence drawn from the results. Specifically, Study 3 looks at the correlation between
team cognition and performance to determine whether team cognition was a predictor
in performance, and thus the survey answers do not affect variables such as score. On
the other hand, in Study 4 collective intelligence is directly related to improvements
in forecasting accuracy because the former is framed in terms of the latter, and thus
improvements in collective intelligence have a causal relationship to improvements in
forecasting. Therefore, Study 4 shows that collective intelligence is a much better
predictor of human-machine teamwork than team cognition.
9.4.3 Performance
However, the major similarity between Study 3 and Study 4 lies in the conver-
gent results. Specifically, Study 3 shows human-machine teams to be more far more
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successful than human-only teams with respect to team cognition and performance,
and the results in Study 4 show major improvements in hybrid prediction markets
compared to human-only prediction markets. Not only is the hybrid prediction market
more accurate than the human-only prediction market, but all types of aggregators
more effectively correct for bias when trained on the hybrid prediction market’s data.
Furthermore, the human-machine results in Study 4 stand in sharp contrast to those
of Study 3 in much the same way as Study 3’s results deviate substantially from those
of Study 1 and 2.
9.4.4 Implications
As mentioned previously, the difference between human-machine performance
in Study 4 and in Study 3 is comparable to the difference between the latter and
Study 1 and 2. The pattern in the results of human-machine performance is that it
rises with the scale of human-machine interaction (multi-agent dyad, human-machine
triad, hybrid complex system) and the complexity of the task (overcoming game
theoretical dilemmas, coordinating a response to an emergency, forecasting under
uncertainty).
9.5 Similarities and Differences Between all Stud-
ies
All the studies approached human-machine teamwork and human-machine in-
telligence from different perspectives. Study 1 and Study 2 used game theory to
study humans and machines working together as a multi-agent system. Whereas
Study 3 used NeoCITIES to study human-machine intelligence in triads (as opposed
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to dyads like in Study 1 and Study 2), Study 4 used a prediction market study it at
the macro-level as a complex system.
9.5.1 teamwork without Communication
The first major insight shared by all studies is that human-machine teamwork
can occur despite the inability for humans and AIs to directly communicate. This
stands in sharp contrast to human teamwork, which heavily relies on communication
to enable coordination among the teammates. Indeed, despite the fact that in none
of the studies was communication between humans and AIs was possible, human-
machine teamwork still emerged. Specifically, the performance of human-machine
teams was always substantially better that of human-only teams (in the case of Study
3), comparable (such as in the case of Study 1 and Study 2), or vastly superior (such
as in the case of Study 4).
9.5.2 Cooperation and Teamwork
Second, given the ability for humans and AIs to cooperate over shared goals,
cooperation often translates into teamwork, but not as understood in human terms.
Study 1 and Study 2 show that humans and AIs can cooperate despite incentives not
to do so, however Study 3 suggests that team cognition dynamics do not necessar-
ily translate into more effective teamwork in a more complex setting. Furthermore,
Study 4 shows that when the interaction between humans and AIs is framed in al-
most purely adversarial terms (trading on the prediction market is a zero-sum game),
collective intelligence still emerges, and is in fact higher than the collective intelli-
gence emerging from a prediction markets where only humans participate. However,
Study 4 also shows that when humans and AIs are ensembled (since the prediction
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market’s prediction is combined with that of the aggregator), collective intelligence
also improves.
9.5.3 Differences at Scale
Another way to understand this difference is by framing the results of each
study in terms of the size of the human-machine teams. Specifically, the combined
results of all of the studies show that human-machine teamwork is sensitive to scale.
Study 1 and Study 2 show that dyads can effectively cooperate to overcome negative
outcomes from prisoners-dilemma type games. Study 3 however shows that with
teams of three players, human-machine teams don’t perform substantially differently
from each other but they do perform better than human-only teams. Study 4 on the
other hand shows that at a much larger scale (I.E. that of a crowd in a prediction
market), humans and machines can work together in ways that produce higher degrees
of collective intelligence. Therefore, the emergent phenomena of human-machine
teams change as the size of the human-machine team increases.
9.5.4 Implications
When compared to all the other studies, the results of Study 4 suggest that the
model that best relates to human-machine teamwork is that of collective intelligence.
Study 1 and Study 2 approach human-machine teamwork from the perspective of a
multi-agent system; however, the essential prediction under that framework would be
for the human-machine team to converge towards the Nash Equilibrium, which our
results show was not the case. Study 3 approaches human-machine teamwork from
the perspective of team cognition; however, our results show that not only do human-
machine teams not perform differently than other types of teams, but also that team
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cognition is not a strong predictor of human-machine team performance. Contrasting
that to the results of Study 4, which show major improvements in forecasting once AI
entered the picture (as an aggregator, participant, or both), it’s clear that many of
the principles of collective intelligence apply to human-machine teams and can thus
be used to better design prediction markets.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
In Chapter 1, several objectives were outlined for this dissertation. Specifically,
the following goals were articulated:
1. to identify the similarities and differences between human-machine teamwork,
human-human teamwork, and machine-machine teamwork;
2. to explore the unique ways in which team cognition emerges in human-machine
teams;
3. to identify the ways in which AI can enhance collective intelligence in human-
machine teamwork;
4. to develop empirically-backed design guidelines for the integration of AI in pre-
diction markets
This dissertation sought out the goals of studying and connecting multiple
aspects of cognitive science and artificial intelligence by addressing many of the poorly
understood connections between team cognition and collective intelligence. Through
the four studies, the goals outlined in Chapter 1 have been met.
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10.1 Research Questions
Specifically, the results now enable me to answer all of the research questions
in ways that contribute to multiple research communities. Below the results will be
outlined in terms of how each research question specifically.
10.1.1 RQ1: Which principles of human teamwork are appli-
cable to human-machine teams?
The main studies that addressed RQ1 were Study 2 and Study 3. Study 2
looked at shared understanding, optimism towards artificial intelligence, and pref-
erence towards human teammates. Study 3 looked a several of the variables that
constitute team cognition, such team interaction, team knowledge, and team envi-
ronment.
The main takeaway from Study 2 was that shared understanding was a ma-
jor predictor of the human-machine team’s cooperation levels in a game theoretical
dilemma. On the other hand, team satisfaction and perceived trust were not signifi-
cant predictors, thereby showing that not all principles of human teamwork translate
effective in the human-machine setting.
Study 3 on the other hand focused almost entirely on team cognition. The hy-
pothesis was that team cognition would serve as a good predictor of human-machine
team performance, yet human-machine teams outperformed human-only teams de-
spite lower levels of team cognition. With respect to team scores, our data indicates
that higher levels of team interaction results in lower team scores. However, the
other team cognition variables were not significant, which limits our ability to draw
meaningful inferences about the relationship between team cognition and team score
in human-machine teams. With respect to situational awareness on the other hand,
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team interaction had twice the negative impact as team knowledge on situational
awareness.
Therefore, only a few of the team cognition variables can serve as useful perfor-
mance predictors, but they are all negatively correlated with performance and thus
display the inverse relationship they have with human teamwork. Comparatively
speaking, performance, whether in the form of team score or situational awareness, is
far more influenced and predicted by the agent’s RL model (Study 2) or the number
of machines in a team (Study 3) than by any of the principles the literature associates
with successful human teamwork.
10.1.2 RQ2: In what ways do human-machine teams outper-
form human teams and machine-machine teams?
Going into this dissertation, the expected outcome was that human-machine
teams would consistently outperform human-only and machine-machine teams. This
was the case in Study 1 and Study 2, but only somewhat in the case of Study 3.
Study 1 showed that cooperation is more successful in human-machine teams
because machine-machine teams converge more often on the sub-optimal and mutually
harmful Nash equilibrium. The results of Study 2 match this pattern as well, with the
human-machine teams engaging in longer periods of peace and cooperation. However,
Study 1 also showed not only that human-machine teams coordinated more effectively
than machine-machine teams, but also that they were consistently more likely to
converge towards the mutually beneficial outcome that benefited the human the most
as opposed to the one preferred by the machine.
Study 3 on the other hand showed human-machine teams only be outperform-
ing human-only teams, but not ai-only teams. Although surprising, this result can be
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understood in light of the major strengths of the contemporary RL models used to
develop the NeoCITIES agents. As outlined in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, RL agents
have recently achieved super-human performance across a variety of domains; thus,
the examples of humans and AIs coming together to outperform AI alone we previ-
ously referenced can be understood as exceptions to a much larger pattern of agents
eventually getting so strong that they perform best either independently or as part
of a machine-machine team.
10.1.3 RQ3: What are the performance tradeoffs between
human-human, human-machine, and machine-machine
teams?
The results of Study 3 pointed to two extremes: on the one hand, the machine-
only teams substantially outperformed all other team types, while on the other the
human-only teams substantially underperformed. This was true across all team types
(the machine-only teams outperformed the human-machine teams, while the human-
only teams underperformed) and across all metrics (the same results held for both
team score and situational awareness).
Beyond the machine-only and human-only gap, both types of human-machine
teams performed very similarly. Furthermore, the results show that the performance
of the human-machine teams was closer to that of machine-only teams than that of
human-only teams. Specifically, the team scores of human-machine teams were on
average only 17% lower than those of the machine-only teams while also being over
double those of human-only teams. However, we cannot infer that such results for
the human-machine teams are attributable to the higher number of RL agents. This
becomes clear when considering the performance differences between human-human-
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ai teams and human-ai-ai teams: on average, the former’s team scores were 0.32%
lower than the latter while situational awareness was 1.1% higher. Albeit small, these
differences were statistically significant, and thus give us sufficient evidence to reject
the notion that human-machine teams approach machine-only performance purely
because of the presence of RL agents on the team.
Lastly, although the coordination behavior in the human-machine teams is
very different (communication is not possible in the case of human-machine-machine
teams), the teams are able to adapt and obtain high team scores and retain higher
levels of situational awareness. Interestingly enough, the gap between human-machine
teams and ai-only teams for situational awareness (1% difference) is far narrower than
that for team scores (17%).
10.1.4 RQ4: Do human-machine multi-agent system exhibit
higher degrees of collective intelligence than human-
only systems?
This question was addressed in a straightforward manner through Study 4,
which reframed prediction markets as human-machine multi-agent systems. RQ4 is
answered affirmatively in multiple ways. First, at a basic level the hybrid prediction
market outperformed the human-only prediction market, thereby showing a higher
level of collective intelligence. Second, when using a machine learning model as the
aggregator, both prediction markets became more accurate, showing that even when
limited to a more external role, the human-machine ensemble outperformed. Lastly,
across all models used to test different aggregation methods, the hybrid prediction
market was most successful, indicating that enabling AI to participate as a trading
bot alongside the human participants generated the kind of data that enables all
155
types of aggregation to be more accurate.
10.1.5 RQ5: Can collective intelligence be used as the input
to artificial intelligence?
Our results in Study 4 clearly show that collective intelligence can be used as
the input to AI so that the latter enhances the former. Specifically, our findings refer-
ence one of the core conditions of collective intelligence in prediction markets outlined
by Surowiecki (2005): aggregation. The prior literature has primarily focused on the
use of different auction structures and matching algorithms depending on the type of
forecast that is being elicited from the prediction market [Luckner et al., 2011]. The
process of turning private judgments into a collective decision is still poorly under-
stood. Chen et al’s (2005) attempts at using linear, logarithmic, absolute distance,
and quadratic scoring in the context of football forecasts showed very little effect
in overall accuracy, whereas our use of classical machine learning models and deep
learning have shown impressive levels of improvement in terms of accuracy (at least
67%).
However, our results don’t suggest that these methods would always achieve
these levels of performance in just any prediction market, but rather are tied to
the fact that only through our design can the right kind of data and corresponding
ground truth be generated through artificial events so that the models can learn and
eventually generalize to concrete events being forecasted.
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10.1.6 RQ6: Which machine learning approaches are best
suited for prediction markets?
Study 4 was designed to answer this question at multiple levels given how AI
permeates each of the experimental conditions in different ways. Specifically, with
both types of prediction markets the data was tested as the input to a machine
learning model which was in turn benchmarked against a simple linear regression.
In the case of a human-only prediction market, the 2-layer neural network
(MLP) trained on the price data substantially outperformed all other methods: its
error rate was 0.008, which is substantially better than the second best which was the
decision tree also trained of price data (-1.037 error rate). Furthermore, Study 4 shows
that in the case of a human-only prediction market, all aggregation methods perform
worse after being trained on the capital distribution as opposed to the price data. In
the case of the hybrid prediction market however, it was the classical machine learning
approaches (decision tree and SVM) that outperformed all others. Specifically, a
decision tree trained on price volatility performed 19% better than the two closest
models, which were the SVMs trained on either data structure.
Overall, the top performing model was the MLP (0.008) trained on price data
from the human-only prediction market , followed by a decision tree (0.094) trained
on the price data from the hybrid prediction market and an SVM (-0.116) trained on
the capital distribution data from the hybrid one . One way to interpret the result
is that training deep learning systems on human-only prediction markets achieves
the best accuracy. However, the gains are somewhat marginal: the much larger and
significant pattern is that implementing any machine learning model and training it
on either the price data or the capital distribution leads to massive improvements in
accuracy. This insight becomes self-evident when considering that the lowest level of
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forecasting improvement by any model in either prediction market was 67%.
Furthermore, fixating on the marginal gains between models distracts from the
much more important observation that with the exception of one instance of the MLP,
all models improve when trained on the hybrid prediction market’s data. Therefore,
most of the gains are achieved by integrating machine learning both as a participant
through the trading bots and as an aggregator.
10.2 Overall Study Contributions
When combined, the studies and models making up this dissertation lead to
several major implications for research at the intersection between cognitive science
and computer science, team cognition and collective intelligence, and multi-agent
systems and prediction markets.
10.2.1 We should not limit our understanding of human-
machine teamwork to the principles of human team-
work
Given the technical limitations that have historically affected the develop-
ment of AI agents, the research community’s understanding of the difference between
human teamwork and human-machine teamwork has been severely limited. This dis-
sertation is the first attempt at using reinforcement learning to study human-machine
teamwork by leveraging a platform like NeoCITIES, which has been validated to be
an effective tool for analysis for human teamwork. As mentioned previously, the
differences in scores and situational awareness between the two types of human-
machine teams in Study 3 (human-machine-machine and human-human-machine)
158
suggest that their superior performance compared to human-only teams cannot be
attributed merely to the presence of the agents, but rather emerge from dynamics
not yet fully understood. Given the long history of team cognition effectively pre-
dicting human teamwork in NeoCITIES, the fact that the team cognition model is
not a meaningful predictor of human-machine performance undermines the notion
that human-machine teamwork can be fully understood through the lenses of human
teamwork.
Furthermore, this dissertation as a whole makes a compelling case that there
are far better models to understand human-machine teamwork: multi-agent systems
and collective intelligence. The former is useful to understand the pivotal role in-
centives and game theoretical dynamics play in cooperation between humans and
machines. Specifically, Study 2 shows that that most principles of human team-
work, even something that is usually thought of as critical as communication, are
poor reference points in understanding how humans and machines can work together
to accomplish goals. However, Study 1 and Study 2 also show the limitations of the
multi-agent system model, because the humans and the RL agents in the experiments
often managed to escape the mutually harmful Nash Equilibrium to successfully coop-
erate despite the incentive not to do so. In turn, these results show that game theory
alone cannot fully explain human-machine teamwork, which would otherwise be the
case if human-machine teamwork could be entirely reduced in terms of a multi-agent
systems model.
Study 4 on the other hand shows how collective intelligence is a useful model
to understand the impact of human-machine interactions on the intelligence of a
prediction market. The results also show several different ways in which collective
intelligence emerges through different types of relationships between humans and
machines: horizontal, in the case of the machine fulfilling a highly differentiated role
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as a trading bot, and vertical, in the case of the AI as the aggregator combining
the data generated by the prediction market and separately calibrating predictions.
However, just like with the multi-agent system model, the collective intelligence model
also has limitations in its ability to effectively account for human-machine teamwork.
Specifically, the methodology used in Study 4 shows how having an AI play the role
of aggregator enables the emergence of collective intelligence in the prediction market
despite substantial overlap (50%) in participant knowledge, which runs contrary to the
prior literature’s traditional understanding of how collective intelligence emerges in
crowds. Indeed, this dissertation shows how the introduction of AI can enable humans
to transcend many of the behavioral biases that plague prediction markets, thereby
demonstrating how collective intelligence is not tied the marginal trader hypothesis.
Thus, it may be more productive to move away from researching human-
machine teamwork through analogies to human teamwork, and instead engage in a
more interdisciplinary approach that leverages technical advances to not just explore
the connections between machine-machine teamwork and human-machine teamwork,
but also between multi-agent systems and prediction markets.
10.2.2 Team cognition and collective intelligence are analo-
gous phenomena happening at different scales
Another major contribution of this dissertation is the thorough analysis of
the team cognition and collective intelligence literature to classify similarities and
differences. Specifically, this dissertation uses the human-machine teamwork setting
to show how both models speak to a similar emergent phenomenon albeit a differ-
ent scales. While team cognition explains the emergence of a shared mental model
as teammates respond to a physical situation, collective intelligence speaks to the
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emergence of higher-level information processing as a crowd navigates a probabilistic
setting. In both cases, a new and different cognitive process arises in the team that
cannot be accounted for at the individual level, but that share many of the same
properties that result in higher degrees of performance.
Overall, despite their differences, team cognition and collective intelligence
have many core features in common. This dissertation builds upon this insight by
showing how the Superforecasting research can help us reframe team cognition and
collective intelligence as manifestations of the same cognitive phenomenon. Specifi-
cally, researching Superforecasters shows how a large crowd is no longer necessary to
have collective intelligence as long as teams are trained through particular cognitive
strategies when engaging in forecasting. Additionally, this dissertation’s analysis of
Superforecasting opens up a new research landscape for team cognition by showing
how team cognition is not limited to perception, military settings, and responses to
physical situations, but can also occur in prediction, forecasting, and probabilistic
decision-making.
In essence, this dissertation suggests that a new type of intelligence can be
unlocked through teamwork that goes beyond what the team cognition literature has
been demonstrating. By identifying the analogous nature of the two phenomena,
collective intelligence expands ways of thinking about team cognition beyond the
situational response setting, and team cognition deconstructs the prevailing notion
that collective intelligence is merely the by-product of the law of large numbers in a
sample of random guesses. Specifically, as a team of Superforecasters displays both
team cognition and collective intelligence, the two emergent phenomena, thought
to be separate up until that point, can be unified as complementary aspects of a
higher-level form of information processing that in turn can become the foundation
for human-centered technology designed to enhance teamwork.
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10.2.3 Thinking of prediction markets as human-machine teams
improves collective intelligence by enabling the effec-
tive use of AI
As mentioned previously, the current literature on prediction markets is almost
entirely focused on a mechanistic view. To that end, most literature on the design of
prediction markets is focused on improving the efficiency of the matching algorithm,
on structuring different types of auctions, or on the most effective way to model real
world events. This overly technical perspective comes at the expense of asking deeper
questions about the nature of collective intelligence and the dynamics underlying its
emergence in prediction markets.
This dissertation stands in sharp contrast to that approach, and shows how
bridging the gap between the communities of cognitive science and computer science
is critical in order to design more effective prediction markets. Specifically, Study
4 shows through both its methodology and its results how to conduct more robust
experiments with prediction markets, which in turn supports new research validating
teamwork approaches to the design of new and better prediction markets. Through
this framework, a prediction market thus becomes a larger form of a human-machine
team where multiple humans and multiple machines work together to generate the
data necessary for the aggregator to improve the system’s collective intelligence.
In essence, by thinking of collective intelligence as a macro-form of team cog-
nition, we were able to design a new type of prediction market that leverages both
human as well as machine intelligence to aggregate local knowledge effectively to pro-
duce very accurate estimates of probabilistic outcomes. Our design shows that AI
can play a role in enhancing collective intelligence by both participating and trading
alongside human participants to nudge them towards more effective forecasting, and
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also as the overall aggregator of the information generated by the prediction market
in order to calibrate its predictions and thus offset many of the behavioral biases
identified in the literature.
10.3 Intellectual Contributions to Academic Com-
munities
Given the interdisciplinary approach of this dissertation, the academic con-
tributions span several domains. Specifically, the studies and the models combined
reference major concepts from cognitive science, game theory, human factors, human-
computer interaction, and machine learning. As a result, we organized the implica-
tions and contributions of this research into three major areas: artificial intelligence,
team cognition, and collective intelligence.
10.3.1 Artificial intelligence
As discussed in Ch 1, most artificial intelligence research right now is being
conducted with the aim of replacing as opposed to augmenting human effort. This
dissertation shows several ways of keeping human effort in the loop by validating the
need to study human-machine teamwork as AI becomes more sophisticated.
Specifically, as reinforcement learning evolves, RL agents should be studied
in a human-machine team setting as well in order to better understand the complex
dynamics of these autonomous agents interacting with humans in the real world.
Furthermore, the AI community should not assume that agents will be naturally
willing to cooperate with humans, or that cooperative behaviors in any one scenario
necessarily translates to generalized willingness to cooperate in many other contexts.
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To that end, our experimental setups (especially in Study 1 and Study 2)
establish a robust methodology to examine human-machine teamwork by testing co-
operative dynamics and coordination in multi-agent systems. Leveraging game theory
in this way is useful precisely because deviations from Nash Equilibria highlight the
distinctive dynamics governing cooperation and coordination in multi-agent systems,
which in this context can serve as useful proxies for human-machine teamwork. This
approach is very valuable for AI-safety researchers because it enables the precise and
quantitative analysis of the cooperative dynamics between humans and AIs.
Overall, this dissertation extends prior findings of the value of game theory to
study the behavior of multi-agent systems by showing how game theory can inform
the design of experimental setups to identify the different ways humans and AIs
can cooperate and coordinate under different incentive structures. Specifically, our
methodology provides a strong and reliable basis for future researchers to test and
make inferences about the ways in which different RL models, different beliefs about
whether the other player is an AI or a human, as well as different game theory models
with different Nash Equilibria influence the cooperative dynamics of human-machine
teams.
10.3.2 Team cognition
This dissertation strongly emphasises the need to approach human-machine
teamwork not from just the human or only the machine perspective, but from both.
Human-machine teamwork is a complex phenomenon that, just as the studies show,
varies wildly in different contexts and at different scales. Thus, this dissertation shows
that human-machine teamwork can only be understood through an interdisciplinary
perspective that includes both cognitive science as well as computer science.
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Specifically, our results go contrary to the expectations traditionally set by
the teamwork literature. For instance, Study 1, 2 and 3 invalidated the anticipated
need for advanced natural language processing to effectively study human-machine
teamwork, thereby showing that human-machine teamwork can emerge despite lack
of communication [Bates and Weischedel, 2006]. Specifically, this dissertation showed
how RL and our methodology for developing agents obviate the need for natural lan-
guage processing because human-machine teamwork between humans and RL agents
stems not from communication, as is the case with humans, but from cooperation and
coordination that is much more akin to the game theoretical dynamics in multi-agent
systems.
Besides communication, however, human-machine teams should make us re-
consider what we know about situational awareness and its sources. Fan et al’s
(2010) speculated that situational awareness in human-machine teams would come
with higher cognitive load; our data does not support this claim, as situational aware-
ness did not result in fatigue and lower levels of team satisfaction as measured by the
survey. Similarly, our data on situational awareness as measured by NeoCITIES does
not highlight the coordination deficiencies resulting from a lack of direct communica-
tion in human-machine teams as suggested by Demir et al (2017); it shows precisely
the opposite insofar as the human-machine teams displayed higher levels of situational
awareness than human-only teams where communication was more frequent. Indeed,
the superior performance exhibited by the machine-only teams in NeoCITIES shows
that sequencing and synchronicity improve alongside the RL agent’s skill-level in the
simulation.
More importantly, this dissertation underscores the difference between au-
tomation and autonomy as outlined in Chapter 2. The prior literature makes several
assumptions with regards to the alleged pivotal role predictability and directability
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play in human-machine teamwork [Klien et al., 2004, Christoffersen and Woods, 2002].
Such assumptions tend to be predicated upon an automation-centric view of AI and
human-machine teamwork because it presupposes that the best way to achieve human-
machine teamwork is by designing agents entirely around human dynamics and be-
haviors. Instead, this dissertation framed the human-machine team as a human-
autonomy problem, thereby sidestepping many of these design assumptions in order
to incorporate cutting-edge AI architecture without limiting researchers to any par-
ticular model. The subsequent results ended up aligning with McNeese et al’s (2019)
theory that humans and machines can retain interdependence and yet still function
effectively as long as they share a common goal.
10.3.3 Collective intelligence
This dissertation strongly advocates for the design of prediction markets with
human factors principles. Prediction markets are collective intelligence mechanisms,
and thus only a stronger foundation in cognitive science can inform the design of
better prediction markets by identifying the underlying mechanisms behind collective
intelligence. However, this dissertation also shows that researchers ought to also
approach prediction markets from a multi-agent teamwork perspective in order to
discover better ways to accommodate the introduction of artificial intelligence so that
humans and machines can work together and thus produce higher levels of collective
intelligence.
Specifically, our results suggest that we have only scratched the surface of the
potential designs for trading bots in prediction markets. Specifically, the prior lit-
erature has assumed that it should be up to the human participants to place bets
to realign prices with historical base rates [Atanasov et al., 2016]. For example, a
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human-only prediction market expects that whenever the prices of “yes” and “no”
shares don’t add up to 1, then human traders would buy and sell those shares un-
til the prices converge towards the right values. This assumption however stands in
sharp contrast with the marginal trader hypothesis, for the capital accumulated by
essentially arbitraging temporary inconsistencies between the prices of “yes” and “no”
shares would give those traders more resources to influence future prices despite the
lack of better information. It thus makes sense to think have bots perform that func-
tion, thereby removing noise from a participant’s behavior as they therefore become
limited in making directional bets as opposed to speculative trades.
Many other possibilities exist that can inspire future research, such as mean-
reversion bots who buy and sell shares as they deviate from a moving average. More
specifically however, the design of trading bots aimed at enhancing the collective
intelligence of a prediction market should be informed by the biases the literature has
identified in prediction markets. Our design was very much informed by Dudik et al’s
(2017) in classifying the sources and impacts of different biases. Since sampling error
arises from the noisiness of the local knowledge of the participants, we included the
randomized trading bots so that the direction of the variation would not be biased
in any particular direction. Since market-maker bias arises from players overshooting
or undershooting their estimates based on how they are rewarded by functions used
to facilitate trading, we relied upon the volatility emerging from the bots trading to
incentive initial trading, which would not exhibit any specific pattern detectable and
exploitable by the human participants. Lastly, since converge error arises from the
market price constantly fluctuating, we included the other type of trading bot whose
entire objective is to stabilize prices by removing excess volatility from the system.
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10.4 Future Work
As part of this dissertation, several platforms were developed in order to run
the experiments. Each platform focused on a particular dimension of human-machine
teamwork: the Game Theory for Teams environment used in Study 1 and Study 2
enables the study of human-machine teamwork through game theoretical scenarios
and multi-agent systems, the updated version of NeoCITIES used in Study 3 enables
human-machine teams to be studied through a simulation that has been validated
by the prior literature as a test-bed for team cognition, and the prediction market
used in Study 4 provides a more effective way to study collective intelligence. Each
platform opens up many exciting opportunities for future research
10.4.1 Game Theory for Teams Environment
For future work related to human-machine teamwork in multi-agent systems,
it would be useful to extend the number of game theoretical scenarios available to
researchers. Specifically, Study 1 and Study 2 showed how it’s possible to isolate and
separately study coordination and cooperation through game theory models whose
incentive structure emphasis a particular dynamic. Similarly, other game theory
models exist that can be useful for future researchers to identify specific multi-agent
system dynamics.
For example, an interesting game that can be used to advance human-machine
teamwork research is the diner’s dilemma, which posits a scenario where the players
have decided to split the cost equally and are confronted with the choice to either
order a more expensive meal or a cheap alternative. The central conflict is that if all
players pick the more expensive meal, then all the members of the group experience
a loss caused by the higher bill paid by each individual, yet an individual player
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can experience a gain by successfully ordering the expensive meal when everyone else
orders the cheap alternative. The game’s structure supports an infinite number of
players, thereby providing researchers with the opportunity to test how cooperation
is affected as the human-machine team grows larger.
Under the same theme, the public goods game would also provide interest-
ing research opportunities. Often used in experimental economics, the game involves
players depositing private tokens into a public pot that is then multiplied by a factor
and subsequently evenly distributed among all players, regardless of participation.
The central conflict of the game is the free-rider problem, which directly deals with
trust. Therefore, researchers could implement the public goods game in the environ-
ment and test how sensitive trust in a human-machine team is to various factors,
including the factor by which the common pot is multiplied.
10.4.2 NeoCITIES
With respect to NeoCITIES, there are several modifications that can expand
the simulation’s capabilities in order to support a wider variety of experiments. At
the outset, Study 3 was limited to a fairly basic scenario found in the literature,
but the platform supports far more complex scenarios with more resources, different
priority levels, and stricter roles. Beyond scenarios, NeoCITIES currently supports a
theoretically unlimited number of players, although the RL agents need to be trained
differently for such scenarios, especially if they involve more sharply differentiated
roles than those featured in Study 3.
Separately, future work may involve limiting communication among all players,
in order to equalize the playing field between team types. Specifically, the human
participant in a human-machine-machine team is not able to communicate with their
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teammates, while communication is possible between the two human participants in
a human-human-machine team. Given the prominent role communication plays in
human coordination, new results may emerge when humans are forced to rely on
indirect means of coordination irrespective of team type.
Lastly, future work should focus on breaking down team scores and other
measurements by player, in order to better identify the relative value each teammate
brings to the team. Indeed, this kind of in depth analysis should motivate the testing
of a wider variety of RL models across more differentiated roles than in Study 3.
Specifically, individualizing the team scores may help shed light as to whether the
relationship between teammates is even (they each contribute the same amount to the
team score) or uneven (some teammates contribute a disproportionate amount to the
team score). The relationship between contribution inequality and team performance,
especially if mediated by team types, would produce valuable insights into the optimal
equilibrium state in human-machine teams.
10.4.3 Prediction Market
The prediction market developed for Study 4 enables a more precise study of
collective intelligence by providing both the ground truth of events being forecasted
as well as the local knowledge available to each participant. These two mechanics
enable several promising avenues for future research.
To start with, a follow up to Study 4 would be to simulate knowledge updates
among the participants to compare human-only and hybrid prediction markets in
terms of market efficiency as measured by how quickly event prices update to incor-
porate changes in the local knowledge of the participants. Furthermore, the prediction
market equivalent of bubbles can be simulated by distorting the local knowledge al-
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location in order to dilute the signal possessed by the participants. The more players
trade on information that is a duplicate of other players’ information, the more the
event price will diverge from ground truth until an update causes it to crash. Such
scenarios of low probability but high magnitude risk have never been able to be stud-
ied for the purposes of collective intelligence and forecasting, and thus provide fruitful
ground for future research.
Separately, another promising area for future research would be demographics.
Given that our prediction market can map onto real world events just as it can on
simulated ones, researchers could implement an instance of the prediction market
to study forecasting among particular demographics to determine the ways in which
collective intelligence is influenced by social context. For example, future research may
delve into the differences between a prediction market where only doctors participate
to one where only nurses participate as they both try to forecast the influx of patients
at a hospital. Furthermore, such research would also include an analysis of the impact
of varying demographic distributions among the traders would have on the AI’s ability
to effectively aggregate information to calibrate the prediction market’s forecasts.
10.5 Closing Remarks
The research objectives for this dissertation were wide-ranging. Specifically,
this dissertation sought to integrate multi-agent systems, team cognition, and collec-
tive intelligence through an interdisciplinary approach directed at advancing each of
the research communities. looking back upon the work within this dissertation, the
objectives were effectively addressed.
The first goal of the dissertation was the identification of the similarities
and differences between human-machine teamwork, human-human teamwork, and
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machine-machine teamwork. The dissertation shows that human-machine teams be-
have more closely to machine-machine teams as opposed to human teams, and thus
often coordinate and outperform despite the inability to directly communicate.
The second goal was to explore the unique ways in which team cognition
emerges in human-machine teams. Contrary to what was anticipated, team cognition
did not prove to be an effective model to predict human-machine team performance
with. These results run counter to what would be expected from the team cognition
literature.
The third goal was to identify the ways in which AI can enhance collective
intelligence in human-machine teams. This dissertation shows that AI can play the
dual role of participant and aggregate in a prediction market, and that doing so
meaningfully enhances collective intelligence as measured by the prediction market’s
heightened ability to forecast despite uncertainty.
The last goal was to develop empirically-backed design guidelines for the in-
tegration of AI in prediction markets. This dissertation successfully implemented
Model A, which used human factors principle to design a prediction market that ad-
dresses behavioral biases while simultaneously preserving the key features that give
rise to collective intelligence. The major takeaway is that by thinking of a prediction
market as a higher-level form of human-machine teamwork, it becomes possible to
discover new ways for humans and machines to work together to tackle a problem as
challenging as probabilistic decision-making.
Overall, in the process of achieving these goals, the dissertation produced
three sophisticated research platforms that will open new ways for future researchers
to study multi-agent systems, human-machine teamwork, and collective intelligence
in prediction markets.
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Q1 Please enter the code you received at the end of the game. Please ensure the code you 
enter here matches the code given to you by the game, if the codes do not match you will be 
unable to receive payment. 
 
Q41 Here is your ID: ${e://Field/Random%20ID} 
Please copy and paste this number into the survey code field in Mechanical Turk and your HIT 
will be reviewed within two business days. 
 
Q31 What is your age? 
o Under 18 years old  (1)  
o 18 - 25  (2)  
o 26-35  (3)  
o 36 - 45  (4)  
o 46 - 55  (5)  
o 56 - 65  (6)  
o 66-75  (7)  
 
 
 
Q32 What race are you? 
o African American  (1)  
o Caucasian  (2)  
o Indian  (3)  
o Asian  (4)  
o Other  (5)  
 
 
 
Appendix A Team Cognition Survey
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Q33 What is your gender? 
o Male  (1)  
o Female  (2)  
o Other  (3)  
 
 
 
Q39 Type the response "human". 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q34 What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? (If you're currently 
enrolled in school, please state the highest degree you have received) 
o Less than a high school diploma  (1)  
o High school diploma (GED)  (2)  
o Some college  (3)  
o Associates degree (AA)  (4)  
o Bachelor's degree (BA, BS)  (5)  
o Masters degree (MA, MS, MEd)  (6)  
o Professional degree (MD, DDS, DVM)  (7)  
o Doctorate degree (PhD, EdD)  (8)  
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Q2 How mentally demanding was the task? 
o Very Low   1  (1)  
o Below Average  2  (2)  
o Average  3  (3)  
o Above Average  4  (4)  
o Very High  5  (5)  
 
 
 
Q36 Select the choice that is second to the furthest right. 
o Very Low 1  (6)  
o Below Average 2  (7)  
o Average 3  (8)  
o Above Average 4  (9)  
o Very High  5  (10)  
 
 
 
Q3 How physically demanding was the task? 
o Very Low  1  (1)  
o Below Average  2  (2)  
o Average  3  (3)  
o Above Average  4  (4)  
o Very High  5  (5)  
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Q4 How hurried or rushed was the pace of the task? 
o Very Low 1  (1)  
o Below Average 2  (2)  
o Average 3  (3)  
o Above Average 4  (4)  
o Very High  5  (5)  
 
 
 
Q5 How successful were you in accomplishing what you were asked to do? 
o Very Low 1  (1)  
o Below Average 2  (2)  
o Average 3  (3)  
o Above Average 4  (4)  
o Very High  5  (5)  
 
 
 
Q35 Select the choice that is all the way left. 
o Very Low 1  (6)  
o Below Average 2  (7)  
o Average 3  (8)  
o Above Average 4  (9)  
o Very High  5  (10)  
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Q6 How hard did you have to work to accomplish your level of performance? 
o Very Low 1  (1)  
o Below Average 2  (2)  
o Average 3  (3)  
o Above Average 4  (4)  
o Very High  5  (5)  
 
 
 
Q7 How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed, and annoyed were you? 
o Very Low 1  (1)  
o Below Average 2  (2)  
o Average 3  (3)  
o Above Average 4  (4)  
o Very High  5  (5)  
 
 
Q42 My team understands its roles and responsibilities.  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
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Q43 My team knows where it can get information  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
 
 
 
Q44 My team understands interaction patterns  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
 
 
 
Q45 My team understands how they can exchange        
  information for doing various team tasks  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
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Q46 My team can adopt flexibly to any roles within the team  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
 
 
 
Q47 My team is likely to make a decision together  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
 
 
 
Q48 My team communicates with other teammates while        
  performing team tasks  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
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Q49 My teammates informally communicate with one        
  another throughout various team tasks.  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (11)  
o Very High  (12)  
 
 
 
Q50 My teammates consistently demonstrate effective        
  listening skills.  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
 
Q51 My teammate has a general knowledge of specific        
  team tasks.  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
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Q52 My teammate knows specific strategies for         
 completing various tasks 
 
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
 
 
 
Q53 My teammate knows the general process involved in        
  conducting a given task  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
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Q54 My teammate understands the skills necessary for        
  doing various team tasks.  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
 
 
 
Q55 My teammate communicates with other teammates        
  while performing team tasks  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
 
 
 
Q56 My teammate supports continuous improvement in        
  terms of personal skills as well as overall team skills  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
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Q57 I have a good knowledge about my teammates’ attitudes  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
 
 
 
Q58 There is a sense of cohesion and cooperation among       
   my teammates  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
 
 
 
Q59 My teammate takes pride in his/her work  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
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Q60 I have a good knowledge about my teammates’ preferences  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
 
 
 
Q61 My teammates like to do various team tasks  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
 
 
 
Q62 My teammates enjoy thinking  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
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Q63 I have a good knowledge about my teammates’ tendencies  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
 
 
 
Q64 My teammates are committed to the team goal  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
 
 
 
Q65 My teammates encourage each other’s work to        
  improve various team task outcomes  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
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Q66 My teammate strives to express his or her opinion  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
 
Q67 There is an atmosphere of trust among my teammates  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
 
 
 
Q68 My team creates a work environment that promotes productive results  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
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Q69 My team creates a safe environment to openly discuss any issue related to the team’s 
success  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
 
 
 
Q70 My team acknowledges and rewards behaviors that contribute to an open team climate  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
 
 
 
Q71 My team often utilizes different opinions for the sake of obtaining optimal outcomes  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
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Q72 Discussions for decision making occur within my team during meetings so that team 
meetings are viewed as useful 
 
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
 
 
 
Q74 My team knows the environmental constraints when we perform various team tasks  
o Very Low  (1)  
o Below Average  (2)  
o Average  (3)  
o Above Average  (4)  
o Very High  (5)  
 
 
Q12 Please state your agreement to the following statements as they relate to yourself. 
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Q9 I am optimistic towards artificial intelligence. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q10 I am experienced working with artificial intelligence. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q11 I have a positive relationship with technology. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
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Q37 Select the middle answer choice. 
o Strongly disagree  (27)  
o Somewhat disagree  (28)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (29)  
o Somewhat agree  (30)  
o Strongly agree  (31)  
 
 
 
Q13 I would prefer working with a human rather than an AI. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
 
 
Q15 Please rate your agreement to the following statements as they pertain to yourself. 
 
 
 
Q16 I felt my teammate and I had a shared understanding of our teamwork. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
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Q17 I tried to cooperate with my teammate during the task. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q18 My team member was cooperative during the task. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q19 My teammate and I were cooperative during the task. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
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Q38 You must select the answer choice that states somewhat agree. 
o Strongly disagree  (27)  
o Somewhat disagree  (28)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (29)  
o Somewhat agree  (30)  
o Strongly agree  (31)  
 
 
 
Q20 My teammate and I worked effectively during the task. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q21 My teammate and I worked together better at the end of the task than at the beginning. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
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Q22 I am satisfied with my performance. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q23 I am satisfied with my teammate's performance. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q24 I would work with my teammate on another task. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
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Q25 I felt I was the leader during our collaboration. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q26 I trust my teammate in acting in our mutual best interest. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q27 I reacted aggressively towards my teammate. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
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Q28 My teammate reacted aggressively towards me. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q29 I would like to be able to communicate with my teammate. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q30 Our performance would benefit from? 
________________________________________________________________ 
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